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I.  Introduction
With the withdrawal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from the Gaza 
Strip, increasing attention inevitably has focused upon the fate of Israeli 
settlements on the West Bank,1 the area of the Palestinian Mandate west of 
the Jordan River that Jordan captured in 1948 and that Israel refers to as 
Judea and Samaria.  Excluding small outposts constructed without 
permission of the Israeli military administration2 and certain disputed 
neighborhoods within the borders of Jerusalem3, approximately 250,000 
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1 See,e.g., Editorial, Not Good Enough, HAARETZ, Mar. 6, 2006, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/690437.html (urging removal of West Bank settlements); Aluf Benn 
& Yossi Verter, Olmert to Offer Settlers:  Expand Blocs, Cut Outposts, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/692632.html(last updated Mar. 10, 2006) (Acting Prime Minister 
Ehud Olmert, if Kadima Party forms the next government, intends to remove settlements beyond a certain 
line, but then to expand settlement blocs within that line); Mazal Mualem, Netanyahu:  Poll is Referendum 
on Olmert’s Pullout Plan, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/692852.html (last 
updated Mar. 12, 2006); Nir Hasson & Lilach Weissman, Peretz: Labor won’t Waive on Negotiations for 
Withdrawal, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/692847.html (last updated Mar. 
11, 2006) (Labor will not witdraw from West Bank unilaterally, but will remove illegal outposts and 
compensate settlers who leave West Bank voluntarily).
2 See, generally, Talya Sason, Summary of Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts, Mar. 20, 2005 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Summary+of+Opinion+Concer
ning+Unauthorized+Outposts+-+Talya+Sason+Adv.htm (hereinafter, the “Sason Report”).
3
 A 2004 map prepared by the Washington Institute for Near Policy shows all areas of Greater Jerusalem 
that fall outside the pre-1967 armistice lines, distinguishing between those areas largely inhabited by Jews, 
those largely inhabited by Arabs, and those with mixed populations.  See
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/mapImages/41de98e058452.jpg (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).  One of the 
neighborhoods that falls outside the pre-1967 lines is Gilo, which lies in the direction of Bethlehem and has 
been the subject of many attacks.  See CNN.com, Bomb kills 19 on Israeli bus, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/18/mideast.violence/index.html (last visited Dec. 22, 
2005).   The question of what areas of Jerusalem Israel should retain has now resurfaced, with talk of a 
“unified Jerusalem” under Israeli sovereignty less current than it had been under the Sharon government. 
2Israeli Jewish settlers live in approximately 150 settlements on the West 
Bank.4  While the exact amount of territory the settlements occupy on the 
West Bank is subject to debate, most authorities place that area as less than 
two percent of the land mass of the West Bank.5 Both the agony of the Gaza 
withdrawal6 and the impetus for establishing a Palestinian state according to 
the “road map”7 – the plan adopted by the United States, the United Nations, 
the European Union and Russia and accepted by the Palestinian Authority 
See Nadav Shragai, No MoreTalk of Unified Jerusalem, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/690895.html (last updated  Mar. 7, 2006).
4 See Nadav Shragai, Peace Now: No New West Bank Outposts, But More Settlers in 2005, HAARETZ 
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/679476.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2006) (estimate of 
250,000 at end of 2005); Mitchell Bard, Facts About Settlements, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/settlements.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (estimate of 
246,000 as of August, 2005); B’Tselem, 
http://www.btselem.org/English/Settlements/Settlement_poplation.xls (visited Jan. 9, 2006) (estimate of 
232,718 settlers at end of 2004). Note that Palestinians, who characterize many parts of present Jerusalem 
(e.g., Gilo) as settlements, state much higher figures.  See, e.g., EDWARD SAID, THE END OF THE PEACE 
PROCESS, introduction at xiii (2000) (“there are about 350,000 Israeli Jewish settlers on Palestinian land”).  
5
 The percentage depends, to a large extent, upon whether the references are to the designated municipal 
borders of a settlement or the built-up area and whether the reference includes road construction ancillary 
to the settlement.   See infra notes 254-58, 279, and accompanying text. 
6 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paying the Price for Peace, The Human Cost of Disengagement
Jul. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israels+Disengagement+Plan-
+Renewing+the+Peace+Process+Apr+2005.htm.   For a pictorial presentation of the agony, see Anat 
Balint, Haaretz photographer wins 1st prize in World Press Photo contest, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/681472.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2006) and 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/681483.html (last updated Feb.11, 2006).  For the difficulty of the 
Gaza evacuees reestablishing their lives following the evacuation, see, e.g., Raffi Berg, Israel’s ‘forgotten’ 
settlers, BBC News, Nov. 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/4442106.stm.; 
Nadav Shragai, Abandoned Comrades, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/657298.html (last 
updated on Dec. 13, 2005)(describing the unemployment, homelessness, illness and other social problems 
of the evacuees).   See also Dan Izenberg, Comptroller Slams Gaza Resettlement Failures, THE 
JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1139395557407&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Mar. 7, 2006).
7
 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Performance Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two State Solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr. 30, 2003) (hereinafter, the “Road Map”), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/A+Performance-
Based+Roadmap+to+a+Permanent+Two-Sta.htm.  The Road Map called for the creation of a Palestinian 
state in certain stages, beginning in Phase 1 with “Ending terror and violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life 
and Building Palestinian Institutions.”  While Phase 1 was supposed to have been accomplished by May, 
2003, it has yet to be accomplished. Since its inception, disagreements over the various steps – for example, 
whether the Palestinian Authority must disband various militant groups before Israel has any obligation to 
cease settlement construction -- have surfaced.   Nonetheless, the specifics of the Road Map have seemed to 
replace the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (Sep.13, 1993) (hereinafter, the “Oslo Agreement”), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm,   
resulting from secret negotiations in Oslo between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as the 
primary reference with respect to the mutual obligations of Israel and the Palestinians.
resulting from secret negotiations in Oslo between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as the 
primary reference with respect to the mutual obligations of Israel and the Palestinians.
3and Israel, with reservations8 -- highlights the importance of confronting 
directly the more contentious issue of whether these settlements preclude a 
peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
To some – a group that includes not only Palestinians9 and the 
governments of other Arab nations, but also most members of the European 
Union10, much of the American press11, the United Nations General 
Assembly12, and, occasionally, even the American government13 – the 
question hardly merits serious review.  Along with the security fence that 
Israel is constructing to separate most of its cities from the major population 
centers of the West bank, settlements constitute the major obstacle to a peace 
settlement.  Even commentators and scholars usually considered stalwarts in 
their defense of Israel14 and certain American Jewish groups that would 
define themselves as pro-Israeli15 decry the presence and expansion of 
Jewish settlements on the West Bank.  Indeed, the liberal left in Israeli 
politics seems to blame the settlers, for every offense imaginable, including 
8See Israel’s Road Map Reservations, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=297230 (May 27, 2003).       
9 See Associated Press, Palestinian FM: Settlements threaten chance for Palestinian state, HAARETZ 
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/651888.html (updated Nov. 30, 2005); Glenn Kessler, 
Palestinians get Rare Bush Meeting,Policy Complaints are behind Meeting, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2005,  
http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2005/10/12/palestinians_get_rare_bush_meeting?mode=PF
(last viewed Feb. 25, 2006).
10 See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Europeans Rebuke Israeli Jerusalem Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at 
A18.
11 See, e.g., Editorial, Gaza First, But Not Last, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2004, at A24 (late ed.); Editorial, 
One Step Back in the Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005 at A22; Editorial, Bush, Abbas Intentions,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2005, at A16.
12 See,e.g., A/RES/60/105,18 January 
2006,http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/d28e6c316706c0438525
7106006ce8ca!OpenDocument (last viewed Feb. 15, 2006).  Other resolutions to the same effect can be 
accessed at, 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/vGA!OpenView&Start=1&Count=150&Expand=121#121 (last 
viewed Feb. 15, 2006).  See also Associated Press, UN slams Israeli settlements, E. Jerusalem separation 
fence, HAARETZ DAILY, Dec. 2, 2005, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/651888.html; Richard 
Schifter, The First Word: Is the UN Improving?,  THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1134309585843&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(updated Dec. 15, 2005).
13 See, e.g., US Department of State Daily Press Briefing #180,
Wednesday, Dec. 4, 1991, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1991/9112/180.html(last 
visited December 22, 2005). 
14 See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR PEACE 13 ( 2005).
15
 An organization called the Israel Policy Forum fits into this category.  See Israel Policy Forum, Building 
a Bridge From Disengagement to Two States at 2-3 (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.ipforum.org/display.cfm?id=6&Sub=16&dis=7;  Letter from “Prominent American Jewish 
Leaders” to Condoleezza Rice, Nov. 22, 2004, available at http://www.cephas-
library.com/israel/israel_letter_by_prominent_american_jewish_leaders.html See also, Shlomo Shamir, 
N.Y. Jewish Leaders Lobbied Rice on Gaza Border Deal, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/646999.html
4the reality to no peace exists between Israel and Palestinian Arabs.16   In 
contrast, to some Israelis, settlements are not an obstacle to but a 
prerequisite of peace, either because they represent the first line of defense 
against an Arab attack from the East and/or Palestinian terrorism17 or 
because empirically their establishment and growth provided the impetus for 
serious peace overtures from Palestinian representatives.18
This article takes a different tack.  Israeli settlements, first and 
foremost, need not be an obstacle to peace for the reason that their location 
may influence the eventual borders between Israel and a Palestinian state, 
but need not determine such borders.   Just as Palestinians can and do live 
within the predominantly Jewish state of Israel, Israeli Jews can live within 
a predominantly Palestinian nation.  And if this analysis is true, then much 
of the agony that accompanied the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and has 
accompanied recent evacuations of some illegal outposts on the West Bank19
can be avoided, and negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority to achieve a final settlement made that much easier.
It is useful to begin this exploration with an analogy.  Imagine 
African-American families moving into part of a city exclusively inhabited 
by whites, acts of terrorism being committed against them by certain persons 
living within the white community and sellers of the property to African-
Americans – having been labeled traitors and “collaborators” – being 
executed without trial for their act of betrayal against their own community.  
16
 For a reflection of this view, see Akiva Elder, Kadima supporters and the road map, HAARETZ,
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650612.html (last updated, Nov. 28, 2005).
17
 For a reflection of these views, see CNN.com, Extra! West bank, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/EDUCATION/08/14/extra.west.bank/index.html (last visited December 22, 
2005).
18 See Hillel Halkin, Why the Settlements Should Stay, COMMENTARY, June 1, 2002, 21-27, at 23.
19
 For descriptions of the difficulty of the recent evacuation of Amona on the West Bank, see Greg Myre, 
Settlers Battle Israel’s Police in West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at A1;  Jonathan Lis, Amos Harel, 
Gideon Alon, Lilach Weissman & Nadav Shragai, B’Tselem to Mazuz:  Investigate police violence during 
Amona Evacuation, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/677685.html (last 
updated Feb. 2, 2006) (over 200 protesters and police injured in evacuation of Amona); Bradley Burston, 
Brushfire civil war:  Israel, the New Enemy of the True Jew, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=677531&contrassID=2 (last updated Feb. 2, 
2006) (“Increasingly, the language of hardline settlers has taken on a note of estrangement, even divorce 
from institutions of the state, the police, the Supreme Court, the army, the prime minster….By no means 
are they representative of settlers as a whole…Theirs is brushfire civil war.  But brushfires can take 
directions and forms which no one can control.”);  Nadav Schragai, Why the SettlerLeaders Stayed Silent, 
HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/677705.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2006) (referring to the 
evacuation of Amona, “The ‘consciousness searing’ that settler leaders spoke of so frequently in the 
months before the disengagement [from Gaza] occurred yesterday, five months after the disengagement.”); 
Jonathan Lis & Gideon Alon, Olmert Promises that Government will Maintain Dialogue with Settlers, 
HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/678953.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2006) 
(reporting on a Jerusalem rally, “The speeches expressed the growing feeling within the religiously 
observant camp that the justice system discriminates against the right and the settlers.”). 
5Imagine, further that the “enlightened” liberal community would blame the 
African-Americans for their own plight and repeat as a mantra the notion 
that if only the African-Americans would leave that community, all would 
be peaceful in race relations.  While tragically such opinion was once widely 
held, it is totally unimaginable that it reflects liberal and enlightened 
thinking today.  
But, the reader might protest, if the African-American hypothetical is 
meant to suggest that the nearly universal condemnation of Israeli 
settlements is intellectually inconsistent, the analysis is false.20  It has been 
argued, for example, that whereas African-Americans, or Jews for that 
matter, have domestic rights to settle anywhere in the United States, Jews 
are not a people having any collective rights to settle in Palestine.21 This 
article seeks to parse out the assumptions that underlie a liberal inclination to 
place Israeli settlements in a different category than that of a minority 
wanting to live among members of another group.  I suggest that, subject to 
certain conditions, the right of Jews to live in historic Palestine is a 
powerful imperative that cannot be dismissed away because some, or even 
substantially all, Palestinian Arabs do not want Jewish communities in their 
midst, any more than the right of African Americans to establish 
communities in territories inhabited by “whites” should be dismissed in a 
context of white opposition.  
20
 One such party who rejects such is W. Thomas Mallison, whose views seem quite infected by a 
pronounced anti-Israel animus towards Israel as a Jewish state.  See W. Thomas Mallison, Remarks at 
American Society of International Law Proceedings, April 25-27, 1985, Craig Jackson, Reporter, Israeli 
West Bank Settlements, the Reagan Administration’s Policy toward the Middle East and International Law,
79 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 217, 226  (1987); Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison, Settlements and 
the Law, A Juridical Analysis of the Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories at 7 (The American 
Foundational Trust 1982), available at
http://www.geocities.com/alabasters_archive/settlements_and_the_law.html (last viewed Feb. 25, 2006). 
21 Id.  In fact, Mallison disputes the whole concept of a Jewish people. See W.T. Mallison, The Zionist-
Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute “The Jewish People” Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in 
It:  Appraisal in Public International Law, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 987-93 (1964).  That position 
contrasts with his readiness to accept Palestinian peoplehood (see W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. 
Mallison, An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the 
Palestine Question at 39-41 (Study prepared and published at the request of the Committee on the Exercise 
of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, United Nations 1979)), a recent Twentieth Century 
identity as compared with the several millennia concept of a Jewish people.  See infra note 307, and 
accompanying text.
David Kretzmer make a more legitimate objection to this analogy based upon the power 
relationship between the parties.  But, of course, the question of power depends upon the scope of the 
parties and relations considered.  In the case of African-Americans, does one consider simply them and 
their white neighbors or the power of the federal government?  In the case of Israelis and Arabs, does one 
consider not only the Palestinians but also 22 Arab nations hostile to Israel’s existence, or even more, a 
larger number of other nations that seem automatically to vote for any resolution the would deny Jews a 
sovereign state equal to those insisted upon by other peoples? See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Res. 3376 available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/30/ares30.htm (Nov. 10, 1975), equating Zionism and racism.
6At the core of the position taken in this article is a fundamental 
distinction almost universally overlooked in discussions about Jewish 
settlements22:  settlements and sovereignty need not be coterminous – that is, 
it is entirely possible, at least theoretically, to have both Arab “sovereignty” 
over lands and Jewish communities within that sovereignty.  Part II of this 
article explores this distinction between sovereignty and settlements in the 
context of an increasing and necessary realization of the incompatibly of 
Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Israel’s identity as a Jewish 
democratic state.23  Part III outlines those arguments, particularly those 
based upon liberal values, that support the continuation of Jewish 
settlements on the West Bank even when a state of Palestine is established.  
Part IV lays out the conditions which must be satisfied for this resolution to 
occur.  In effect, these conditions also respond to those arguments that have 
been raised against the settlements, including their legal status, and to doubts 
that might be raised against the viability of settlements remaining in a future 
state of Palestine.
II. Sovereignty and Settlements
It is almost universally assumed that Jewish settlements equate to 
Israeli sovereignty.  The nexus between settlements and sovereignty is 
critically important from both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives.  From a 
Palestinian perspective, because the settlements are scattered over much of 
the West Bank (even if their actual borders constitute less than 1/50 of its 
territory), the continuation of Jewish settlements under Israeli sovereignty 
realistically means Israeli sovereignty over all or substantially all of the 
West Bank.  Even if Israeli sovereignty did not encompass all of the West 
Bank, it would either, if the settlements were connected to each other or to 
Israel, preclude a contiguous Palestinian state having sensible borders, or, if 
the settlements were not connected, nonetheless represent a serious 
infringement on Palestinian sovereignty.  In either case, according to 
Palestinian sentiment, the settlements would leave little room for other than 
a Bantustan-type Palestinian state or other self-governing entity.  These 
22
 Seemingly, the sole published party taking exception to this view is the Israeli novelist, Hillel Halkin.  
See Halkin, supra note 18, at 21-7; Hillel Halkin, Beyond the Geneva Accord, COMMENTARY, Jan., 2004; 
Hillel Halkin, Whose Land? Why the Settlements Should Stay, Making the West Bank Judenrein is no way 
to Bring Peace, WSJ.COM, http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id+110001769 (May 29, 
2002).  
23
 Although Israel does not have a constitution, it has adopted certain “Basic Laws”, one of which, the 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, states: “The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity 
and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic 
state.”  See http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
7issues of contiguity and sovereignty are discussed later in this article.24
From an Israeli perspective, if settlements remain and they necessarily 
implicate Israeli sovereignty, it will become impossible to separate the 
border of Israel from that of a state of Palestine.  The two entities will have 
become combined.  Realistically, then, Israeli sovereignty over settlements 
eventually means de jure or de facto Israeli sovereignty over all or much of 
the West Bank.  The inseparability of Israel from a Palestinian state will 
spell the demise of a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that is, a 
predominantly Jewish state and a predominantly Arab state living side by 
side of each other in the territory west of the Jordan River.  And none of the 
various possibilities that flow from this fact favors the continued existence 
of Israel as a Jewish democratic state adhering to the rule of law.  With the 
exception of fringe elements within the Israeli political spectrum25, even 
former stalwarts of the settlement movement and the concept of a Greater 
Israel encompassing all land west of the Jordan have now seemingly 
recognized this reality.26 Thus, Ehud Olmert, the acting Prime Minister of 
Israel and head of the newly-created Kadima party, has reiterated in various 
fora that Israel “must create a clear border that reflects the demographic 
reality that has been created on the ground as soon as possible.”27  In the
words of Michael Oren, “[a] solid majority of Israelis accept that they cannot 
24
 For a discussion of the issue of contiguity, see infra notes 117-126, and accompanying text; for a 
discussion of the issue of sovereignty see infra note 455, and accompanying text.
25 See Nadav Shragai, Right-Wing Group Readies to Build 15 New Illegal Outposts, HAARETZ DAILY, 
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/659860.html (updated Dec. 19, 2005) (referring to a group 
named, “Loyalists of the Land of Israel”, that intends to build additional illegal outposts on the West Bank). 
26
  Belated recognition of this fact led even Ariel Sharon, the prime minister of Israel presently in a coma 
and one of the champions of the settlement movement during the 1970’s through the 1990’s, to leave the 
Likud party, which he had helped to found, and to establish a new party, Kadimah, in November of 2005.  
Kadimah’s platform includes territorial compromise in order to insure “a Jewish and democratic state.” See
Mazal Mualem, Kadima Platform Calls for Jewish Majority, Territorial Concessions, HAARETZ, Nov. 29, 
2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/651003.html.  See also Steven Erlanger, How Reality Cut 
Likud’s Vision Down to Size, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at 43. See Aluf Benn, Olmert:  Top Priority is to 
Determine Israel’s Borders, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/673922.html
(updated Jan. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Israel’s Borders].
27
 Aluf Benn, Managing the conflict, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/677165.html (last 
updated Feb. 1, 2006).  Aluf Benn, Olmert: Top Priority is to Determine Israel’s Borders, HAARETZ 
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/673922.html (updated Jan. 24, 2006); Aluf Benn, 
Olmert:  Israel Will SeparateFrom Most Palestinians, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/680081.html (last updated Feb. 8, 2006) (reporting on Olmert’s first 
interview with the media since assuming his post as Acting Prime Minister, in which Olmert said that Israel 
“will separate from most of the Palestinian population that lives in the West Bank, and that will obligate us 
to separate as well from territories where the State of Israel currently is…”); David Ratner, Olmert:  We 
WillFreeze Spending on West Bank Construction, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/691248.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2006); Aluf Benn & David 
Ratner, Olmert: If Kadima Wins, We Will Not Invest in Territories, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/691448.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2006).
8continue to occupy the West Bank and Gaza without endangering the moral 
and demographic foundations upon which the Jewish state is built.”28  To 
understand this reality and hence knowledgably to discuss the various 
options concerning Israeli settlements, consider the various possibilities of 
Israeli sovereignty, either de jure or de facto, over the West Bank.
One possibility is that over time – due to vastly differential birth 
rates29 – the Palestinian population will overwhelm and surpass the number 
28
 Michael B. Oren, Hamas Has Won. What’s Next?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28-9, 2006, at A8.
29
 The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (“ICBS”) reports an Arab Moslem birth rate in Israel of between 
twice to one and one-half that of Jews during the ten-year period from 1996 through 2005.  See
http://www.cbs.gov.il/yarhon/c1_e.xls (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).  The Arab population of Israel grew from 
1,069,4000 at the end of 1997 to 1,372,800 at the end of 2005, an increase of 28.37 percent, while in the 
same time period the Jewish population of Israel grew from 4,701,600 to 5,302,600, or an increase of 12.78 
percent. id. The latter statistics may show some slight distortion given two factors that might affect the 
total populations: increase in the Jewish population of Israel resulting from immigration from other 
countries (a factor that would increase the Jewish population), and lack of consistency in the territory of 
Israel covered by the statistic (a factor that would increase the total Arab population).  For example, Dr. 
Aziz Haider, a Hebrew University sociologist, claims that the ICBS statistics are distorted by including the 
Druze on the Golan Heights and the Arabs of East Jerusalem, both of whom are not Israeli citizens.  See
Lily Galili, We are More Normal than You Think, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/685199.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2006).  Haider also believes that 
the aggregate birth rate reported by the ICBS is misleading, in that the Bedouin in the South have much 
higher birth rates than Palestinian citizens of Israel who live in the North.  
In any event, it is believed that the birth rate of Palestinians on the West Bank exceeds the current 
birth rate (3 percent) of Israeli Arab Muslims, but accurate figures with respect to the Arab population on 
the West Bank and birth rates are more difficult to establish and presently subject to enormous dispute 
among demographers.  The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (“PCBS”) conducted a West Bank and 
Gaza census in 1997, deriving the figure of 2,895,683 Palestinian Arabs in the West and Gaza.  Making 
certain assumptions, including a birth rate of 4-5 percent, the PCBS projected a Palestinian population 
(excluding the Arabs in Israel) of 3.83 million by mid-2004.  See Bennett Zimmerman & Roberta Seid, 
Arab Population in the West Bank & Gaza, The Million and a Half Person Gap, Study presented at the 
American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C. (Jan. 10, 2005) (hereinafter, the “Zimmerman group”), 
available at http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.990/event_detail.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). The 
Palestinian projections would have meant that as of the end of mid-2004, there would 2,895,683 
Palestinians on the West Bank if one included the Palestinians living in Jerusalem, and 2,685,474 
Palestinians if one excluded Palestinians living in Jerusalem from the calculation. B’tselem, in a 2002 
document that amounts to a “brief” against the settlements, estimated the West Bank Palestinian population 
at 2 million.  See Yehezkel Lein, Land Grab Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank at 95 (B’Tselem 
2002), available at http://www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land_Grab_Eng.doc (last visited Jan. 11, 
2006).  In contrast, adjusting for lower actual birth rates, lower fertility rates, net emigration from the West 
Bank rather than immigration, alternative counts for a resident population base and internal migration of 
Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel proper (within the “green lines”), the Zimmerman group 
concluded that, as of mid-2004, the resident-only population of West Bank Arabs (excluding Jerusalem) 
was 1,349,525.  Taking into account the number of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the same group recently 
concluded that there is at least a 1.4 million person gap between the PCBS projection and the true 
Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza.  The Zimmerman group also concluded that the gap 
between the Jewish population and the Arab population west of the Jordan was narrowing more slowly than 
most had initially projected.  The Zimmerman study has attracted some support.  See, e.g., Nadav Shragai, 
Deal with the Demography, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/690923.html (last updated 
Mar. 7, 2006).  But other demographers dispute this claim.  For example, Sergio Della Pergola of Hebrew 
University states that the Zimmerman “claim is based on several additional assumptions, such as a drastic 
decline in the fertility rate of the Palestinians, which has no basis in reality, and the anticipation of a large 
9of Jews west of the Jordan, its Arab residents will have (as they should) all 
rights of citizenship, including the right to vote, and Israel will remain 
democratic but cease to exist as a Jewish state.30  Whether the name 
remains,“Israel”, or, more likely, is changed to “Palestine” or some other 
term more palatable to its majority is largely academic.  What will certainly 
change is the Law of Return31, and Israel’s core identity as a haven for Jews 
in a still very much anti-Semitic world32 will cease.  In fact, just as Israel’s 
Jewish majority has from its inception caused the state to adopt and 
implement an “affirmative action” policy for Jews throughout the world, its 
dominant Arab population might well adopt and implement its own 
affirmative action policy favoring the return of all those Arabs claiming 
some connection to “Palestine” and outright banning the further immigration 
of Jews, no matter how distressed the latter are in other parts of the world.
The second possibility is for Israel to “transfer” all Arabs from the 
land west of the Jordan to other places.  There is historic precedent for such 
a move – to take but one example, millions of Germans were “repatriated” to 
Germany from Eastern Europe after the defeat of Germany and in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II.33  Numerous other population 
transfers have occurred in the Twentieth Century.34  No matter how many 
supposed “precedents” exist, however, for Israel actively to consider or 
implement population transfer as a means to retain a Jewish majority if 
Israel’s sovereignty extended over the entire West Bank would be morally 
repugnant.  It would also clearly violate the first paragraph of Article 49 of 
positive balance of Jewish immigration, which is not in sight in the present circumstances.”  See Sergio 
Della Pergola, A Question of Numbers, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/674640.html (last 
updated, Jan. 25, 2006).  He notes that while original estimates called for a parity between the Jewish and 
Arab populations by 1910, “the trend of narrowing the Jewish majority [of the population west of the 
Jordan] until it is lost by 2020 is common to all the scenarios” and the Gaza withdrawal has delayed that 
reality by perhaps another 20 years. Id.
30 See Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 453, 470 (2003) 
(“The Israeli government is not and cannot become sovereign over the entire Palestinian population of the 
West Bank and Gaza without forfeiting the expresssion of its own self-determination.”).
31
 The Law of Return gives every Jew the right to automatically acquire Israeli citizenship.  See Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Law of Return 5710-1950, Dec. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law of Return 5710-1950. 
32 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON ANTI-SEMITISM: EUROPE AND EURASIA, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Jan/05-93928.html?chanlid=eur (last visited December 23, 2005);
Associated Press, Britain’s Chief Rabbi:  ‘Tsunami of Anti-Semitism’ Sweeping the World, HAARETZ 
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/664887.html (updated Jan. 1, 2006); Mortimer B. 
Zuckerman, A Shameful Contagion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 7, 2002, at 34 .
33 See Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT’L L. J. 207, 
228 (1975).
34
 Many of these exchanges are summarized in Eyal Benvinisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property 
Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (1995) (hereinafter, “Benvinisti 
& Zamir”) at 322-24.  
10
the 4th Geneva Convention.35  Although fringe elements of Israel’s political 
spectrum might seem comfortable with the possibility of transfer, it seems 
totally incongruous that Israel, of all countries and as a matter of government 
policy, would in the still personally felt aftermath of the Holocaust engage in 
one of the practices practiced upon Jews during World War II.  Minimally, 
such an act would serve to transform a heatedly debated historical topic36 –
whether, on the one hand and as Israel contends, most Arabs who became 
refugees in 1948 left of their own volition, with or without the 
encouragement of their own leadership and/or of the invading forces of the 
five Arab nations that attacked Israel or, on the other hand and as 
Palestinians have contended, as a result of force exercised upon them by 
Jews  -- into firmly accepted doctrine that there was a broad Zionist plan, 
which indeed was even implemented, to rid the territory west of the Jordan 
35 See infra note 157.  While this provision applies only in the case of belligerent occupation, it would be a 
ruse for Israel to end its occupation by annexing the West Bank and then forcibly to transfer its Palestinian 
residents.
36
 The views both ways are summarized in BENNY MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER, ISRAEL AND THE 
PALESTINIANS 1-48 (1994)[herinafter MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER].  Morris identifies himself, as well as a 
few other Israeli historians, as a “new historian”, who in an earlier text, took issue with the traditional 
Israeli view that the refugees left as a result of calls from other Arab leaders to depart for the sake of 
providing an unobstructed path in their desire to wipe out the nascent Jewish state. In this work, as well as 
his earlier writing (THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949 (1987)), Morris 
concludes that  “what occurred in 1948 lies somewhere in between the Jewish ‘robber state’ and the ‘Arab 
order’ explanations.” MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER. at 17.  The work of Morris and other “New Historians” 
has itself been criticized. EPHRAIM KARSH, Rewriting Israel’s History, pp.169-85 in RETHINKING THE 
MIDDLE EAST (2003).  Morris’ own views seem to have evolved.  Replying to a distortion of his view by 
Henry Siegman in The N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Morris commented: 
In his article, Siegman repeatedly "cited" things I had said—with a consistency of distortion that is 
truly mind-boggling. Just to give one key example: I most emphatically never stated anywhere that 
"the dismantling of Palestinian society...and the expulsion of 700,000 Palestinians [were] a 
deliberate and planned operation intended to 'cleanse'...those parts of Palestine assigned to the 
Jews." Quite the opposite. Had Siegman bothered to read my books, he would have discovered 
that mainstream (Haganah–JewishAgency) Zionist policy, until the end of March 1948—meaning 
during the first four months of the war—was to protect the Arab minority in the Jewish areas and 
to try to maintain peaceful coexistence. Intentions changed only in April, when the Yishuv was 
with its back to the wall, losing the battle for the roads and facing potentially politicidal and 
genocidal pan-Arab invasion. And even then, no systematic policy of expulsion was ever adopted 
or implemented (hence Israel's one-million-strong Arab minority today). The Arabs have only 
themselves to blame for the (unexpected) results of the war that they launched with the aim of 
"ethnically cleansing" Palestine of the Jews. (Contemporary Arab apologists, always full of 
righteous indignation, conveniently forget this.)
Benny Morris, ‘Israel: The Threat from  Within’: An Exchange, 51 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, No. 6, April 
8, 2004.  And even more recently, reviewing the work of ABU SITTA, ATLAS OF PALESTINE 1948 (2005), 
Morris writes:  “From reading this Atlas, the reader will not know that it was the Palestinian Arab onslaught 
on the Jewish community in Palestine in November to December 1947 that provoked Jewish counter-
violence, which then triggered the Arab exodus; and that it was the follow-up invasion of the country by the 
armies of the surrounding Arab states in May to June 1948 that turned what might have been an ephemeral 
phenomenon into a still larger tragedy, consolidating and finalizing, as it were, the refugee status of the 
fleeing communities.” Benny Morris, Details and Lies, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Oct. 31, 2005, 
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20051031&s=morris103105.
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of its Arab inhabitants. While there undoubtedly were instances of force 
used against Palestinian civilians in the context of the 1948 war, none of 
them seem to have had the imprimatur of the Jewish Agency or, after the 
establishment of Israel, its government.37  It would be academic and wholly 
irrelevant that the present one-sided narrative as to the birth of the 
Palestinian refugee problem38 pertains to an event half a century ago rather 
than the present.  Equally as important, Israel as a Jewish state would 
become a pariah not only among other nations of the World – at times, a not 
wholly outrageous overstatement of Israel’s position as a result of Arab 
antagonism and increasing world-wide anti-Semitism, often expressed in the 
guise of anti-Zionism39 – but also among the overwhelming majority of 
diaspora Jewry40.
 Nor do Arab and Muslim threats to “throw the Jews into the sea”, 
“wipe Israel off the map,41 or, according to one of the many references to 
Israel and Jews in Hamas’ charter, “implement Allah’s promise … [to] fight 
the Jews (and kill them)”42 negate or even reduce the moral repugnancy of 
forced population transfer. While moral systems are frequently based upon 
the restraint “of self-interest in favor of promoting a reciprocal recognition 
37 EFRAIM KARSH, Were the Palestinians Expelled? and The Palestinians and the Right to Return, in
RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST 127-54, 155-68 (2003).
38 See supra note 37, at 127-54. 
39
 For descriptions of this phenomenon, see ALAN DERSHOWITZ, Are Critics of Israel Anti-Semitic?, in THE 
CASE FOR ISRAEL at 208-16(2003) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL]; Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Graffiti on 
History’s Walls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 3, 2003, at 44-51.
40
 With respect to American Jews, some indication of this may be surmised by political affiliation.  A 2005 
Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion sponsored by the American Jewish Committee listed 54 
percent of American Jews as Democrats, and the vast majority of the remainder, 29 percent as 
independents.  Thirty four percent identified themselves as liberal, 29 percent as moderate and only 27 
percent as conservative.  Nearly one in four American Jews, 23 percent, identified themselves as “distant” 
from Israel, and over 60 percent of respondents said Israel should be willing to dismantle all or some of the 
settlements as part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians.   See Annual Survey of American 
Jewish Opinion,  http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=846741&ct=1740283
(Dec. 20, 2005).  Given the political affiliation of most American Jews and their preference for the 
dismantling of settlements, the percentage of American Jews feeling “distant” from Israel if Israel adopted 
a forcible transfer policy to retain the West Bank would rise appreciably from the present percentage and 
seemingly equal at least the percentage, 60 percent, that favors dismantling settlements. Another indication 
of some dissociation among American Jews from Israel is the sharp decline (30 percent) in their 
registration for the upcoming World Zionist Congress. See Daphna Berman, Drop in U.S. Voter Sign-up for 
World Zionist Congress, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/681258.html (last updated Feb. 
19, 2006). 
41
 Steven Erlanger, Israel Wants West to Deal More Urgently with Iran, NY TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A8 
(Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, has recently called for Israel to be “wiped off the map”). 
42
 The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance movement (Hamas), Art. Seven, 
http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/charter.html (last viewed Feb. 1, 2006).   See also Itamar 
Marcus, Special Report #27 (December 1, 1999) The Palestinian Authority’s Beliefs = Hamas’ Charter, 
http://www.pmw.org.il/specrep-27.html (last viewed Feb. 1, 2006).   
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of rights and interests,”43 negative acts cannot be justified on the basis of 
“reciprocal intentions”, short of steps necessary to save lives and perhaps 
property.  Neither could one rationalize forced population transfer by noting 
that continual pressure and persecution forced over 800,000 Jewish refugees 
to flee Arab countries in the period right before and after the creation of the 
State of Israel, of which number Israel absorbed more than 580,000 
persons.44 Again, one would be attempting to use reciprocity – in this case, 
an asserted population exchange -- as the basis for a negative act not 
necessary to save lives.  Moreover, Israel’s use of Jewish refugees from 
Arab lands to justify a population transfer of Arabs would be “double 
dipping”:  regardless of why and under what circumstances many Arabs fled 
the nascent state of Israel in 1948, Israel and its supporters have already 
made the argument that their numbers were less than the Jewish refugees 
from Arab countries forced to abandon their properties and flee to Israel 
shortly thereafter.45
A third possibility is equally unpalatable.  To include all or 
substantially all of the West Bank within its sovereignty, Israel could simply 
deny citizenship and therefore a right to vote to many or all of its Arab 
residents.  Outright denial of citizenship and franchise rights would place 
Israel in the same camp as South Africa prior to the early 1990’s, converting 
an outrageous analogy46 underlying the present divestment efforts on college 
campuses and among certain Protestant church groups47 into an apt 
43
 David M. Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, n. 107, and accompanying text 
at 252-3 (1982).  
44 MARTIN GILBERT, THE ROUTLEDGE ATLAS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 48 (Routledge, 8th ed. , 
2002) (1974).
45 See, e.g.,  ALAN DERSHOWITZ, Did Israel Create the Arab Refugee Problem?, in DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, 
supra note 39, at 88-9. 
46
 The term apartheid is broadly and frequently applied to any measures that Israel takes, including those 
that are security-related.  See, e.g., Greg Myre, Israel Considers Banning Palestinians on West Bank’s 
Main Roads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A10 (Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, described a 
possible Israeli road plan in response to attacks on Jewish civilians on West Bank roads as “the official 
introduction of an apartheid system.”); Chris McGreal, Worlds Apart, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2006,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1703245,00.html (“There are few places in the world where 
governments construct a web of nationality and residency laws designed for use by one section of the 
population against another. Apartheid South Africa was one. So is Israel.”)  For criticisms of this view, see
Dennis Ross, Pretoria Calling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005,  at A27 (“Yasir Arafat loved to equate the 
Palestinian struggle for statehood with the struggle of South Africans against apartheid, but his was always 
a false analogy.”); HonestReporting Communique, ‘Road Apartheid’ Debunked, Oct. 21, 2005; 
HONESTREPORTING, Guaradian Promotes Apartheid Slur, Feb. 12, 2006, 
http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/45884734/critiques/Guardian_Promotes_Apartheid_Slur.asp.
47 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR PEACE 154-55 (2005).  See also Rosner’s Blog, Divestment against 
Israel is back in town, HAARETZ, Feb. 7, 2006, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerBlog.jhtml?itemNo=680115&contrassID=25&subContrassID=
0&sbSubContrassID=1&listSrc=Y&art=1.
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similarity.48  Again, it would matter not the least that other countries have 
long employed a modified apartheid, e.g., Japan’s treatment of its resident 
Korean population49 or even Lebanon’s denial of citizenship and franchise to 
its “Palestinian” population.50
But could the problem be finessed if, at a point where a majority of 
Israel’s population consisted of Jews, it were to enshrine in its political 
system – for example, by adopting a Constitution -- law that made 
unchangeable some modicum of political control by Jews, regardless of 
subsequent population changes?  To ensure its status as a safe haven for 
Jews, Israel would have to enshrine the Law of Return as fundamental, 
unchangeable law and divide political power so that, irrespective of whether 
Jews constituted the majority or minority within the land, they would have a 
sufficient number of parliamentary seats to either retain or significantly 
share power.  Dictatorships, with or without the semblance of a Parliament –
do just that.  For example, Alawis, a small dissident sect originally derived 
from Shiite Islam, controls Syria by retaining substantially all key military 
and political positions, despite the fact that Sunni Muslims constitute the 
overwhelming majority of Syria’s population.51 Prior to the recent Iraq War, 
Sunni Arabs, and, in fact, a smaller clan among them, Tikritis, to which 
Saddam Hussein belongs, ruled Iraq to the disadvantage of Shi’ia and Kurds 
who constituted over three-fourths of that country’s population.52 Even 
Lebanon, which at times purports to be an Arab democracy, has weighted its 
political structure so that a Maronite Christian is always its President and, 
48 See DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE 797 (2004) (“Ehud Olmert … declared in December 2003 that 
Israel could not remain in the territories lest it lose its moral grounding and find its Jewish supporters 
internationally unable to defend an apartheid reality.”)
49
 Hideki Tarumoto, Multiculturalism in Japan:  Citizenship Policy for Immigrants,  5 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL ON MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES (IJMS), 88 – 103 (2003),
ISSN 1564-4901, http://www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol5/issue1/art6 (“the myth of homogeneity has long 
been challenged by the presence of ethnic and national minorities, including ethnic Koreans and 
Chinese.Ironically, the idea has denied basic human rights to the “Oldcomers” who were
Japanese subjects before 1947 and are now permanent non-national residents in
Japan, where they were born and educated…”). 
50 See United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, LEBANON: Palestinian Refugees 
Complain they are Second Class Citizens, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=49326 (last visited 
December 23, 2005).
51 See A. Shadid, Death of Syrian Minister Leaves A Sect Adrift in Time of Strife, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 
2005 at A1; Mordechai Nisan, Alawi Tribal Politics and Syria’s Future,  THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1134309631221&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(updated Dec. 22, 2005) (describing the degree of control, the various personalities, and the ministries 
controlled).
52 See Confrontation in the Gulf, For the Iraqi Ruler, Variation on a Name, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, at 
16, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F30610FB3B580C768EDDA10894D8494D81 (last 
viewed Feb. 12, 2006).
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despite their dwindling numbers, Maronites retain significant political and 
economic powers in a country a majority of whose citizens belong to other 
groups (Sunni Muslims, Shiites, or Druze).53  Indeed, much of the “world” 
seems to understand Lebanon’s refusal to deny not only voting rights, but 
any significant economic opportunities to the Arabs that fled Israel on the 
ground that the granting of such rights would upset Lebanon’s delicate 
“ethnic balance.”54
The quality of Israel’s “democracy”, however, is apt not to be judged 
by Lebanese standards.  While differential voting is not uncommon in 
private organizations – for example, class voting in American corporate law 
-- and, as noted, characterizes the political structures of certain other nations, 
the principle of “one person-one vote” has now become so enshrined in the 
scheme of Western democracies, no matter how imperfectly implemented, 
that it is unlikely that Israel could sustain such a transparently anti-
democratic ruse for long.  The criticism and resultant ostracism that Israel 
would face would probably not differ materially from Israel’s having 
adopted a political structure that explicitly denied Arabs the right to vote.
If, then, Israel cannot both retain the West Bank and retain its status as 
both a democratic and predominantly Jewish state that does not discriminate 
against its minority citizens, Israel cannot retain sovereignty over the West 
Bank forever.  If so, does it not follow automatically that most settlements –
especially those not contiguous to the “Green Line” – the armistice line prior 
to 1967 – must be removed in order to permit sovereignty over the vast 
majority of Palestinian Arabs resident west of the Jordan by an Arab 
juridical entity?  
Contrary to the assumption made by most commentators, academics 
and policy makers55 alike, removal of Jewish settlers from the West Bank 
53 See Library of Congress Country Studies, Lebanon, Government and Politics, 
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/presidency/history/after/after.htm (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006); U.S. 
Department of State, Country Note: Lebanon, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (Aug. 2005) 
(last viewed Feb. 12, 2006) (President a maronite; prior to 1990, Christians and Muslims shared 
parliamentary seats in a ratio of 6:5; under the Ta’if Accords, that ratio was changed to 50:50).  As of 1987, 
it was estimated that only 16 % of Lebanon’s population was Maronite (see
http://www.photius.com/countries/lebanon/society/lebanon_society_maronites.html (last viewed Feb. 12, 
2006)), a figure that might well be lower today. 
54 See Orly Halpern, Damascus torpedoed Jordan's peace offer, THE JERUSALEM POST, March 24, 2005, at 
1.
55
 For example, Amir Peretz, the Labor party chairman, has stated that, if Labor forms the next Israeli 
government, it would evacuate West Bank settlements that did not fall into Israel’s eventual borders.  See 
Lilach Weisman, Nir Hasson & Mazal Mualem, Peretz:  Settlers who Leave West Bank will be Fairly 
Compensated, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/673863.html (updated Jan. 24, 2006).  
Ehud Olmert seemingly intends to follow a similar path if Kadima forms the next Israeli government.  See
Aluf Benn & Lilach Weissman, Olmert:  We Must Separate from the Palestinians, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/679959.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2006).
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(hereinafter, sometimes “removal” or the “removal option”) and the 
destruction of their settlements is not the only option.  Theoretically three 
others exist: Israeli settlements remain, but Israeli sovereignty pertains only 
to them and not to other West Bank territory (“partial sovereignty” or the 
“partial sovereignty option”); a sufficient land swap occurs such that almost 
all settlements become part of Israel and Arab communities in Israel become 
part of Palestine (the “land swap option”); and Israeli settlements remain but 
become part of a sovereign Palestine (“continuance” or the “continuance 
option”).56
The partial sovereignty option is for settlements, wherever they are, 
simply to remain under Israeli sovereignty.57  All remaining land on the 
West Bank would be transferred to Arab sovereignty.  Indeed, Palestinian 
negotiators themselves have tried to characterize the plan pressed by 
President Clinton and accepted by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the 
2000 Camp David Summit as substantially equivalent to the partial 
sovereignty option.58  This outcome would leave islands of Israeli 
sovereignty within a much larger geographical area of “Palestine.”  
Precedents for partial sovereignty do exist, including the limited sovereignty 
exercised by certain Native Americans in the United States over their 
reservations59, the sovereignty of the Vatican within the larger nation of 
Italy60, the sovereignty of Monaco within the larger nation of France61, and, 
historically, the sovereignty status of a nation’s embassy to and in another 
56
 A recent proposal, which was earlier said to become part of Labor’s plank for the next election, would 
combine the continuance option with a lease arrangement, whereby, although Palestinian sovereignty is 
agreed upon, the settlement areas, or at least the large blocs of settlements, are then leased back to Israel 
under a Hong Kong arrangement for a period of 99 years.  See Mazal Mualem & Nir Hassan, Labor to call 
for leasing settlements from PA, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/663117.html (updated 
Dec. 28, 2005).  It does not appear, however, that this idea became part of Labor’s platform.  See supra
note 55.      
57
 For a criticism of this possibility, see Akiva Eldar, Kadima Supporters and the Road Map, Nov. 28, 
2005, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650612.html.
58 See DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE, THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 668, 
691 (2004).  This is shown graphically by maps prepared by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
one depicting the actual proposal tendered to the Palestinians by President Clinton and the other map 
depicting  the Palestinian’s view of the proposal.  See
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/mapImages/41db110b8ca1f.jpg (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).  See also
Benny Morris, Camp David and After: An Exchange, 1. An Interview with Ehud Barak, THE N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS 42-6 at 44,  June 13, 2002, where Barak refutes the contention that his proposal amounted to a 
Bantustan, and ascribes Arafat’s characterization of his proposal as such to Arafat’s fear of Palestinian 
reaction to Arafat’s rejection of Barak’s proposal had it been explained truthfully to Palestinians.
59 See The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2005). 
60 See CIA, The World Factbook: Holy See (Vatican City), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/vt.html .
61 See Id., The World Factbook: Monaco, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mn.html.
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country.62  But to the Palestinians – no matter how small such islands would 
be (at present, the built-up area of such settlements constitutes less than two 
percent of West Bank land) – the partial sovereignty option would be seen as 
an infringement on its own sovereignty.  Issues of security and police forces 
aside, matters of trade, taxation and the like would be outside of any 
Palestinian say.
A second theoretical option, which has resurfaced recently63, is the 
land swap option, which would incorporate into Israel almost all of the 
settlements in exchange for land presently part of Israel. True, substantially 
all peace proposals, including that of President Clinton at the Camp David 
summit in the summer of 2000 and the subsequent meeting at Taba in 
December of that year64, incorporate some concept of a land swap, with the 
largest settlements contiguous to the 1967 borders incorporated into Israel 
and some Israeli land, usually that in the Negev contiguous to Gaza, 
incorporated into Palestine.  But Uzi Arad, the former head of Israel’s 
intelligence agency, has larger ambitions.  In order “to increase ethnic 
homogeneity and to preserve each side’s basic territorial reach,”65 land swap 
proposals of which he writes approvingly would transfer to Palestine not 
only vacant land, but areas of Israel with large Palestinian and bedhouin
populations.66  He cites a study projecting the Jewish population of Israel to 
decline to 74 percent in 2050 without a land swap and to remain at 81 
62 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Art. 22, Apr. 18, 
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227.
63 See Uzi Arad, Trading Land for Peace.  Swap Meet, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 18 & Dec. 5, 2005, at 
16-18 (Arad, former Director of Intelligence in the Mossad, is the founding head of the Institute for Policy 
and Strategy at the Lauder School of Government, of the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya); Yoav Stern, 
Geographers propose transfer of Israeli Arab Towns to PA, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/673813.html (last updated Jan. 23, 2006).
64 See Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper (January 2001), 
http://www.mideastweb.org/moratinos.htm (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006) (“Both sides accepted the principle 
of land swap but the proportionality of the swap remained under discussion”).
65
 Arad, supra note 63, at 16.
66
 Arad also writes approvingly of a trilateral land swap involving Israel, Palestine and Egypt, again
designed for the same demographic and geographic purposes. Arad, supra note 63, at 18.  The leader of 
Yisrael Beiteinu, considered a “far-right” party has also reiterated a similar proposal, that is, incorporating 
Jewish settlements strongholds into Israel in exchange for “areas within the 1967 border populated mostly 
by Israeli Arabs to be handed over to the PA…” Lilach Weismann & Lily Galili, Lieberman says he’s 
ready to evacuate his own settlement, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/676593.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2006).  Even former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger seems to advocate a land swap that would involve “territories in 
present-day Israel with significant Arab populations[, asserting that] [t]he rejection of such an approach, or 
alternative available concepts, which would contribute greatly to stability and to demographic balance, 
reflects a determination to keep incendiary issues permanently open.”  Henry A. Kissinger, What’s Needed 
From Hamas, WASH. POST., Feb. 27, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/26/AR2006022601263.htmlt .
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percent by performing a land swap.67 And, to the degree that Israeli 
Palestinians do not favor a land swap that would result in their communities 
becoming part of a sovereign Palestine rather than the state of Israel, Arad’s 
suggestion can be interpreted as favoring land swap regardless of their 
consent.  Moreover, if a land swap on its own did not solve the demographic 
problem he cites, he would seemingly favor a transfer of Palestinians who 
are Israeli citizens to Palestinian sovereign territory.  However, whether one 
speaks in terms of a land exchange, a component of which is that Arab 
villages now part of Israel become part of Palestine, or “population 
transfers”, even Arad acknowledges that most Israeli Arab citizens –
irrespective of their increasing nationalist identity as Palestinians68 -- wish to 
remain citizens of Israel.  The rebuke to this proposal has been fast in 
coming.  Arik Carmon, the head of the Israel Democracy Institute that has 
spearheaded an effort to establish a written constitution, termed “Arad’s 
arguments … racist in nature, damaging to human rights – and of course to 
the foundations of democracy -- … [and] in contradiction to international 
norms and … unrealizable.”69  As Carmon opined, “[t]he termination of an 
individual’s citizenship, according to international law, cannot occur unless 
he relinquishes it by agreement.”70  A similar suggestion by a group of 
academic geographers was rejected by Ahmed Tibi, a member of the 
Knesset from Hadash-Ta’al, as “making its Arab population feel like a 
rejected enemy…”71
Unlike the partial sovereignty and land swap options, the latter with or 
without an additional population transfer of Arabs, only two options – the 
removal option and the continuance option – do not infringe on Palestinian 
sovereignty or result in the forced removal of Arabs from the state of Israel 
in order to retain its Jewish majority and character.  Of the two, the removal 
option is almost universally assumed to be necessary and inevitable, while 
the continuance option remains overlooked by substantially all 
commentators.  
In sum, Israeli sovereignty over all of the West Bank is incompatible 
with both Israel’s continued status as a democratic Jewish state and the 
creation of a viable sovereign Palestinian state.  That conclusion does not 
67
 Arad, supra note 63, at 16.
68 See infra note 453, and accompanying text. 
69
 Arik Carmon, A Blot on Israeli Democracy, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/656513.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2005).
70 Id. 
71
 Yoav Stern, Geogrqphers Propose Transfer of Israeli ArabTtowns to PA., HAARETZ., 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=673813 (last updated Jan. 23, 
2006).
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necessarily mean that removal of Jewish settlements is the only option.  
Concentrations of Jewish and Arab populations should definitely influence 
the de jure border between Israel and a Palestinian state, but they need not 
dictate sovereignty. If so, the continued presence of Jewish settlements, per 
se, is not an obstacle to the creation of a Palestinian state.  Part III explores 
why their continued presence in a state of Palestine is, at least in theory, a 
more desirable option than their removal from the territory included in a 
Palestinian state, while Part IV posits and analyzes the necessary conditions 
to which this resolution is subject.
III. Reasons in Support of Continuance rather than Removal
The preceding section analyzed the incompatibility between Israeli de 
jure or de facto sovereignty over the West Bank and its continued status as a 
democratic Jewish state. Jewish settlements close to Israel’s 1948 armistice 
lines can be incorporated into Israel consistent with that status, with or 
without some land swap of unpopulated or sparsely populated Israeli 
territory in the Negev contiguous to Gaza.  But two options remain with 
respect to other settlements: removal, that is, the destruction of the 
settlements and the return of their residents to Israel, or continuance, that is, 
their continued presence in a state of Palestine. This section analyzes why 
the latter option is preferable.
A. Reversing an exclusionary policy:  Jews, too, have the right to live in the 
historic Land of Israel 
In drawing borders between Israel and a state of Palestine, the location 
of Jewish and Palestinian communities is not irrelevant:  while the location 
of these communities need not determine the borders between the states, 
they should surely influence those borders. The great bulk of Jews living 
West of the Jordan should be within the borders of Israel, just as the great 
bulk of Arabs should be within an Arab juridical entity. From Israel’s 
perspective, that proposition follows from Israel’s basic identity: it cannot 
serve as a “homeland” for Jews – especially Jews oppressed in other 
countries – unless it is predominantly Jewish.  The same holds true for a 
future Arab juridical entity – it too must be predominantly Arab.  Otherwise, 
the very desire for political rights that drives the Palestinian political 
struggle would be thwarted. 
But complete separation is impossible.  Israel will always include 
minorities and, as should be the case, strive for inclusion of those minorities 
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on a non-discriminatory basis.   This proposition follows from Israel’s 
identity not only as Jewish state, but a democratic one.  Approximately 20 
percent of Israel’s present population is Arab.72  Arab political parties do 
exist73, Arabs belong to larger Israeli parties, especially Labor74, and Arabs 
serve in the Israel parliament, the Knesset,75 some of whom voice views 
quite antagonistic to the very existence of Israel.76  Arabs have served on the 
Israeli Supreme Court77 and in the ministerial ranks of the government78.  
Unlike Israeli Jews, who with several exceptions face compulsory army 
service, Arabs can choose to serve in the Israeli military; with rare 
72
 J. Post Staff, Population on Eve of 2006 Stands at 6,986,300, THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1135696353179&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Dec. 28, 2005) (the Central  Bureau of Statistics report a population of Israel at the end of 2005 of 
6,986,300 people, of whom 76% are Jews, 20% are Arabs, and 4% are non-Arab Christians.).  
73 E.g., Hadash-Ta`al, National Democratic Assembly, and United Arab List.  See Knesset English 
Homepage, http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/MKIndex_Current_eng.asp?view=1(last visited December 
24, 2005).  See also Yoav Stern, Two Parties, and No More, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/680069.html (last updated Feb. 8, 2006) (describing both the 
differences between the three Arab parties represented in the Knesset and the necessity for Arab 
representation in the Knesset).
74
 For example, two present Arab Knesset members representing Labor are Raleb Majadele and Saleh Tarif.  
However, a recent poll indicates that 20.6 percent of Israeli Arabs will vote for predominantly Jewish 
parties, with a plurality of those voters intending to vote for Kadima, the newly formed centrist party now 
headed by Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.  See Jack Khoury, Poll:  20% of the Arab Public will Vote 
for Predominantly Jewish Parties, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/692250.html (last 
updated Mar. 9, 2006) (according to the poll, Kadima will receive 9.9% of the Arab vote, compared to 
7.5% for Labor).  The same poll indicated that 66 percent of Israeli Arabs intended to exercise their right to 
vote.
75
 A complete list of Knesset members, at least 12 of whom are Arab members, may be found at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/MKIndex_Current_eng.asp?view=1 (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
76
 Included within this group of Knesset members are Azmi Bishara, Ahmed Tibi, Taleb al-Sana, 
Abdulmalik Dehamshe and Mohammed Barakeh.  See Bishara’s Blast, THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1134309618537&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2F
ShowFull (updated Dec. 21, 2005) (quoting Bishara as having said, among other things, “We Arabs aren’t 
interested in your democracy.  Give us Palestine and take your democracy with you.”); Alexander 
Yakobson, Assad’s Advocates, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/665417.html (updated Jan. 
3, 2005) (three of the Arab MK’s alleged that the UN investigation into the death of the former Lebanese 
Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, was influenced by Israel, wanting to maintain tension with Syria).; Ze’ev 
Segal, MK Bishara’s Liberty, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/679104.html (last updated 
Feb. 6, 2006) (describing MK Bishara’s expressions with respect to terrorism and a recent Supreme Court 
decision permitting his continued presence in the Knesset). 
77
 In March 1999 Hamad Abdel Rahman Zuabi was appointed to a nine-month seat on Israel’s Supreme 
Court, and in May 2004 Salim Joubran became the first Arab to obtain a permanent seat.  See Greer Fay 
Cashman, It Was Joubran's Day, THE JERUSALEM POST, May 25, 2004, at 5.
78
 For example, Nawaf Masalha served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 28th government of 
Israel.  See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Previous+governments/Ministers%20and%20Senior%20Official
s%20of%20the%2028th%20Governm (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006).
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exceptions, Palestinian Arabs do not so choose, but larger numbers of 
Bedouin79 do.
No one should be deceived on the basis of the above sketch that 
Israel’s record of inclusion of its Arab minority has been stellar; quite the 
contrary.80  But, relevant to the present discussion, no less than Palestinian 
Arabs living in Israel, Israeli Jews, subject to certain conditions explored in 
Part IV of this article, should have a similar right to live within a Palestinian 
state.81  The continuance option in contrast to removal would allow Jews to 
live within their historic Jewish homeland, Eretz Yisrael, the land of Israel, 
although they would not be living within the state of Israel (Medinat 
Yisrael).  Indeed, the single most important reason that supports the 
continuance over the removal option is that the former upholds the liberal 
principle that Jews, qua Jews, are not forbidden to live in a particular place, 
whereas the removal option undermines if not denies that right.  Jordanian 
law forbade land ownership of land by Jews.82  Similarly, under the 
Palestinian Authority, a sale of land by an Arab to a Jew is considered a 
capital offense, and sellers of land to Jews have been executed.83  Are these 
truly policies that deserve reinforcement in a peace agreement between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority that creates a Palestinian state?
79 See David Ratner, Bedouins to Staff Public Transportation Security Unity in South, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/660306.html (updated Dec. 21, 2005).
80 See e.g. Dan Rabinowitz, A Lesson in Citizenship, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/659905.html (updated Dec. 21, 2005) (detailing how the Interior 
Ministry’s decision to reject a request of a predominantly Arab town to expand favors the Jewish 
population in the same area); Ruth Sinai, Arab Woman Petitions High Court Against Link Between Army 
Service, Mortgage Rights, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/665372.html (updated Jan. 3, 
2006) (suit filed with Supreme Court, alleging that army service, or alternative national service, which are 
optional rather than mandatory for Arabs, discriminates against Arabs because mortgage law gives 
additional points for such service).  On the other hand, there are ongoing efforts at greater inclusion.  For 
one such example, see Gideon Alon, Knesset Panel Recommends Building New Israeli Arab Town from 
Scratch, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/683443.html (updated Feb. 16, 2006) (the 
planning advisor of the Knesset Interior and Environment Committee has recommended the building of a 
new Arab town to deal with the shortage of space in existing Arab communities).  For a legal discussion of 
these ongoing efforts, see Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453, 479-98 (2003).
81
 It should be noted that this question differs from whether there is a “right of return” for Palestinian 
refugees.  See Ruth Lapidoth, Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return toIsrael?, Dec. 1, 2001, 
available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Do+Palestinian+Refugees+Hav
e+a+Right+to+Return+to.htm?DisplayMode=print .   Recognition and implementation of a right of return 
would mean that Israel would cease to exist as a predominantly Jewish state.  Recognizing a Jewish right to 
live in Palestine, particularly in the numbers that a final settlement with some border adjustments would 
imply, would not in any way undermine the future of Palestine as a predominantly Arab state.
82 DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 65 and 233; Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 315; Joshua 
Weisman, Restrictions on the Acquisition of Land by Aliens, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 47-48 (1980). 
83 See JUSTUS RIED WEINER, HUMAN RIGHTS OF CHRISTIANS IN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY 13 (2005), available 
at http://www.jcpa.org/christian-persecution.htm; Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 315.
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To Jews, the principle that Jewish communities are not excluded from 
maintaining communities on the West Bank is particularly important for 
reasons of identity and history.  Jewish identity began in the territory that the 
Roman Emperor Hadrian, following the Jewish revolt against the Romans in 
the second century, renamed Syria Palaestina in order to expunge its Jewish 
identity.84  Their formation as a people occurred between the millennium or 
so B.C.E. and the first several centuries A.D., during which they inhabited 
the land, returned from a forced exile to it, built two temples there, and then 
transformed their religious practices from one based upon priestly sacrifices 
to one based upon prayer.85  Excluding perhaps Jerusalem, specific areas of 
the West Bank which almost certainly would become part of a state of 
Palestine – for example, Hebron --  are more central to Jewish identity than 
areas west of the Jordan that would remain part of Israel86 when borders are 
drawn.  Jews had continually inhabited Hebron for millennia and 
continuously inhabited it for at least 500 years prior to a 1929 massacre at 
the hands of Muslim Arabs encouraged by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the British 
appointed grand mufti of Palestine, who later, living in Berlin as an adviser 
to Adolf Hitler, encouraged the latter to extend the Final Solution to the 
Jews living in the Middle East.87  The general area in which Israel sits, most 
frequently labeled either the “Middle East” or “Near East”, is one where 
Jews were either entirely excluded – e.g., The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
both historically88 and even at present89 – or subject to recurrent second-
class status (dhimmitude)90, persecutions and expulsions.  In the words of 
84
 Following the Jewish revolt led by Bar Kochba against Roman rule (132-135 c.e.), the Roman Emporer 
Hadrian took various measures against the Jews, including changing the name of the territory from Judaea 
(Israel) to Syria Palaestina.  See H.H.BEN-SASSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 334 (Harvard 10th
prtg. 1997).
85 BEN-SASSON, supra note 84, at 3-342.  See also GILBERT, supra note 44. 
86 PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1937) at 2 
[hereinafter “Peel Report”] (“…by about 1100 B.C. the Israelites had occupied most of the hill-country in 
Palestine and …were already distinguished from the peoples of the coast…”); Bradley Burston, Want 
Greater Israel? Vote for the Left, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=681161&contrassID=2 (updated Feb. 10,2006) 
(“Netanyahu…gave away nearly all of Hebron, a holy city second only to Jerusalem in its sanctity to 
Jews”).
87 DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 40-44.
88
 For descriptions of the slaughter of Jews and their expulsion from most of the Arabian peninsula, see 3 
HEINRICH GRAETZ, THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS 76-85 (Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia 1894); 
Hayim J. Cohen, Arabia, pp. 231-35 in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA (Keter Publishing, Jerusalem 1972).
89 See Saudi Arabia, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004
released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State,
February 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41731.htm (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006).
90 See MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS SHAYBANI’S SIYAR 11 (Johns Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore 1966): “the tolerated religious communities collectively called the ‘People of the Book’ or 
Dhimmis … preferred to hold fast to their own law and religion at the price of paying a poll tax (jizya) to 
Islamic authority.  The Muslims enjoyed full rights of citizenship while the followers of the tolerated 
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one scholar, while “persecution of Jews in the Islamic world never reached 
the scale of Christian Europe…[,] that did not spare the ‘Jews of Islam’ … 
from centuries of legally institutionalized inferiority, humiliating social 
restrictions and the sporadic rapacity of local officials and the Muslim 
population at large.”91  And, at least prior to the influx of Russian Jews in 
the later 1980’s and 1990’s, a majority of Israel’s Jewish citizenry were 
exiles from Arab lands, or the children or grandchildren of such exiles.92
Equally important to Israel’s identity and statehood was its emergence 
in the aftermath of the Holocaust,93 with the horrendous death of a majority 
of the relatives of most Ashkenazi Jews who settled in Israel.  And an 
essential Nazi idea, precedent to the Holocaust itself, was the alleged 
“despoliation” of the Aryan race by the presence of Jews in Germany and 
Austria. Nonetheless, Israel established relations with the Federal Republic 
of Germany.  But suppose that Germany had insisted as a price for such 
recognition that no Jew could henceforth live or own property within 
Germany.  Is it conceivable that Israel would ever have signed such a peace 
treaty?  For Israel to accept the fact that Jews, as Jews, cannot continue to 
live in a predominantly Arab governed polity severs a nerve cord connected 
to an important historical underpinning of the state of Israel.94
The removal and destruction of settlements from Gaza, in the context 
of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, produced much soul-searching 
and agony, but did not present the same emotional, historical and geographic 
challenges that removal from the West Bank would present.95  Nonetheless, 
religions enjoyed only partial civil rights…”  It should be noted that the term dhimmi initially implied a 
protected status, but as time went on it connoted an unequal and inferior status which subjected Jews to 
harsh treatment.
91 EPHRAIM KARSH, The Long Trail of Arab Anti-Semitism, in RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST 97, 98 
(2003).
92 See Sarah Sennott, It Is Now or Never; Iraqi Jews who were Stripped of their Citizenship and their 
Homes over the Past Half Century may Finally get a Chance to Reclaim them, NEWSWEEK.COM, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4703546/ (last updated Apr. 9, 2004).
93 See generally TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION:THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1993); AMOS 
ELON, THE ISRAELIS, FATHERS AND SONS 198-204 (1971).
94
 For sure, there are those who like former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who negotiated the Israeli-
Egyptian peace treaty precisely to that position:  as part of that peace treaty, Israel completely evacuated 
Yamit, an Israeli settlement, without any attempt to negotiate its continued existence as part of Egypt.  
Similarly, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon masterminded and successfully effected the evacuation of all 
Jewish settlements from Gaza.  But, to Jews, the Sinai and even Gaza do not have the same standing as the 
West Bank from religious, historical or geographical perspectives. See supra note 86, and accompanying 
text, and infra note 95 and accompanying text.
95 See Rafael D. Frankel, Security and Defense: Has Unilateralism Run its Course?, THE JERUSALEM POST,  
Feb. 16, 2006, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1139395428454&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(last viewed Feb. 17, 2006) (“[T]he West Bank was never viewed in the same light as Gaza by many 
Israelis. For years, a large segment of the country supported leaving the tiny coastal strip for demographic 
reasons, since only 8,000 Jews lived among 1.3 million Arabs. This sector also sought to stem what they 
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the Gaza removal, like an earlier decision by Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin to abandon Yamit in the context of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace 
treaty,96 does offer precedent for the removal option.  At the same time, 
another aspect of the Gaza withdrawal may actually offer a more apt analogy 
to the emotional agony of adopting and implementing the removal option in 
the context of West Bank settlements.  In response to public outcry and its 
own soul-searching, the Israeli cabinet, reversing an earlier decision, decided 
not to destroy any of the synagogues in Gaza.97
In sum, the continuance option maintains the principle that a minority, 
in this case, Jews, can maintain communities among a larger and different 
ethnic group, in the same way that Arab communities in Israel uphold the 
same principle.  The removal option contradicts this principle, in much the 
same way that the principle would be violated if little-supported proposals to 
transfer Palestinian Arabs out of Israel to the state of Palestine were ever 
pursued.  There are limits to the exercise of this principle – these are 
explored in Part IV – but the principle itself is a weighty one.   
B.  Jewish settlements as a metaphor of acceptance
The settlements should stay for another powerful reason.  The Arab-
Israeli dispute has been characterized by two competing narratives.98  Each 
narrative incorporates both an “affirmative” case, relating the Jewish or Arab 
nexus to the land, as the case may be, and a “negative” brief, that has as its 
considered to be the hemorrhaging of resources that providing security for the settlers there drained in 
terms of both money and blood. Moreover, Gaza was not the crucial security corridor that the West Bank 
is, nor were its sand dunes once home to the tribes of Israel, as were the hills and gullies of Judea and 
Samaria.”).  The recent evacuation of an illegal settlement on the West Bank, Amona, gives some 
indication of the emotional and political complications of evacuating West Bank settlements in general.  
See Amos Harel, Arnon  Regular, Nadav Shragai, & Johnathan Lis, Security Forces Demolish Amona 
Homes Amid Violent Clashes, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/676627.html (last updated, 
Feb. 1, 2006) (over 200 wounded settlers and police officers, along with several members of the Knesset 
from parties supportive of the settlers).  In the words of Hillel Halkin, “There is indeed something 
unacceptable about telling Jews that although they may live anywhere they wish, in New York and London, 
in Moscow and Buenos Aires, there is one part of the world they may not live in – namely, Judea and 
Samaria, those regions of the land of Israel most intimately connected with the Bible, with the second 
Temple period, and with Jewish historical memory, and most longed-for by the Jewish people over the 
ages.” Halkin, supra note 18, at 24.
96 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, Dec. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace Process/Guide to the Peace Process/Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
97 See Steven Erlanger, Synagogie Dispute Clouds Gaza Transfer, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 10, 2005, at A7. (“But, 
the expected occurred, and the synagogues were razed by the Palestinians after the Israelis departed.”)  
Greg Myre, Israel Lowers Its Flag in the Gaza Strip, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 12, 2005, at A10 (“Hours after the 
Israelis left the settlement of Neve Dekalim, young Palestinians were tearing aluminum window frames and 
metal ceiling fixtures out of the main synagogue there, as fires burned inside.”).
98 See DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 24 (2003).
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purpose and/or effect to deny the nexus asserted by the other. Unfortunately, 
the affirmative and negative parts of these stories are often so intertwined 
that separating these elements becomes difficult.99
Many of the affirmative elements of the Jewish narrative have been 
presented above.100 Its core is the several millennia nexus between the 
Jewish people and the land, Eretz Y’srael.101  Historically, Israel’s 
affirmative case was supplemented by its negative brief:  Palestine was 
99
 “We were here first”, even without the accompanying negation of the conflicting narrative, can be 
understood as, “You were here second.”
100 See supra notes 84-92, and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., Dore Gold & Jeff Helmreich, An Answer to the New Anti-Zionists:  The Rights of the Jewish 
People to a Sovereign State in Their Historic Homeland, JERUSALEM VIEWPOINTS No. 507 (Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs, Nov. 16, 2003), available at http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp507.htm.  Gold is a former 
representative of Israel to the United Nations.  Other prominent parties who have described these narratives 
are Yehoshua Porath, Professor Emeritus from Hebrew University (See Yehoshua Porath, Mrs. Peters’s 
Palestine, 32 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 36-40, Nos. 21 & 22, Jan. 16, 1986, and  Walter Reich, former 
director of the US Holocaust Museum, 1995-98, and Professor of International Affairs, Ethics and Human 
Behavior at George Washington University. See Walter Reich, Reich’s Letter to Samuel Rosner , available 
at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerGuest.jhtml?itemNo=670656 (last viewed Jan. 16, 2006).  
Porath, writing a critical review of Joan Peters’ From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-
Jewish Conflict over Palestine, writes somewhat critically of some elements of the Jewish narrative, at least 
in its unquestioned form: 
“Jews, and Zionists especially, developed their own myths about Palestine. First they interpreted 
ancient Jewish history according to the ideology of modern nationalism, equating the old Israelite 
and Judean kingdoms with modern nation-states. The Maccabean revolt and the period of 
Hasmonean rule were seen as typical manifestations of the struggle for modern national liberation. 
During the years when most Jews lived in exile, it was argued, they always kept a separate 
national identity: they never converted of their free will to another religion, and they preserved the 
memory of their ancestral land, to which they always hoped to return. Indeed, against all odds, 
some never left. Special emphasis was put on this last group. Every bit of evidence that could be 
found, however trivial it may have been, was used to prove the continuity of the Jewish presence 
in Eretz Israel and to show that it was central to the life of Jews in exile … The Zionists argued 
that Jewish identity and the yearning to return to Palestine were strengthened by the persecutions 
of the Jews in all parts of the world, including the Islamic and Arab countries. The return itself 
was mainly perceived as a matter of Jewish resolve to establish a homeland, which required 
struggle against Palestine's foreign rulers—the Ottoman Empire first, and then the British 
Mandate.”  Porath, supra, at 36.  
Reich describes the Jewish narrative thus:
 “It was a story that saw that the Jewish claim to the land as ancient and unbroken. Central to this 
story was the understanding that the Jews had lived in that land for over a thousand years; that it 
was the core of their cultural, moral and religious achievements; that while there they had 
developed the teachings that had spawned the three great religions of the West; that it was the 
place of their Temples and the site of their worship and their Zion; that ultimately most of the 
Jews were exiled from that land; that many nevertheless remained in it; that the exiles continued to 
pray, three times a day, for a return to it; that while they were in exile in Europe they were 
constantly abused and repeatedly and genocidally massacred; that as a result, in the nineteenth 
century, Herzl and other political Zionists created a movement, Zionism, to bring Jews back to 
their homeland, their Zion, where they could a normal nation, determine their own destiny and 
protect themselves; and that the creation of Israel was a just achievement based on the origin of 
the Jews in that land and a necessary achievement based on the centuries of massacres and 
genocide the Jews had endured in exile, of which the Holocaust was the most recent and most 
stunning example.” 
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barely inhabited when modern Jewish immigration began; many Arabs came 
to Palestine attracted by the economic development produced by modern 
Zionism prior to the establishment of the State of Israel; Palestinians never 
considered themselves to be a separate people in a separate polity apart from 
other Arabs; and, in general, Arab states and the Palestinians have pursued 
repeated warfare and terrorism against Israel and the Jews.102  Combining its 
affirmative and negative elements, the Israeli narrative has historically 
portrayed the conflict as the unwillingness – carried to the extreme of Arab 
encouragement of the Holocaust, of successive wars against Israel, and of 
repeated acts of terrorism during the years of Israel’s existence – to permit 
the existence of a sovereign Jewish nation in the Middle East despite the 
demonstrated connection between the Jewish people and the land.
As might be expected, the Palestinian narrative substantially differs. 
Its affirmative case stresses the fact that at the end of the nineteenth century 
Palestine was inhabited, that Arabs formed the majority of the population, 
and that Arabs lived in villages – i.e., they were more than Bedhouin
roaming across the deserts.  More recently, Palestinians have sought to 
buttress their claim to the land with the assertion that Palestinian are 
descended from the Canaanites and therefore have always inhabited the land, 
preceding even the ancient Hebrews. It is the Palestinian negative brief, 
however, that has seemed to merit the most repetition.  Walter Reich, former 
director of the United States Holocaust Museum and now Professor of 
International Affairs, Ethics and Human Behavior at George Washington 
University, describes its elements as follows: 
          According to the Palestinian narrative, Jews have no right to the 
land, and even had nothing, or little, to do with it in the past. The Jews 
of today are seen as unrelated to the Hebrews who lived there two 
thousand years ago; according to some versions of this narrative, 
European Jews were simply the offspring of converts in Europe, and 
were not descended from the Hebrews who used to live in what is 
now Israel and the West Bank. So important is it for the Palestinian 
"narrative" to deny the Jewish connection with the land - and therefore 
102
 Porath describes the negative brief as follows:  “The Arab population was not presented as a major 
obstacle since, it was said, it was so small. Palestine during the late Ottoman and early British periods was 
portrayed as a barren land, hardly inhabited, whose tiny Arab population consisted mostly of wandering 
Bedouin tribes whose presence was only temporary.  According to the Zionist myth, only modern Jewish 
colonization brought about the economic development of Palestine and improved the hard conditions there. 
These developments, it was said, attracted poor Arabs from the stagnant neighboring countries. Their 
numbers grew faster than the Jewish immigrants because the malicious British authorities always 
encouraged them to come and did much to help to absorb them, both economically and legally.” Porath, 
supra note 101, at 36.
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the justice of the Zionist return - that even the existence of the 
Temples is denied. …
By creating Israel, Europeans were colonizing Palestine, 
coming there without any basis for their arrival, much as the French 
had colonized Algeria and the Boers and British had colonized South 
Africa.103
According to this view, then, Israel’s creation – a European colonial 
enterprise to deny Palestinians, the indigenous population, their right to the 
land and sovereignty104-- was “utterly unjust.”105
To what degree have Jews and Arabs remained steadfast in believing 
in and/or adhering to these narratives?  Most Israelis still believe in the 
positive core of their narrative – that Zionism and the resultant State of Israel 
represented the act of self-determination by a people with an extraordinarily 
103
 Reich, supra note 101.
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 This view is repeatedly emphasized in the various writings of Edward Said.  See, e.g., SAID, supra note 
4.  Summarizing Said’s writing on the subject, Karsh characterizing Said’s view as “the local populations 
of the Middle East, the Arabs in particular, as the hapless victims of an alien encroachment …”   See
EFRAIM KARSH, RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 37, preface.  Porath describes the Palestinian 
“myths” in the following terms: “The Arab side tried to prove that first of all the Jews were not a nation in 
the modern sense of the term and consequently did not require a state of their own. In the tradition of both 
Western liberal and doctrinaire socialist thinking, the Arabs argued that the Jews were only a religious 
community; that peoples could not return to their ancient homelands without turning the entire world 
upside down; and, most important, that Palestine had been settled since the seventh century AD by Arabs. 
Over the years many Arab ideologists even claimed that Arabs had occupied the land in pre-Biblical times 
because of the "Arab character" of Canaanites.  ¶Zionism, the Arab argument continued, if it had any grain 
of historical justification at all, emerged only in a European setting. It came about as a reaction to Western 
Christian or secular and racist anti-Semitism, with which the Arabs had nothing to do; therefore, they 
should not be required to pay the costs of remedying it. In Arab and Islamic countries Jews suffered none 
of the terrible treatment that Western Jews had suffered. On the contrary, the Muslims in general and the 
Arabs in particular treated their religious and ethnic minorities with full equality and enabled both 
Christians and Jews to take part in public life, to rise to high positions of state, and, in recent times, to 
become full members of the modern and secular Arab nation living in its various states. The Jews living in 
the Arab and Muslim countries, moreover, did not take part in the Zionist movement. They even actively 
opposed it and did not want to emigrate to Israel. That most of them eventually did so the Arabs attribute to 
the machinations of Israel working with corrupt Arab rulers who were "stooges of imperialism."¶After the 
1948 war Arab propaganda added an important new claim: since the Jews wanted Palestine empty of 
Arabs, they used the opportunity of the war to systematically expel the indigenous Arab population 
wherever they could do so. Some Arab writers, and others favorable to their cause, have gone so far as to 
claim that the war itself was set off in December 1947 by the Jews in order to create the right circumstances 
for the mass expulsion of Palestinian Arabs from their homeland. ¶Until the mid-1960s the Arab claims 
were usually presented as part of the ideology of Arab nationalism. Palestine was (and ideologically 
speaking still is) considered part of the greater Arab homeland and the Palestinians part of the greater Arab 
nation. The aim of the Arab struggle was to preserve the Arab character of Palestine from the Jewish-
Zionist threat. The Palestinian case was at best secondary when it was made at all. Only since the middle of 
the 1960s and particularly after 1967 has the distinctively Palestinian component become relatively 
stronger among the factors that shape the identity of the Palestinian Arabs.” Porath, supra note 101 at 36. 
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strong physical, emotional and religious nexus to the land106 – but have 
abandoned key elements of their negative brief.107  In doing so, most Israelis 
understand that the Jewish/Arab struggle is, in the words of Chaim  
Weizmann, the first president of Israel, “not the clash of right and wrong, 
but the clash of two rights.”108  It is unclear, however, whether Arabs, in 
general, and Palestinians, in particular, have similarly abandoned those 
narrative elements that would deny any legitimacy to Jewish historical 
claims.109 Writing approximately 15 years ago, Michael Curtis noted, “it 
needs to be reiterated that the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains what 
it has been for some seventy years, the implacable opposition by Arab states, 
except Egypt since 1979, to the Jewish presence in the Mandate area of 
Palestine and, since 1948, to the existence of the state of Israel.”110  While in 
the subsequent fifteen years Jordan has made peace with Israel and the 
Palestine National Council met to revise the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization charter111 – sometimes referred to as the Palestine National 
Charter – the only publicly available version still calls for the destruction of 
Israel112 as does the even harsher representation of Israel and Jews in 
Hamas’ charter.113  And, as recently as the Camp David summit between 
then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, President Yasir Arafat of the 
Palestinian Authority, and President Clinton, Arafat reportedly insisted on 
“repeat[ing] old mythologies and invent[ing] new ones, like, for example, 
that the Temple was not in Jerusalem …”114
To the Israelis, the question is an existential one:  can Jews, as Jews, 
live with a degree of power and not in dhimmi status within the Middle East?  
That is, is there some acceptance of the Jewish narrative of a permanent and 
106
 See Raday, supra note 30 at 461-68.
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 This is not to say that all elements of the Israeli negative brief are incorrect, any more than that there is 
no truth to the Palestinian negative brief.  For example, Kenneth Stein’s exhaustive study of histories of the 
Middle East revealed that “[b]efore 1950, Arab histories that treated Palestine or the Palestinian Arabs as 
separate historical entities were extremely rare.” Kenneth W. Stein, A Historiographic Review of Literature 
on the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 96 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, 1450, 1454 (1991).  
He added, “Most Arab historians viewed Palestine as a geographic aejunt to greater Syria and Palestinians 
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 Eugene V. Rostow, Correspondence, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 717, 719 (1990).
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112 See Palestine National Charter, http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/pna_three.html (last viewed Feb. 12, 
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113 See supra note 42.  See also Richard Cohen, A Disturbing Invitation, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at 
A15 (discussing the extent to which Hamas is not only anti-Israel but virulently anti-Semitic).
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 Dennis Ross, Camp David: An Exchange, 48 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, No. 14, Sep. 20, 2001, at 90.  
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continual connection between the Jewish people and this land?  Whether 
Jews are permitted to live within a state of Palestine, in effect, then, is a 
metaphor as to whether Israel, as a Jewish nation, can live in a sea of 22 or, 
once Palestine is established, 23 different Arab nations within the area.115
And if the answer is negative – that is, any Arab state that is established 
must exist without Jewish settlements – then that answer portends that any 
Palestinian state that will be established will not have as its true goal the 
two-state solution.  To Israel, the question of establishing a legal entity of 
Palestine depends upon whether that is the end of the conflict – an 
acknowledgement that Jews too have rights to the land (as Israel, in 
recognizing such a Palestinian state, would reciprocally be acknowledging) 
– or simply a strategic move to be supplanted one day by one predominantly 
Arab state.116
115 See Halkin, supra note 18, at 27 (“One thing should be clear.  A West Bank without Jews means a 
Palestine and Israel without a normal relationship.”); Halkin, Beyond the Geneva Accords, supra note 22 at 
26 (“The issue, should be clear, is not one of sovereignty.  There is no reason why, under conditions of 
peace, Jewish towns and villages should not exist in a sovereign Palestine as Arab towns and villages exist 
in a sovereign Israel.  On the contrary: if a sovereign Palestine cannot tolerate the presence of Jews, in what 
sense has it made peace with a Jewish state?”).
116 See Giora Eiland, The Palestinian Authority and the Challenge of Palestinian Elections, 5 JERUSALEM 
ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 1, 2006, available at http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-16.htm (last viewed Feb. 2, 
2006) (“The second strategic decision that the Palestinians have yet to make is to recognize that a two-state 
solution means that one one side there will be a Palestinian state, but on the other side there will be a 
Jewish state.” Id. at 5).  Eiland, who is head of Israel’s National Security Council, adds, “I have never heard 
any real Arab leader say loud and clear that Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish state.  We are looking 
for real recognition of the right of a Jewish state to exist alongside a Palestinian state and we have not yet 
heard it.” Id.  See also Daniel Pipes, Why Hamas Leaves Me Neutral, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 31, 2006, 
http://www.nysun.com/article/26722 (last viewed Feb. 2, 2006) (“…the elections might bring benefits, 
prompting Israelis finally to recognize the deep and pervasive anti-Zionism in the Palestinian Arab body 
politic.”); Henry A. Kissinger, What’s Needed From Hamas, WASH. POST , Feb. 27, 2006, at A15 (“Even 
relatively conciliatory Arab statements, such as the Beirut summit declaration of 2003, reject Israel's 
legitimacy as inherent in its sovereignty; they require the fulfillment of certain prior conditions. Almost all 
official and semi-official Arab and Palestinian media and schoolbooks present Israel as an illegitimate, 
imperialist interloper in the region.  Even Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, who are in the minority in not 
ascribing all responsibility for the breakdown of the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000 to Arafat and 
the Palestinians (see infra note 195), describe the Palestinian perspective in the following terms:  “For all 
the talk about peace and reconciliation, most Palestinians were more resigned to the two-state solution than 
they were willing to embrace; they were prepared to accept Israel’s existence, but not its moral legitimacy.  
The war for the whole of Palestine was over because it had been lost. Oslo, as they saw it, was not about 
negotiating peace terms but terms of surrender.”  Robert Malley & Hussein Agla, Camp David:  The 
Tragedy of Errors, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 9, 2001, 59-64 at 62.
 Hamas has been even more explicit about its aim of liberating all of Palestine even after its 
Parliamentary elections it extends the hudna, or truce, against Israel. Hamas Leader Khaled Mash’al, in 
remarks at a Damascus mosque on February 3, 2006, “By Allah, I know that all Arab leaders – and I have 
met many of them – deep inside want the resistance in Palestine to be victorious, and want Palestine to be 
liberated.  Perhaps the need for flattery and for diplomacy, and the American hegemony, force other things 
on them, but in their hearts they are happy when we are victorious.” The Middle East Media Research 
Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series – No. 1087, http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD108706
(Feb. 7, 2006).  See also Asaf Maliach, Hamas’ post-election Strategy, Step-by-step to the liberation of 
Palestine, Feb. 5, 2006, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=557 (last viewed Feb. 17, 
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C.  Contiguity and Borders
If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in establishing order and a 
functioning self-governing entity in Gaza117 and if Hamas’ recent victory in 
Palestinian parliamentary elections does not derail peace efforts, it is 
inevitable that a Palestinian state, the geographic bulk and center of which 
will consist of much of the West Bank, will be established.  In addition to 
the question of how Gaza and the West Bank will be connected, a key focus 
now has become whether the West Bank part of that state will be a 
contiguous unit, with sensible borders, or a group of loosely tied districts. 
Given the very small area west of the Jordan, only 10,871 square miles,118
drawing borders with the clarity that often characterized colonial borders is 
impossible, and contiguity for both a predominantly Jewish and a 
predominantly Arab Palestinian state is not easy to achieve.  The Peel 
Commission Partition Plan of July 1937 would have allowed for a 
2006) (“Hamas' calls for the "Hudna" with Israel is merely an ancient maneuver commonly used by radical 
Islamic organizations to reestablish and strengthen their power without being exposed to danger from their 
adversaries. The "Hudna" is intended to serve the step by step program that Hamas advocates for the 
liberation of all of Palestine, from the sea to the river.” Id. at 4). 
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LONDON TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-1729052,00.html; 
Sarah El Deeb, Palestinian Police Storm Gaza-Egypt Border, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2005/12/30/AR2005123000176.html (describing 
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1675137,00.html (describing the growing anarchy in Gaza 
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prompted exodus of foreigners, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-1963176,00.html (Dec. 30, 
2005) (“Security has deteriorated to such an extent over the past year that only a few dozen international 
staff dare to live and work in Gaza [, as a result of]…the authority … cav[ing]in to the kidnappers’ 
demands, fuelling the cycle of seizures by clans or groups of renegade gunmen who have seen the 
snatching of foreign staff as a quick way to resolve their difficulties.”); Ze’ev Schiff, Escalation is 
inevitable, HAARETZ,  http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/664152.html (updated Dec. 30, 2005) 
(describing how all the assumptions about the cessation of Qassam rockets being fired against Israel once 
Israel withdrew from Gaza have proved wrong); Editorial, Democracy in Palestine, 
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contiguous Arab state, but not a contiguous Jewish state119; a 1938 Jewish 
proposal for partition foresaw both a Jewish and an Arab state in several 
sections120; a British proposal for partition of the same year envisioned a 
Jewish state in two sections and an Arab state that included Jaffa but was 
physically cut off from it121; and pursuant to the 1947 United Nations 
Partition Plan, accepted by the Jews but rejected by the Arabs, both Israel 
and the Palestinian state would have had three different segments.  And, 
perhaps most significant to the present discussion, even a cursory look at a 
map of Israel slightly north of Tel Aviv, its largest city, reveals a pre-1967 
“waist-line” of only approximately 15 kilometers, in an area with a 
population even more dense that that of the Gaza Strip.122  It has been 
suggested that if the largest of the settlements, Maale Admumim, remained 
under Israeli sovereignty and were connected to Jerusalem by construction 
in the several kilometer stretch between the two, a Palestinian state would 
lack contiguity, but, in fact, the Palestinian state would still have the same 
width at that point, 15 kilometers as has Israel at its narrowest point.  In 
other words, continuance of Israeli settlements on the West Bank even if 
they remained under Israeli sovereignty would probably not result in a 
Palestinian state any less convoluted than the State of Israel. 
Nonetheless, contiguity has seemingly been elevated from wise 
policy, to the extent it can reasonably be achieved, to principle, and a 
frequent allegation leveled against Jewish settlements is that they prevent a 
contiguous Palestinian state with sensible borders.123 And the facile 
conclusion is that if the presence of settlements with Israeli Jews prevents a 
119 See Peel Report, supra note 84, at 382-86 and map No.8, “Partition Provisional Frontier”.  The map is 
reproduced in GILBERT, supra note 44.  The Peel Commission was appointed by Edward, the 8th, to 
determine the causes of riots in Palestine in 1936 and to make recommendations to prevent their recurrence.
120 See GILBERT, supra note 44, at 26.
121 See GILBERT, supra note 44, at 27.
122 See U. Elitzur, It’s Crowded Around Here, Oct. 6, 2005, www.yenetnews.com; The Contiguity Double 
Standard, 14 CAMERA MEDIA REPORT #2 at 15-6 (Fall, 2005);  Routledge Atlas at 53.
123 See Editorial, Bush, Abbas Intentions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2005, at A16, (“Palestinians perceive 
continued thickening of settlements as proof that Israel has no intention of allowing a viable Palestinian 
state on land that is not divided into multiple separate enclaves.”); Yehezkel Lein, Land Grab Israel’s 
Settlement Policy in the West Bank at 42 (B’Tselem May 2002) (“many settlements block the territorial 
continuity of dozens of Palestinian enclaves…This lack of contiguity prevents the establishment of a viable 
Palestinaian state, and therefore prevents realization of the right to self-determination.”).  For example, it 
has been charged that Israeli construction of housing on the several kilometers of land that lie between 
Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, the largest of the West Bank settlements, would preclude contiguity for a 
state of Palestine.  In fact, however, such a state to the east and southeast of Maale Adumim would still 
have a waist as wide as that of Israel in the Qualkilya-Kfar Saba area.  See HonestReporting Communique, 
Orla Guerin’s Lack of Contiguity, May 2, 2005,   
http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/45884734/critiques/Orla_Guerins_Lack_of_Contiguity.asp.  For 
specific examples of smaller settlements that are said to interfere with Palestinian community contiguity 
south of Jerusalem, see Lein, at 102.
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contiguous state with sensible borders, then the simple solution is to remove 
rather than tolerate them.124  Both principle and policy, however, militate in 
favor of continuance over removal.
The principled reason has already been explored:  removal only 
achieves contiguity at the expense of the principle that Jewish communities, 
just because they are Jewish communities, should not automatically be 
excluded from the Land of Israel, whereas the continuance option, by 
separating the concept of Jewish settlements from Jewish sovereignty, 
allows for both contiguity and that principle.  
The policy reason takes account of political reality.  With its implicit 
equation of Jewish settlements and Israeli sovereignty, the removal option 
puts tremendous stress on the question of the exact location of the border
between Israel and a state of Palestine.   This phenomenon is reflected, for 
example, in pressure to expand Jerusalem eastward so that Jews inhabit a 
geographic continuum between Jerusalem and settlements east of it.125  In 
contrast, if Jews could be assured that, as Jews, they would be allowed to 
live safely and freely within Eretz Yisrael, albeit outside of Israel’s 
sovereignty, less opposition can be expected to the question of exactly where 
the border will lie.126  And the weight the question holds – does the final 
resolution involve the forced removal of between 50,000 to 100,000 people, 
including Jews who perceive of their communities in religious terms, or does 
it only involve acknowledging Palestinian sovereignty without interfering 
with the lives of the people in these communities? – bears on not only the 
probable success of negotiations, but the time it will take to arrive at a 
124
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example, the views expressed to President Bush by Palestinians aids of  Abbas in a recent meeting. Kessler, 
supra note 9 . 
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Talk of Unified Jerusalem, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArtVty.jhtml?sw=Nadav+Shragai&itemNo=690895 (last updated 
Mar. 7, 2006) (describing the sharp disagreements over what neighborhoods in or closely adjacent to 
Jerusalem will remain in any “division” of the city).
126 See references in notes 454 and 455, infra, as to the diminishing role of sovereignty in its classical sense.  
Analogously, Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan recognized Jordan’s sovereignty over certain areas which 
were then effectively leased back to Israel  for a initial period of 25 years.  See Annex I to Treaty of Peace 
Between Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and State of Israel, Oct. 24, 1994, available at
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html.                                 .
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resolution.   In short, it is actually the continuance option that offers the 
greater prospect of a Palestinian state, Gaza aside, that minimally has 
borders that make as much sense as the Green Line that characterized 
Israel’s pre-1967 borders.
D.  Cost considerations
Continuance of Jewish settlements is also the least expensive way of 
creating a Palestinian state.  Although creation of a Palestinian state by 
2005, there is still great impetus for that reality to be created sooner rather 
than later.  Three sets of cost considerations need to be considered:  the costs 
associated with establishing a viable Palestinian state; the costs associated 
with resolving the Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems; and, if removal 
rather than continuance is the option effected, the cost to Israel of removing 
and resettling all settlers not within the final borders of Israel once a peace 
agreement is concluded.
The first broad category of costs includes those associated with 
insuring the viability of the new Palestinian state.  To bolster the Palestinian 
economy and to provide other practical perquisites for statehood will require 
billions of dollars.127  Even in anticipation of Israel’s withdrawal of 
settlements from Gaza, the World Bank estimated that an additional $1.8 
billion of donor aid would be necessary.128  The costs for insuring the 
economic viability of a Palestinian state following an Israeli withdrawal 
from the West Bank would be exponentially higher.  While much of its 
economic success would be dependent upon the ability of a much higher 
number of Palestinians to find labor in Israel again, as in the period prior to 
the 2000 intifada, increasing Palestinian economic independence is highly 
desirable.129 The most recent World Bank Report on the Palestinian 
economy credited its real 8-9 percent growth of gross domestic product in 
2005, on the financial side, to large increases in both credit to the private 
sector – 30 percent – and donor disbursements – 20 percent to $1.1 billon.130
Its conclusion is that “[t]he only satisfactory way forward is to combine 
127
 By way of example, to build an internal security infrastructure the Palestinian Authority could require 
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good policies by both sides with more money”,131 and called on “[d]onors … 
to increase their assistance levels” further.132
The creation of a de jure Palestinian state, with recognition by Israel, 
the United States and others, will almost certainly require a permanent 
resolution of both the Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems.  Otherwise, 
felt grievances that have made peace between Israel and Palestinians in the 
Middle East so illusive will continue to hamper true reconciliation. Those 
Palestinian refugees, or their descendants, who fled Israel or the territory that 
became Israel in the 1947-48 period, will have to abandon their claimed 
right of return to places within the borders of Israel.  It matters little whether 
international law supports such a right of return133 or the exact circumstances 
of their exodus.  Some refugees – probably small in number compared with 
those claiming refugee status -- might in fact be allowed to reunite with 
family in Israel itself, but, for most, resolution of their status will entail 
permanent residence and citizenship in other parts of the Arab world and/or 
within the new state of Palestine, with some compensation for claimed 
losses of property within the state of Israel.   Resettlement and payments for 
claimed property losses will itself cost tens of billions of dollars.134  Jews 
forced to flee from Arab countries, contemporaneously with or soon after the 
establishment of the state of Israel, are similarly seeking compensation for 
the loss of value of their homes and businesses.135  In the words of Julius 
Stone, “any rule of international law requiring rights of return or 
compensation would have to apply equally to Jewish refugees from Arab 
countries…”136
If the removal rather than continuance option were chosen, it is 
necessary to consider as well the cost of evacuating and resettling any 
Jewish settlers whose settlements are not included within the borders of 
Israel as negotiated between it and the Palestinian Authority.  The aggregate 
131 Id. at 2.
132 Id. at 5.
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http://www.americansephardifederation.org/sub/sources/jewish_refugees.asp (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006).  
For a detailed study of the property that was seized, see generally ITAMAR LEVIN, LOCKED DORRS: THE 
SEIZURE OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN ARAB COUNTRIES (2001). 
136 STONE, supra note 118, at 67.
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cost of removing 7,000 settlers from Gaza and initiating their resettlement 
has already exceeded $1 billion.137 As of four years ago, one party estimated 
that the total cost of evacuating all the settlements at over $20 billion,138 an 
amount that would have to be adjusted upwards to take account of inflation 
in the price of housing within the pre-1967 borders of Israel.  Moreover, the 
definition of “cost” becomes relevant.  Most usage of the term in the Gaza 
context referred to the cost of compensating Gaza residents for the loss of 
their homes.  Necessarily, any compensation suffers from being both highly 
subjective and highly objective, at one and the same time.  The scheme is 
highly subjective in the sense that politics and availability of funds 
determine the outcome as much as any rigorous effort to determine all the 
financial costs of resettlement.139  As of three months after the 
disengagement from Gaza, three-quarters of the evacuees were unemployed 
and a substantial number still living in tents.140  The scheme is highly 
objective in the sense that rather than an individualized and highly 
particularized calculation, settlers are treated in broad categories.   While the 
exact number of settlers that would have to be compensated from a West 
Bank withdrawal varies depending upon which settlements would remain in 
an Israel with modified borders, the number is usually presented as upwards 
of 70,000 people.  Moreover, since greater opposition to the removal of 
West Bank settlements can be expected, even the cost of implementing such 
a decision would probably well exceed the enforcement expenses in 
evacuating the Gaza settlements.141 Inevitably, Israel would turn to the 
international community and especially the United States to aid with such a 
137
 Different sources report different calculations.  Compare Meirav Arlosoroff, Billion-Shekel Culture 
Shock, HAARETZ, Dec. 6, 2005, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ArticleContent.jhtml?itemNo=654026 (“The civilian cost of 
evauating Gaza, the cost of moving just 1,700 famlies, has already reached NIS 5 billion to NIS 6.5 
billion.”, with 4.62 Israeli shekels to the US dollar on Dec. 6) with Motti Bassok, Fischer:  Israel’s Credit 
Rating Could be Raised with Stable Fiscal Responsibility, HAARETZ, Dec. 21, 2005, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/660416.html (“The total civil cost to the state of disengaging from 
the Gaza Strip has reached NIS 4.8 billion, according to Yonatan Bassi, head of the Disengagement 
Administration”, with 4.598 Israeli shekels to the dollar on Dec. 21, 2005).  Neither figure appears to 
include the full costs, including the loss of income to the evacuees, most of whom are not employed yet, the 
psychological and similar personal related costs, or the military costs of removal.  All of these were 
considerable.  The military costs would have to include the costs of mobilizing and devoting a sufficient 
number of appropriate military personnel to handle the removal.
138
 Halkin, Why the Settlements Should Stay, supra note 18, at 22.
139
 Arsoloff, supra note 137.
140
 Nadav Shragai, 75% of Pullout Evacuees Jobless, HAARETZ, Nov. 9, 2005, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/643163.html.
141 See e.g., the enormous costs of evacuating a few settlers from the illegal settlement of Amona, given the 
number of other people who join in protesting the decision.  Jonathan Lis, Amona Evacuation Cost NIS 
7.5M, Most of it from Money Earmarked for War on Crime, HAARETZ, Feb. 9, 2006, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/680575.html.
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resettlement at the same time that enormous financial demands would be 
made upon that same external community to fund the costs of a new 
Palestinian state as well as to resolve the Palestinian and Jewish refugee 
problems.
In sum, requiring as a condition for the creation of a Palestinian state 
that no Jewish communities continue to exist within its borders would mean 
substantially aggravating the calculus of the total costs of that creation.  
Correlatively, the fastest and least expensive means of achieving a 
Palestinian state is to allow Jews to remain within its borders.
IV. Conditions precedent for Israeli Jewish settlements in a state of Palestine
All other things being equal, continuance is preferable to removal 
based upon both considerations of principle, contiguity, cost and final 
resolution of the conflict.  But are other things equal?  It has been argued 
that Jewish settlements stand on “Arab” land, violate international and other 
law, and prevent the establishment of a viable, sovereign Palestinian state, 
and that neither Jews nor Arabs would find it practical to have Jewish 
settlements continue to exist in that state.  These arguments, in effect, posit 
conditions that must be satisfied for Jewish settlements to remain in 
Palestine:  that settlements are not shown to have been established on 
“Arab” land; that their establishment is not demonstrated to have been 
“illegal” under international and other law; that their presence does not 
prevent the creation of a viable sovereign Palestinian state; and that 
continuance rather than removal is a pragmatic solution.
These have been identified as necessary conditions not only because 
they respond to arguments and concerns that have been voiced against, or 
about, Jewish settlements on the West Bank, but also for independent good 
cause.  The condition that Jewish settlements not lie on land that legally 
belongs to another is based upon the principle that even military victory does 
not justify theft of property.142  Abstractly, at least, the international law 
condition – that the creation or continued presence of the settlements not be 
conclusively demonstrated to have violated that body of law -- is premised 
both upon respect for that body of law, and the instrumental consideration 
that if actions contrary to law are validated, one simply invites additional 
breaches.  Exploring the legality of Jewish settlements is quite difficult, 
142
 Admittedly, this principle is often violated more in the breach than the observance, as is evidenced by 
the difficulty of original owners of artwork or land prior to the Holocaust in retrieving or laying successful 
claim to their property, even in European nations that pledge adherence to this principle.
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which is why this condition has been stated in the negative.143 Because the 
question of land ownership and use implicates questions of international law, 
the issue of land ownership is considered below as part of the overall 
discussion of international law.   
The condition that Israeli Jewish settlements not prevent the creation 
of a viable Palestinian state is necessitated by the desirability of the two-
state solution.  As explored previously, any solution other than two states 
would eventually mean the cessation of the state of Israel or, as previously 
discussed, apartheid-like or forced transfer options that would negate Israel’s 
status as a democracy.  The pragmatic condition responds to an argument 
that has been made even by parties that do not necessarily accept the notion 
that Jewish settlements are illegal or would interfere with the creation of a 
viable Palestinian state.  If the continuance option is not pragmatic, most 
particularly if Jews would not want to live in such a state for fear of their 
safety or based upon other grounds, then the continuance option advanced in 
this Article is at best academic.  Both the state viability condition – which 
deals primarily with Palestinian interests – and the pragmatic condition –
which addresses primarily Israeli interests – force us to confront the issue of 
what it would mean for Israeli Jews to live under Palestinian Arab 
sovereignty.
A. That Israeli settlements are not demonstrated to be illegal: the 
occupation, land, and transfer issues
Well over one hundred scholarly works weigh in on the question of 
whether Israeli settlements are “illegal.”144  When this body of work gets 
condensed in the popular press, the dominant notion seems to be the 
settlements are illegal, and the more popular commentators and politicians 
hostile to Israel repeat this, the more it is believed.145  The task here is not to 
repeat or refute every scholarly argument, but it is interesting to reflect both 
143
 The condition, as stated, is that Israeli settlements have not been conclusively demonstrated to be illegal 
under international law rather than that Israeli settlements be demonstrated to be consistent with 
international law. This condition is intentionally stated in the negative because of the political nature of the 
legal arguments.  Given their inconclusive character, other arguments – both pro and con the settlements –
would seem to be of greater relevance.  See infra notes 443 to 493, and accompanying text.
144 See sources cited in Peter Malanczuk, Israel: Status, Territory and Occuped Territories, 1468-1508 at 
1497-1501, in Rudolf Bernhardt, editor, 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERANTIONAL LAW, (1995).
145
 As Martha Minow has noted in reference to the persistence of belief in the Czarist forgery, Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion, “mere resonance and reverberation lends credibility.” Martha Minow, The Persistance 
of Falsehood and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 47-55, at 47 in DEBORAH R. KAUFMAN, et.al,eds., 
FROM THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION TO HOLOCAUST DENIAL TRIALS, CHALLENGING THE MEDIA, 
THE LAW AND THE ACADEMY (2006) (forthcoming).
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on the extent to which these arguments have changed over time (somewhat) 
and the weaknesses inherent in the arguments of both supporters and 
opponents of the settlements.  
The arguments on both sides are well rehearsed and extraordinarily 
heated.146  Unfortunately, as Michael Curtis has observed, “[n]o doubt, 
customary and conventional international law have often been used to 
buttress tendentious political positions, and it would be unrealistic to expect 
otherwise.”147  Commenting on the views of two such scholars who have 
sought to support Palestinian violence148, Curtis characterized their argument 
as “infused with an animus that exceeds the usual boundaries of scholarly 
discourse while paying scant attention to the realities of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.”149 Some commentators start from such a strong position that the 
creation of the State of Israel is “unlawful” or “wrongful” that their 
particular position with respect to Israeli settlements on the West Bank is 
both predetermined and suspect.150
International law based arguments concerning Israeli settlements rest 
primarily upon two sources of international law:  the 1907 Hague 
Regulations151 and the 1949 4th Geneva Convention.152  In particular, 
146
 See, e.g., Craig Jackson, Israeli West Bank Settlements, the Reagan Administration’s Policy Toward the 
Middle East and International Law, 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 217 (1987)(The different remarks made 
in American Society of International Law Proceedings, April 25-27, 1985). 
147
 Curtis, supra note 110.
148
 Richard A. Falk, Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the 
West Bank and Gaza:  In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129 (1991).
149
 Curtis, supra note 110.
150 See, e.g., W. THOMAS MALLISON, SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1986).  After starting their study denigrating the concept of a “Jewish people” 
and the Zionist movement (at 1-17), the Balfour Declaration calling for the creation of a Jewish state in the 
Palestinian Mandate (at 18-78), the Jewish Agency which acquired by purchase most of the land on which 
Jewish settlers within the “Green Line” (the armistice line established in 1948) (at 79-141), and the 
resolution of the United Nations calling for the creation of two states in the part of the Palestine Mandate 
west of the Jordan River (at 142-73), their “juridical analysis” of Israeli settlements is totally predictable 
and pre-ordained (at 240-75).  A similar analysis pervades their earlier work, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION (1979), 
“prepared and published at the request of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People.”  See also W.T. Mallison, Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims, supra note 21 .
151 See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Custom of War on Land and its Annex:  Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed at the Hague, 18 October 1907) (hereinafter, 
“Hague Regulations”), reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
60-81 (2004) (herinafter SCHINDLER).  While Israel is not a signatory, its Supreme Court has held the 
regulations to be part of customary international law that is both applicable to Israel and enforceable in its 
courts as a part of its municipal law.
152
 Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (signed at Geneva, 12 
August 1949), ), FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 (hereinafter, Final 
Record), Vol I. at 297-335 (William S. Hein & Co. Buffalo 2004), also reprinted in Schindler at 575-631.   
Although Israel signed the Convention, subject to reservations not here relevant, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has treated the Convention technically as not binding on Israeli courts in that, as conventional rather than 
customary international law, it would take an act of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, to cause the 
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Articles 43,153 46,154 52,155 and 55156 of the Hague Regulations and paragraph 
6 of Article 49157 of the 4th Geneva Convention have been cited against 
and/or in support of the settlement activity. Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations generally obligates an occupying power to “ensure, as far as 
possible, the public order and [civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country”; Article 46 bars the confiscation 
of private property; Article 52 bars requisitions from municipalities or 
inhabitants “except for the needs of the army of occupation”; and Article 55 
obligates the occupying power to “protect the capital of …[the real estate of 
the hostile State], and administer it according to the rules of usufruct.”  More 
generally, these provisions, along with others such as Article 23(g)158, create 
convention to be considered part of Israeli municipal law.  Nonetheless, the Israeli Supreme Court has in 
fact measured the actions of the Israeli military against the Convention. See infra, notes 415-26, and 
accompanying text.
153
 “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter 
shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, 
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” SCHINDLER, supra note 
151, at 78.  Benvinisti uses the term, “civil life”, deeming it a more accurate translation of the French than 
the term, “safety”, which has been used in English sources. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF OCCUPATION  7 (1993). 
154
 Paragraph 2 of Article 46 provides: “Private property cannot be confiscated.” SCHINDLER, supra note 
151, at 78.
155
 Article 52 provides, in part:  “Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from 
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation.” SCHINDLER, supra note 151, 
at 79.
156
 Article 55 provides, in part:  “The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and
usufructuary of … real estate … belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country.  It 
must protect the capital of these properties, and administer it according to the rules of usufruct.”
157
 Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied 
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are 
prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the 
security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the 
displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material 
reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to 
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest 
practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the 
removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members 
of the same family are not separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have 
taken place.
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the 
dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies. Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 307; SCHINDLER, supra note 151, at 594.
158
 Article 23(g) provides that “it is especially forbidden … To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, 
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”  Schindler at 73.  
Unlike Articles 43, 46, 52 and 55, which are part of Section III of the Hague Regulations dealing with 
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a standard of “military necessity” by which to judge the actions of an 
occupying army.  Although the Hague Regulations do protect the inhabitants 
of an occupied territory, they were primarily designed to protect the interests 
of a temporarily ousted sovereign159 in the context of a short-term 
occupation:
…[T]he Regulations placed emphasis on a settlement whereby 
reversion of control to the ousted power, in whole or in part, would 
occur.  The predominant theme … was the provisional character of 
occupation, wherein the ousted power retains sovereignty, his 
authority being merely in a state of abeyance.  Interference in the 
ousted power’s legislative and institutional system was thus 
prohibited, for fear of being inimical to the settlement process.  …To 
preserve the rights and authority of the ousted sovereign, the Hague 
Conventions proscribed any activity on the part of the occupant that 
might tend to undercut it, with changes in existing laws and 
institutions being the foremost concern.160
 In contrast, the 4th Geneva Convention is unabashedly humanitarian law 
that primarily seeks to protect persons caught up in warfare and its 
aftermath.  Article 49 thereof generally seeks to prohibit the forced 
movement or use of people; the extraordinarily negative behavioral models 
primarily underlying Article 49 were the deportations and slave labor 
practices of the Nazis during World War II, which had a felt immediacy at 
the 1949 Geneva Conference of delegates and the preparatory conferences 
that preceded it.161  Paragraph 6 of Article 49 specifically prohibits an 
occupied territory, Article 23(g) applies in the context of hostilities, i.e., the warfare prior to belligerent 
occupancy.
159
 For example, both themes were emphasized in an address made by Alexander Nelidow, the Russian 
delegate to the Hague Conference and the President of the Conference: “This task …consists of two parts:  
on the one hand, we must endeavour to discover a method of settling amicably differences which may arise 
between States, and thus prevent ruptures and armed conflict.  On the other hand, we must endeavour to 
lighten the burdens of war – in case it breaks out – both as regards the combatants and those may be 
indirectly affected by it.” JAMES BROWN SCOTT, ED., THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES ON 1899 
AND 1907, 197 (1917).
160 ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  9 (1978).
161
 Max Petitperre, Head of the Swiss Federal Political Department, who presided over and convened the 
first plenary session of the Conference considering the Convention, declared, in relation to the 4th
Convention:  “Most important of all, the second world War showed that the Geneva conventions would be 
incomplete if they did not also assure the protection of civilians.  It has become an imperative necessity to 
give such persons certain moral and material guarantees.  In 1859 it was the groans of the wounded 
abandoned on the battlefield of Solferino which upset Henry Dunant.  Today another still more tragic 
appeal is being made to us – that of the millions of civilians who perished in the horrors of the 
concentration camps or died a miserable death, even though they had taken no part in military operations.  
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occupying power from transferring or deporting its own civilians into 
occupied territory.  
  The contentions about the illegality of the settlements usually take one 
of three inter-related forms, or variants of such: first, the settlements are 
illegal because Israel illegally occupies the West Bank;  second, the 
settlements are illegal because they are on “Arab” land and not justified by 
military necessity under the Hague Regulations; and, third, the settlements, 
as a transfer by Israel of its citizens into occupied territory, violate paragraph 
6 of Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention. The corresponding 
contentions, by supporters of the settlements, stress the disputed nature of 
the West Bank, the “military necessity” of settlements to combat terrorism 
and protect Israel from an eastern attack, the “public” or “state” lands on 
which settlements have been situated since 1979, the voluntary rather than 
forced nature of the settlement activity, and, in general, either the 
inapplicability of international law to Israeli actions on the West Bank or the 
conformity of Israeli actions with that law.  
Before the particulars of these conflicting arguments are explored, it is 
instructive to note the uniqueness of Israel’s position from both an 
institutional and a temporal perspective.  Although the Israeli government’s 
stance has vacillated with respect to whether the West Bank is “occupied 
territory” as that concept is understood in either the Hague Regulations or 
the Geneva Convention,162 it did in fact establish a military administration 
overseeing the West Bank in accordance with the Hague Regulations and 
has also asserted that its conduct with respect to the West Bank and the 
Palestinians therein conforms to the humanitarian standards of the 4th
¶It lies with us to give civilians the protection which has become a necessity.  This is perhaps the most 
important part of our mission….”  Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 10.  Even more generally, 
German conduct during World War was the negative paradigm underlying the provisions of the 4th Geneva 
Convention.  Revising perhaps the most prestigious international law text used in the English language 
after World War II – a revision that took account of the 4th Geneva Convention – Hersh Lauterpacht 
commented, “In the part devoted to rules of warfare, the account and analysis of the new developments are 
based, to a considerable extent, on the record of the violation of the law of war by Germany and her allies 
and of the decisions of the various war crimes tribunals which were called upon to adjudicate upon them.” 
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW A TREATISE, DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY, preface at v (Hersh 
Lauterpacht, ed., David McKay Co. 1952). See also G.I.A.D. DRAPER, The Historical Background and 
General Principles of the Geneva Conventios of 1949, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS 
54, 58 (1998) (“This Civilians’ Convention was called into being by the civilized States of the community 
of nations as a direct result of the experience of the Second world War.  In that conflict, as we know, the 
civilian population suffered in death, torture, and starvation to an extent that has never been witnessed in 
the recorded history of humankind.  In Auschwitz Concentration Camp alone 4 ½ million civilians died by 
gassing, let alone the tens of thousand who perished there from shooting, flogging, torture, hanging, 
starvation, typhus and tuberculosis.”); G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS (1958) (comments 
at 26, 34-5, 47-8 all reflect the influence of what became known as the “Holocaust” on the drafting of the 
4th Geneva Convention).
162 See the brief discussion of this in Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 305-06.
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Geneva Convention.  In the words of Eyal Benvinisti, a critic of Israeli 
settlements, “this is the only occupation since World War II in which a 
military power has established a distinct military government over occupied 
areas in accordance with the framework of the law of occupation[, whereas] 
[a]ll other modern occupants who have assumed control over a foreign 
territory have rejected this body of laws as inapplicable and irrelevant.”163
The singularity of Israel’s position temporally is that its control over the 
West Bank has continued for close to 40 years.  This radically differs from a 
“classical” sequence of events related to occupation: belligerent occupation 
is fairly quickly followed by a surrender (post-surrender occupation), which 
then results in a peace agreement according to which either the defeated 
sovereign regains control over the occupied territory status quo ante or the 
occupying power retains some or all of the occupied territory, the border 
having been redrawn between the victorious and defeated nations.164  Most 
of the international law of occupation, particularly the Hague Regulations, is 
premised upon this model of short term rather than long term occupations,165
making the issue of the applicability of the international law to Israel’s 
occupation of, or control over, the West Bank somewhat especial.166  In 
short, there is scant precedent in discussing the legal issues.
1.  The “occupation” issue: the question of Israel’s legal status on the 
West Bank
The claim has frequently been made that Israeli settlements on the 
West Bank are illegal because Israel’s occupation of the West Bank is 
163 BENVINISTI, supra note 153, at 107.  Geoffrey Best, another party somewhat critical of Israel’s policies, 
echoes this thought:  “Whatever reservations may be discerned behind the Israeli Government’s refusal to 
recognize the de jure applicability of the fourth Geneva convention, it has at least acknowledge ‘the 
relevance of international legal standards’ as for instance have not, in comparable circumstances, the USSR 
in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, the Republic of South Africa in Namibia, and, one might 
add, Indonesias in East Timor.  Israel’s military authorities have allowed the ICRC considerable freedom of 
access to the occupied territories and its Supreme Court has affirmed the applicability of the Hague 
Regulations.  It is relevant to remark also that the Israel Defence Forces’ commitment to the three other 
Geneva Conventions has never been in doubt, and that Israel has permitted an almost unexampled latitude 
of comment, from within its armed forces as well as from without, on the compatibility of their operations 
with their legal and ethical obligations.”  GEORGE BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 316 (1994).
164 GERSON, supra note 160, at 2-21.
165
 Benvinisti explores the tension between a body of law primarily directed towards short term contexts 
and the needs of the people of occupied territory in longer term occupations.  See generally BENVINISTI
supra note 153, at 7-31.  But even the 4th Geneva Convention has been described as premised on an 
occupation of “limited and temporary” nature.  See DRAPER, RED CROSS CONVENTIONS, supra note 161, at 
39.
166 BEST supra note 163, at 316.
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illegal.167  Such reasoning perhaps falsely equates the two:  Israeli 
settlements on the West Bank might be illegal even if Israel’s occupation 
accords with international law; conversely, Jewish settlements on the West 
Bank theoretically could be quite legal even if Israel’s occupation were 
illegal.  Nonetheless, enough of a connection between occupation and 
settlements has been drawn to merit review of the differing views regarding 
the legality of Israel’s control over the West Bank, including the legality of 
its initial occupation, the legality of its continuing occupation, and the 
implications of those questions on the legality and status of Israeli 
settlements. 
(a) “Disputed” or “Occupied” – the terminological debate
Initially, one might differentiate, however subtly, between a people
under occupation and a land under occupation.  From one perspective, all 
peoples not in control over the governing authority and rejecting the 
legitimacy of that governing authority might be considered occupied.  So, 
for example, the Sunnis in present day Iraq might well consider themselves 
occupied, in the sense that they both do not control the authority that 
governs over them and many reject that government.  The Palestinians 
similarly and rightly feel they are under occupation by a power in whose 
government, army and society they do not participate. To what extent can 
we also say that the West Bank is occupied territory in a legal sense? 
This question of whether Israel is “occupying” territory in a legal 
sense has been debated as long as Israel has had control over the territory. 
One problem that has been cited is that “occupation” of a territory implies 
“the effective control of a power …over a territory to which that power has 
no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory.”168
The question then arises:  what is the “sovereignty” that Israel’s control over 
the West Bank cannot negate?  Jordan itself occupied the West Bank in 
1948, contrary to the General Assembly resolution that called for the 
creation of a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state in the territory west of 
167 See, e.g., SALLY V. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, The Central Role of Law in the International Peace 
Conference on the Middle East, pp.87-100 in QUESTION OF PALESTINE:  LEGAL ASPECTS (1992).
168 BENVINISTI, supra  note 153, at 4. Indeed, “[t]he foundation upon which the entire law of occupation is 
based is the principle of inalienability of sovereignty through the actual or threatened use of force.” Id.
While Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is 
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army”, Article 42 is the first article in Section III, entitled, 
“Military Authority Over The Territory Of The Hostile State.” (emphasis added). Schindler, supra note 151 
at 77. 
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the Jordan River.169   Its annexation of the West Bank was never recognized 
internationally, except by Pakistan and Great Britain.  
In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Yehuda Blum, an international law 
scholar later to become Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, argued 
that since Transjordan had attacked and occupied the West Bank in an 
aggressive rather than defensive war, it probably lacked even the status of a 
“belligerent occupant”170, with the rights to control the West Bank according 
to the standards of belligerent occupancy, including the power to regulate it 
according to military necessity.  At best, Jordan was a “belligerent 
occupant”, but “her rights could not amount to those of a legitimate 
sovereign … [a] conclusion which is of decisive legal significance as regards 
the nature and scope of the present rights of Israel over these territories.”171
Because Jordan could not be considered the sovereign, according to Blum, 
he described the West Bank as having a “missing reversioner.”  Because 
Jordan had no sovereign right over the West Bank, Israel cannot be said to 
have occupied Jordanian land. Moreover, in Blum’s view, because the 
“assumption of the concurrent existence, in respect of the same territory, of 
both an ousted legitimate sovereign and a belligerent occupant lies at the 
root of all those rules of international law[.] … [T]hose rules of belligerent 
occupation directed to safeguarding that sovereign’s reversionary rights 
ha[d] no application” to the West Bank.172  In any event, Jordan itself 
renounced any claim to the West Bank on July 31, 1988.173
Picking up on Blum’s analysis – and well prior to Jordan’s 
relinquishment of any claim to the West Bank -- Eugene Rostow, former 
Dean of Yale Law School and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 
in 1967 during the Six-day War, argued that the West Bank could be 
considered an “unallocated territory.” 174 Having once been part of the no 
longer existent Ottoman Empire and placed under the trusteeship of the 
British, the West Bank, in Rostow’s view, was still under a trust mandate 
sanctioned by the League of Nations and continued under Article 80 of the 
169 See G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181 (Nov. 29, 1947) , available at
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330
061d253!OpenDocument.
170
 Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner:  Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. 
REV. 279, 292 (1968).
171 Id. at 293.
172 Id. at 293. See also Curtis, supra  note 110 at 463-5.  Robbie Sobel, The International Court of Justice 
Decision on the Separation Barrier and the Green Line, 38 ISRAEL L. REV. 316 at318 (2005).
173
 John Kifner, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O.,  N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, late ed. 
at A1.
174
 Rostow developed this position most fully in Eugene V. Rostow,“Palestinian Self-Determination”: 
Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE  STUD. WORLD PUB. 
ORD. 147 (1978-79).
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United Nations Charter.  From this vantage point, Israel, rather than simply 
being considered “a belligerent occupant”, had the status of a “claimant to 
the territory.”  His conclusion, relevant to the subject matter of this paper, 
was that “Jews have a right to settle in it under the Mandate”, a right that he 
declared to be “unchallengeable as a matter of law.”175
In accord with these views, the Israeli government historically was 
careful to characterize the West Bank as “disputed territory.”176 Many 
advocates of Israeli settlements still use that term,177 while certain other 
Israeli Jews, many of whom perceive of the West Bank in religious terms, 
use language indicating an even greater right to Jewish possession of the 
land. In the eyes of the latter, all of the West Bank “belongs” to Israel, 
thereby equating Eretz Yisrael with Medinat Yisrael, the land of Israel with 
the government of Israel.178  With greater widespread recognition of the 
threat that eventual sovereignty over the West Bank posed to Israel’s status 
as a Jewish state, the “Greater Israel” movement lost much of its former 
following, and today most Israelis accept the necessity of a two-state 
solution. More recently, the Israeli government has itself used the term, 
“occupation”, in a practical if not in a legal sense.
(b) Defensive Occupation
Even if, for purposes of international law, “occupied”, is equally as, if 
not more, appropriate an appellation than is “disputed” to characterize the 
West Bank under Israeli control, the analysis cannot stop there.  To the 
extent that the legality of Israeli settlement activity may depend upon the 
175
 Eugene V. Rostow, Remarks, Israeli West Bank Settlements, The Regan Administration’s Policy Toward 
the Middle East and International Law,  79 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 217, 225 (1987). Rostow reiterated 
these views in Eugene V. Rostow, Resolved: are the Settlements Legal?  Israeli West Bank Policies, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1991.
176
 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, May 20, 2001, available 
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ational+Law.htm (hereinafter, “MFA Settlements and International Law”) (“Politically, the West Bank … 
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Israel.”).  Dore Gold, a former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, has repeatedly echoed this view.  
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LETTER/VIEWPOINTS, Jan. 16, 2002 (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs), available at
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legality of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, it bears repeating that 
“occupation” in itself is not unlawful. Yoram Dinstein has articulated why:
 Some Arabs claim that belligerent occupation, as such, is intrinsically 
unlawful.  But this is a spurious contention.  In every war which is not 
confined to a Sitzkrieg, armies are on the move.  When the situation 
stabilizes, the zones between the frontiers and the frontlines are 
subjected to belligerent occupation.  While belligerent occupation 
does not transfer title (sovereignty), it does mean that the occupying 
Power has a temporary right of possession (which can continue as 
long as peace is not concluded).179
Moreover, international law has long recognized a distinction between a 
lawful occupation – for example, those resulting from an act of self-defense 
– and an unlawful occupation.  From the latter, based upon the principle of 
ex injuria just non oritur, no rights can arise.180  From the former, 
annexation of territory not only can result, but has often resulted from war. 
As Alan Gerson has noted, “[a]ny other rule would impose no sanction on 
aggressive behavior and thus defeat the basic quest of international law, or 
any law, in distinguishing lawful from unlawful behavior.  A rule or policy 
requiring lawful entrants to relinquish gains in bargaining power gained in 
reacting against unlawful behavior would condone aggression and penalize 
defensive action.”181
(c) The legality of Israel’s initial occupation of the West Bank
Turning to the issue of whether Israel’s initial occupation of the West 
Bank was lawful,  Israel acquired control over the West Bank during the 
1967 War, about which volumes have been written.182  Most impartial 
observers acknowledge that Israel fired the “first” shot against Egypt, but 
also that Israel had little choice but to do so:  Nasser had imposed a blockade 
on all Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, ordered the UN troops and 
observers between the Israeli and Egyptian borders to leave (a demand that 
then UN Secretary General U Thant inexplicably complied with), and had 
179
 See Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal Dimensions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in ALFRED E. 
KELLERMANN, ET. AL., ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAEL’S 50TH ANNIVERSARY 137-54 at 50 (1998).
180 GERSON, supra note 160, at 14.
181 GERSON, supra note 160, at 75.
182
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planes fly over Israeli bases.183  In short, Israel fired the first shot (attacked 
the Egyptian airfields) in a context where Egypt had signaled that it was 
about ready to attack Israel.  But more relevant to the present discussion is 
that Israel, through intermediaries, twice asked Jordan not to attack Israel 
and join in that war.184  Only after Jordan rejected these pleas and attacked 
Israel did the latter capture the remainder of Jerusalem (including the Jewish 
section of the Old City and the Western Wall, considered the holiest site in 
Judaism) and the West Bank. The bottom line is that Israel occupied the 
West Bank in a defensive war, and, as mentioned, there is no support for the 
proposition that the occupation of territory in a defensive war violates 
international law.185
(d) The legality of Israel’s continued occupation of the West 
Bank
Nor does it appear that Israel’s continued control over the West Bank  
after the cessation of hostilities in 1967 has been illegal. The generally 
accepted, operative international legal document pertaining to this question 
is Security Council Resolution 242, passed by the United Nations Security 
Council in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 War,186 later supplemented 
by Resolution 338 passed during the 1973 war.187  While various resolutions 
were considered by the Security Council, only the compromise British draft 
of Resolution 242 was voted upon, and it was adopted unanimously.188  Its 
English version called for Israel, in return for “[t]ermination of all claims or 
states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in 
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force”, to withdraw from “territories” 
183 See Oren, supra note 182, at 61-126.
184 See Arye Naor, The Six-Day War and Its Aftermath:  A Case for Professionalism in Policy Planning at 7 
(manuscript on file): “On the day before the war broke out (4.6.67) Dayan gave the General Staff 
permission to plan only the conquest of Latrun, which was not be implemented if the Jordanians did not 
enter the war.  Two messages were sent to King Hussein on the day the war broke out (5.6.67) warning him 
not to get involved and promising him no harm as long as he did not join in the fray alongside Egypt.  The 
Jordanians responded with artillery fire on civilian and military targets, including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.”
185 See, e.g., Ruth Lapidoth, Security Council Resolution 242 at Twenty Five, 26 ISR. L. REV. 295, 303 
(1992) (it is generally recognized that occupation resulting from a lawful use of force, i.e. from an act of 
self-defence, is legitimate”). 
186
 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967).  For an extended discussion of the drafting 
history and intent of the resolution, see Lapidoth, supra note 185. 
187
 S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973).
188
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captured in the 1967 War.189 Parties who participated in drafting Resolution 
242 have testified to the significance and intentionality of the omission of 
the article, “the”, prior to “territories”, from the English text, thereby 
signifying Israel’s right to make some border adjustments in the context of a 
peace settlement with the Arab nations.190  Israel, of course, has always 
agreed with that interpretation, while Arab nations and Palestinians have 
always disagreed.  As Ruth Lapidoth reports, “Israel’s interpretation is based 
[not only] on the plain meaning of the English text of the withdrawal clause 
which was the draft presented by the British delegation[, but also] the fact 
that proposals to add the words ‘all’ or ‘the’ before ‘territories’ were 
rejected; and on the idea that in interpreting the withdrawal clause one has to 
take into consideration the other provisions of the Resolution, including the 
one on the establishment of ‘secure and recognized boundaries.’”191
Even were one not to accept the fact that Resolution 242 contemplated 
border changes, Israel was not required to withdraw prior to termination of 
all states of belligerency against it.   Rather than pursuing peace,  Arab 
leaders convened a summit conference in Khartoum, in which they reacted 
to their defeat in the 1967 War and the resultant UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 by restating their position that there would be no 
negotiations, recognition or peace with Israel.192  Moreover, after Jordan 
relinquished its claim to sovereignty in the West Bank, no entity existed with 
which even to negotiate an Israeli withdrawal until, in 1993, Israel and the 
189
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Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords,193 pursuant to 
which the Palestinian Authority was established.  
Later interim accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority led 
to greater degrees of Palestinian self-government and control over the West 
Bank194 – Israeli settlements and external border controls, excepted – until 
the breakdown of the very extended negotiations in 2000 between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority, first at Camp David and then at Taba.  That 
breakdown was followed by the second Palestinian intifada and the renewal 
of Israeli military control over West Bank population centers.  Most well-
placed observers195 have placed the onus for that breakdown on the 
Palestinian Authority and its then head, Yasir Arafat. While it may have 
been possible for Israel unilaterally to have withdrawn from Gaza196 and a 
substantial percentage of Israel’s population wants to repeat the exercise on 
the West Bank,197 withdrawal from the West Bank without a peace treaty is 
much more difficult.  The West Bank lies contiguous for several hundred 
miles to Israel’s heartland.  For the same reason, Israel lacks the same option 
allegedly available to other nations, for example, the United States in Iraq198, 
of simply deciding to withdraw.  
193
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(e) Relationship between lawful occupation and Jewish 
settlements
If one is prepared to accept the fact that Israel’s occupation of the 
West Bank is lawful but would not accept the Blum/Rostow position that 
Israel’s rights to the West Bank exceed that of a occupying power, how do 
the Israeli Jewish settlements on the West Bank fare under the Hague 
Regulations?  Response to the question is most difficult for two reasons 
previously noted: Jordan’s own abrogation of any claim to sovereignty over 
the West Bank; and the admittedly short term occupations envisioned by the 
Hague Regulations.  
Consistent with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,199 which calls on 
the occupant “to respect[…], unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force 
in the country”, Israel has for the most part continued to follow Jordanian 
law on the West Bank, despite its position that Jordan was an illegal 
occupant of the West Bank.  Israel’s stance has been criticized as 
contradictory,200but general continuance of Jordanian law by the military 
administration can be justified on grounds of legal stability, long-term 
reliance and other policy and equitable grounds reflected in international as 
well as other law.  Israel, however, has distinctly abrogated Jordanian law 
that makes it a capital offense to sell land to Jews.  It is inconceivable that 
any country would subscribe to such a law against its own citizens,201 any 
more than the new State of Israel in 1948 would “give effect to the White 
Paper of 1939 regarding the prohibition of land sales to Jews, and the 
prohibition of Jewish immigration into the country”202 or the American 
occupation of Germany following World War II would continue to 
implement the Aryan laws against the Jews.
Most Israeli settlements on the West Bank are not on land purchased 
by Jews, however.  While some early settlements, particularly several early 
ones established in the Jordan Valley according to the Allon Plan under 
Labor-led governments, were on land requisitioned from Arab owners, the 
great bulk of Jewish settlements, and substantially all established legally 
199 Supra note 153. 
200
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under Israeli law after 1979, were established on “state” or “public” lands.  
This development and the controversy over these lands is explored more 
fully in Part III.A.2 of this article.  For now, it is relevant to note that two of 
the most cogent arguments made against the settlements on the basis of the 
Hague Regulations are: 1) the incompatibility of civilian settlements and a 
justification based upon military necessity under Article 52 (the 
requisitioning of private property), and 2) the incompatibility of seemingly 
permanent civilian settlements with the obligation of an occupying power, 
consistent with military necessity, to ensure the continued civil life of the 
occupants of the territory under Article 43 – arguably to maintain the status 
quo ante -- and to hold real estate belonging to the hostile state as a 
usufructuary203 under Article 55 of the Hague Regulations.204
Few would dispute the initial strategic relevance of the earliest 
settlements established according to the Allon Plan,205 primarily in the 
Jordan Valley.  Recent instances of terrorism in Jordan or emanating from 
terrorist groups with headquarters in Syria have reinforced the view that an 
Israeli presence on the West Bank is still necessitated to deter terrorism and 
other threats from sources to the east of Israel,206 although debate continues 
203
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about whether military bases or civilian settlements best serve that strategic 
function.  Elsewhere on the West Bank, perhaps the most contentious 
settlements are those located across and to the west of the central mountain 
ridge of the West Bank, fairly close to Palestinian populated areas.  But 
while it has been contended that these settlements have inhibited the 
expansion of Palestinian communities and economic activity,207 it is also 
true that these settlements may also inhibit Palestinian terrorism.208  The 
proximity of some of the most contested areas to Ben Gurion Airport and 
Israel’s major population centers is a subject of considerable concern.209
The showering of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip, most frequently in 
the territory that had been occupied by Israeli settlements, strengthens the 
argument that civilian settlements serve as a security buffer and undercuts 
the theory that they play no strategic or military role.210 In a context of the 
reality of terrorism, disrupting the “territorial contiguity of Palestinian 
communities”211 does have both negative and positive effects.  In the context 
Implications of a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority, Feb. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2444 (last viewed Feb. 21, 2006); Yaakov 
Katc, Naveh: Zarqawi Trying to get Better Grip,  THE JERUSALEM POST, 
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of an absence of terrorism and the protection of all, neither effect would be 
felt or relevant.  
Recent history also undermines the argument that there is an inherent 
contradiction between seemingly permanent civilian settlements and Israel’s 
rights and obligations under Articles 43, 52 and 55 of the Hague 
Regulations. The very fact that Israel has evacuated and removed or 
destroyed civilian settlements -- first in Sinai after the Egyptian–Israeli 
peace treaty, in Gaza, and in the West Bank at the same time as the Gaza 
withdrawal and subsequently -- demonstrates that West Bank settlements 
can be removed.  The question, of course, remains whether they should be. 
To explore this question more fully, it is necessary to inquire into the 
question of whether these settlements have been established on “Arab” land.
2. The “Land” Issue: the charge that Israeli settlements have been 
illegally placed on “Arab” land
This commonly made and accepted charge merits deconstruction, as it 
conflates and therefore masks several different possible assertions:   first, 
that Jewish settlements have been established by expropriating or 
requisitioning212-- the latter without military necessity -- privately owned 
Arab land; or second, that settlements have been established on land 
belonging to specific Arab villages or communities; or, third, that the land, 
while not privately owned by individual Arabs or collectively owned by 
certain Arab communities, belongs to a general Arab “polity” having rights  
to the land.  Each of these assertions bears exploration, both in terms of its 
own validity as well as the different implications flowing from each.  Each is 
also, in large part, dependent upon the proper characterization of the land 
upon which most settlements lie.
(a) Privately owned Arab land
Excluding Jewish development in East Jerusalem,213 a few early 
Jewish settlements constructed on uncultivated land specifically 
212
 “Expropriation” usually refers to a taking of land without compensation although it might refer to a 
taking of land with compensation (in American terms, “eminent domain”). The former would clearly 
violate the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Hague Regulations as a “confiscation of private property.”  
“Requisition”, which under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations “shall not be demanded … except for the 
needs of the army of occupation” – that is, on grounds of military necessity – retains original ownership, 
but involves use by the occupant for a fee.  One can see requisitioning as similar to rental, except by 
involuntary rather than voluntary transaction. 
213
 This exclusion seems reasonable in that most realists acknowledge that Jewish neighborhoods in 
Jerusalem, regardless of whether the territory is characterized as East or West, would remain part of Israel 
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requisitioned214 for military needs, and some West Bank outposts established 
by Israeli Jews without permission of the military administration – regarded 
by Israel as illegal215 -- substantially no present Jewish settlement on the 
West Bank has been established on land that Israel considers to be privately 
owned.  With some exceptions,216 nor have settlements generally been 
established even on land that was privately owned by Jews prior to 1948.  
Despite Israel’s reversal of Jordanian law barring the sale or ownership of 
land by Jews, Israel has “de facto recognized the actions carried out by 
Jordan regarding the property of Israelis.”217 And Jordan, under its “trading 
with an enemy” corpus of law, both statutory and administrative, regarded 
Jewish-owned land as state land.  The upshot is that, contrary to popular 
opinion, substantially all Israeli settlements established after 1979 are either 
in any final settlement.  Hence, the subject matter of this article pertains to those areas that would most 
probably become part of a Palestinian juridical entity.
214
 As the Israeli Supreme Court noted in Mara’be v. Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 7957/04 [2005], 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html, requisitioning of property differs 
from expropriation, does not involve a change of ownership, but rather a change in possession:  “Taking of 
possession is temporary.  The seizure order orders its date of termination.  Taking of possession is 
accompanied by payment of compensation for the damage caused.  Such taking of possession – which is 
not related in any way to expropriation – is permissible according to the law of belligerent occupation (see
regulations 43 and 52 of Hague Regulations, and §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention…).” Id. at 10.
215 See the Sason Report, supra note 2; Yuval Yoaz, Zmos Harel and Nadav Shragai, IDF and Hebron 
Settlers Holding Secret Talks on Evacuation of Market Area, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/676051.html (updated Jan. 29, 2006) (the Israeli Supreme Court 
turned down a petition to halt the evacuation of Amona, an illegal settlement that has become a focal point 
of dispute between settlement activists and the government).  But see the plea of one observer to have the 
evacuation delayed, partly on the grounds that there are numerous Arab housing projects that have been 
built illegally but not torn down.  Nadav Shragai, Compromise Building in the Outposts, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/675859.html (updated Jan. 29, 2006). 
216
 Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 311.
217
 Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 302.   Interestingly, even land owned by Israelis in East Jerusalem 
have not been returned to their owners.  According to Benvinisti & Zamir, “such practical recognition [of 
the Jordanian treatment of such property] is … found in the fact that Israeli assets that were purchased or 
used for public purposes during the Jordanian rule, and for  which the public need did not cease after 1967, 
were not returned to their owners.  In these cases, the owners receive monetary compensation only.” Id. at 
309.  The authors relate that, after 1967, the Israeli military authorities faced two choices: either to return 
the property to their original owners or to administer the property as the Jordanians had.  They then explore 
why, despite both logical (how could a branch of the Israeli government treat its own citizens as 
“enemies”?) and humanitarian (“Injuries caused to individuals as a result of war should be minimized to the 
extent possible.”) reasons, the military authorities selected the latter alternative, that is, to continue the 
Jordanian treatment of Jewish owned property on the West Bank.  The net result was that Jewish owned 
land, as happened with Arab absentee owned land, became public property. Id. at 313.  A somewhat related 
question is the fate of land owned by Jews prior to the establishment of Israel and sought to be inhabited by 
Jews in the territories, although not those Jews having claims based upon original ownership.  An 
illustration is the attempt by Jews to settle in  houses in the market in Hebron, which were owned by Jews 
prior to the massacre of Jews in Hebron in 1929; the Israeli government considers such settlement illegal 
and, following court orders to evict the settlers, has done so.  See Amos Harel, Hebron Settlers Clash with 
Troops Issuing Evacuation Orders, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/665699.html (updated Jan. 3, 2006).
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on land purchased by Jews from Arabs after 1967218 -- a small minority of 
settlements -- or on property designated as “state land.” To understand this 
development requires, in turn, a review of two seminal Israeli Supreme 
Court cases decided in 1979 -- Ayub v. Minister of Defence, popularly 
known as the Beth-El case,219 and Douykat v. Government of Israel, 
popularly known as the Elon Moreh case220-- as well as an understanding of 
the role of Israel’s Supreme Court in relation to the Israeli government and 
military.221
The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice,222 has 
considered claims of international law violations made against the Israeli 
government or military to a degree unimaginable in the case of other 
national courts with respect to actions of their governments or military in 
armed conflict contexts.  As Eyal Benvinisti has noted, “[a]lthough the 
legality of occupation measures has been examined by many national courts 
on various occasions, never have these measures been scrutinized by the 
occupant’s own judicial system.”223 While “t]he Act of State doctrine (in the 
British or American sense), the sovereign immunity doctrine …, and 
questions of justiciability and standing have proved to be high hurdles for 
claimants in other jurisdictions, …the [Israeli] Supreme Court has flatly and 
consistently rejected these arguments.”224 In Beth-El, the Court dealt with 
218
 Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 299.
219 Ayub v. Minister of Defence (“Bet-El”) (1979) 33 P.D. (2) 113. translated in MEIR SHAMGAR, ED., 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980  THE LEGAL ASPECTS, 
Vol. 1, at 371 (Hebrew University Faculty of Law, Jerusalem 1982).
220 Douykat v. Government of Israel (“Elon Moreh”), 34(1)PD 1, 13 (1979 or 1980?) 34 P.D. (1) 1 0, 
translated in SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 404-41.
221
 Pnina Lahav credits two features of the Judges Law, enacted in 1953, as key factors in the Court’s 
independence:  judicial tenure; and the selection of judges by committee which replaced a political process 
with one that “emphasized … professionalism and apolitical content of judicial decision-making.  See
Pnina Lahav, The Supreme Court of Israel: Formative Years, 1948-1955, 11 STUDIES IN ZIONISM,  no. 1, 
45-66 at 55 (1990). 
222
 For a description of the dual roles of the Israeli Supreme Court, both as an appellate court from district 
court decisions, and as a High Court of Justice, see KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 10-11.
223
 Eyal Benvinisti, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the Territories Occupied in 1967, in
ITZHAK ZAMIR & ALLEN ZYSBLAT, PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 371-78, 372 (1996).  Benvinisti adds:  “Indeed, 
the [Israeli] Supreme Court’s willingness to permit judicial review of occupation measures stands in 
marked contrast to the attitude of the U.S. courts, which refused to entertain claims of Panamanian citizens 
and firms against the U.S. military, following the occupation of Panama in December 1989.” Id.  Allan 
Gerson made much the same point in an earlier work, when he asked the question, “Does the occupied 
populace, however, have a right under international law to appeal to domestic courts of the occupant for the 
purpose of questioning whether military orders and promulgations were within the scope of the issuer’s 
legitimate authority?” GERSON, supra note 160, at 127.  Gerson answered, “In no instance of belligerent 
occupation, other thant he israeli case, is there any record of such practice.” Id.
224 Id. at 374.  Kretzner, supra note 204 at 19-25, elaborates on the Court’s assumption of jurisdiction 
(initially, perhaps on account of the government not contesting such) and its bypassing questions of 
justiciability and standing that have characterized courts of other nations in similar contexts.  Another 
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the issue of whether military authorities could requisition private property225
for a civilian settlement upon proof of military necessity.  Elon Moreh
explored more deeply the definition of military necessity and thereafter 
effectively precluded further requisitioning of Palestinian privately-held land 
for civilian settlements, no matter the claim of military necessity.  
The Beth-El decision actually involved two different cases in which 
Palestinian petitioners sought relief for lands which had been requisitioned 
by the military for the use of civilian settlements.  In one of these cases, 
Beth-El, the owners neither resided on nor cultivated the land, while in the 
other, Beka’ot, the petitioners had cultivated the land.  In both cases, the 
petitioners challenged the consistency of justifying the requisition of land on 
grounds of military necessity and its use for civilian settlements.  They also 
challenged more generally the legality of such requisitioning under 
international law.  
Writing the court’s majority opinion, Judge Witkon rejected the 
contention that use of land for civilian settlement is necessarily contradictory 
to its taking based upon military necessity. He stressed the strategic location 
of both settlements,226 the threat of terrorism, the reservist nature of the 
Israeli Army and the reluctance of the court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the military, even if the latter’s views corresponded to those of a 
opponent of the settlers, Adam Roberts, expressed somewhat similar views, comparing Israel’s position 
with that of other countries:
“Israel deserves credit for acknowledging openly, albeit inadequately, the relevance of 
international legal standards.  Its position contrasts with those of the many occupying powers in 
the past 40 years that have avoided expressing any view on the applicability of internation legal 
agreements:  such powers have included the Soviet Union in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia 
(1968) and Afghanistan (1979); and Sourth Africa in Namibia.  Israel also deserves credit for 
cooperating with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has played an important 
role in the occupied territories  by performing a wide range of tasks, ncluding, in particular, 
monitoring conditions of detention.”  Roberts, supra note 200, at 63. 
A recent example of a case that the Israeli Supreme Court seems destined to rule upon involves the Israeli 
military’s practice of targeting terrorists when physical arrest seems impossible in light of the refusal of the 
Palestinian Authority to do so.  See Ze’ev Segal, Targeting the High Court, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/656512.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2005). 
On the other hand, like the United States Supreme Court, the Israeli Supreme Court will refuse to 
decide a case brought in the absence of a concrete dispute which is predominantly political in nature.  For 
this reason, in Bargil v. Government of Israel, HCJ 4481/91 [1993], available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html , a three-judge panel of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
sitting as the High Court of Justice, refused to hear a general political challenge to civilian settlements in 
the West Bank and Gaza.
225
 For the distinction between expropriation and requisitioning, see supra note 212.
226
 The court, for example, relied upon the affidavit of Major-General Avraham Orly that the “Bet El camp 
is situated in a place of great importance from a security point of view…evidenced by the fact that it was 
previously a Jordanian camp.  The settlement itself is on an elevation commanding the vitally important 
junction of the longitudinal Jerusalem-Nablus route and the Transverse route from the Coastal Plain to 
Jericho and the Jordan Valley.” SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 386.
56
civilian government that favored Jewish settlement on the West Bank.  
Turning to the claim of international law violations, Judge Witkon 
affirmed the template that was, with some later modifications (particularly, 
during the presidency of Aharon Barak), used by the Supreme Court in later 
cases:  that paragraph 6 of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention did not 
reflect customary international law (although the court did not dispute that 
certain other provisions of the Geneva Convention might have) and as “a 
conventional provision … the petitioners … [could] not rely on it” before 
the court; but that the Hague Regulations, having become customary 
international law, could be used by the petitioners.  Focusing upon Article 
52 of the Hague Regulations, which specifically sustains requisition for “the 
needs of the army of occupation,” Witkon then dealt with the divergent 
interpretations of that standard, whether quite narrow, as alleged by the 
petitioners, or more expansive, as alleged by the Israeli government.  The 
court accepted the government’s argument as to the appropriate 
interpretation of Article 52 for much the same reason that it had decided that 
military necessity would be accepted as the ground for the settlements, i.e., 
terrorist attacks and the like.227
It should be noted that one argument advanced by counsel for the 
petitioners was one that has been used by subsequent critics of Israeli 
settlements:  “how a permanent settlement can be established on land 
requisitioned only for temporary use.”  To this Witkon responded, “This 
occupation can itself come to an end some day as a result of international 
negotiations leading to a new arrangement which will take effect under 
international law and determine the fate of … settlements in the 
Administered Territories.”228  This argument would have attained much 
greater importance over the years were it not for the consequences of the 
Elon Moreh case.
In that case, the military government had requisitioned 700 dunams of 
land for a civilian settlement within the borders of a village, Rujeib, close to 
Nablus and approximately two kilometers from the Jerusalem-Nablus Road.  
227
 Ironically, the aftermath of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza has strengthened the argument that 
settlements serve as a security buffer.  Recently, Palestinian rockets fired from the premises of former 
Israeli settlements have reached the outskirts of Ashkelon, a major Israeli city.  See Aaron Lerner, Israel 
Radio: Palestinians Launching Rockets from Abandoned Communities on Northern Gaza Border, Dec. 16, 
2005, http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=27832 (“Palestinians are now exploiting the abandon Israeli 
communities on the norther border of the Gaza Strip as rocket launching sites that are considerably closer 
to such strategic Israeli targets as a power plant and a large fuel storage area located south of Ashkelon”). 
See also, supra note 210.
228 SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 392.  Judge Ben-Porat, concurring, argued that “the word ‘permanent’ 
must be taken in a relative sense”, stressing the continuing state of emergency that Israel had found itself 
for its first 30 years. SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 386.
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Although the land requisitioned for the settlement was uncultivated, 
seventeen Arabs who had plots of land totaling 125 dunams within the area 
of the requisitioned land successfully challenged the action before the Israeli 
Supreme Court.229 Elon Moreh can be analyzed on several different levels, 
including the facts of the case (especially those that differentiate the case 
from the facts recognized by the Court in Beth-El), the tenor of the justices’ 
opinions, the actual reasoning employed, and, most importantly for present 
purposes, the enormous effect of the opinion on the building of future 
settlements.  The case produced three different opinions, one by Justice 
Landau, Deputy President of the Court (in which two other justices 
concurred), and separate concurring opinions by Justices Witkin and Bekhor.
The opinions painted a rather negative picture of the settlers and their 
actions.  Landau’s opinion was highly critical of the speed with which the 
requisition and initial construction occurred and the impropriety of the 
military governor having given notice to the village mukhtar rather than the 
actual landowners – steps that created “the impression … the occupation of 
the land was organized as a military operation by employing an element of 
surprise and in order to forestall the ‘danger’ of intervention by … [the] 
Court on an application by the landowners before work began in the area.”230
Witkin stated that he “[did] not wish to refer to incidents … in which 
members of Gush Emunim (among them the settlers before us) were shown 
to be people who do not accept the authority of the Army and do not even 
hesitate to give violent expression to their opposition”231, but, of course, 
Witkon did precisely the opposite by mentioning such.   In short, the die was 
cast, although none of the opinions explicitly made their judgment in favor 
of the Palestinian landowners dependent upon these negative depictions of 
the settlers.
The government and military first tried to argue that the requisition 
could be justified under a 1948 ordinance by the Provisional Council of 
State, “regard[ing] the State of Israel as possessing sovereignty over all of 
the land of Israel (Palestine).”232 The justices rejected that position:  “In 
dealing with the legal basis of Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria, our concern 
is with legal norms which exist in fact and not only in theory, and the basic 
229
 Technically, the landowners petitioned the court for an order nisi against the Government of Israel, the 
Minister of Defense, the Military Commander of the West Bank and the Military Subcommander of the 
Nablus Subdistrict  directing them to show cause why the requisition orders should not be declared void 
and why the equipment and structures on the land should not be removed.  An interim order was issued, 
which, as a result of the court’s judgment, became absolute.
230 SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 407.
231 Id. at 435
232
 Id. at 417.
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norm upon which the structure of Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria [the West 
Bank] was erected is still today…the norm of military government and not 
the application of Israeli law than entails Israeli sovereignty.”233  In other 
words, Israel’s rights on the West Bank would be judged in terms of its 
status as an occupier.   
In accordance with the earlier Beth-El decision, all justices then 
accepted the applicability of the Hague Regulations, as part of customary 
international law, to the actions of the Israel’s Military Authority (regardless 
of the legality of Jordan’s occupation of the West Bank).  And the standard 
for adjudging the Military Authority’s actions was that of military necessity 
under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations.  Distinguishing Elon Moreh
from Beth-El, the court concluded that the Elon Moreh requisition primarily 
reflected a political response to the settlers’ desires rather than calculated 
military necessity.  Indeed, important facts pointed to both the lack of 
military necessity and to the political nature of the decision that had been 
taken.
While the Chief of General Staff took the position that the settlement 
was militarily required, an affidavit filed by him and other evidence 
indicated that the Minister of Defense had initially disagreed.234  And the 
“military necessity” claimed was based upon a generalized notion of “the 
importance of regional defence”235 in the context of war, rather than the 
comparable justification – protection against terrorist activity -- offered in 
the Beth-El case.236  Moreover, several high-ranking reserve officers had 
opined in their affidavits filed with the court that Elon Moreh would be a 
settlement without military value and, if anything, would consume military 
resources in protecting the settlers and settlements in a time of war.237
The settlers did not help their own case.  Unlike in Beth-El, they were 
permitted to file affidavits of their own, and, in one such affidavit, a settler 
“explained that the members … had settled at Elon Moreh because of the 
Divine commandment to inherit the land given to our forefathers…”238  Both 
the content of the various affidavits as well as the history of Elon Moreh
233 Id.
234
 The Minister of Defense had later gone along with the decision, based upon the fact that the Defense 
Ministerial Committee, which the Prime Minister chaired, had come to a positive decision on the 
settlement.
235 SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 408.
236
 The comparable justification in Beth-El was that terrorist activity was impeded by careful location of 
settlements.
237 SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 409-10.
238 Id. at 414
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convinced the court that politics came first and the conclusion of military 
necessity followed as, at best, a secondary motivation for the settlement.239
To Justice Landau, implicitly,240 and to Justice Witkin, explicitly,241 the 
government bore the burden of proof on the issue of military necessity.  
Without so declaring, this position seemed to have been a procedural shift 
from its earlier decision in Beth-El.  Justice Landau stressed “that the 
military needs referred to in … Article [52 of the Hague Regulations] cannot 
include, on any reasonable interpretation, national-security needs in the 
broad sense”242,  that is, the broad political perspective of the Government 
and settlers.  And, while military necessity could conceivably include the 
regional defense justification used by the Chief of General Staff in his 
affidavit to the court, the primacy of politics over military judgment in 
making this decision undermined that justification.  Hence, not only the 
government’s broadly stated “national security” rationale, but also the 
narrower “regional defence” grounds proferred by the Chief of General Staff 
could not justify the requisition of private property in Elon Moreh.  In 
Justice Landau’s words,
In our legal system, the right of private property is an important legal 
value protected by both civil and criminal law, and as regards the right 
of an owner of land to legal protection of his property, it is immaterial 
whether the land is cultivated or barren. 
The principle of protecting private property applies also in the law of 
war …    
To Julius Stone, the decision was remarkable in that “[p]robing of this 
severity by civilian judges of the motives of this level of military and 
political decision-makers of their own government is … rather unique even 
in democratic policies.”243  Its precedent in the general law of “belligerent 
occupation”  “now offers the novel rider that ‘military needs’, even if 
attested in good faith by the highest military authorities, will not qualify as 
239 Id. at 406-14.
240
 Justice Landau, after stating the facts, then asked:  “Have the respondents [i.e., the Israeli authorities] 
shown sufficient legal warrant for seizing the petitioners’ lands?” Id at 420. (emphasis added).
241
 “… We must ask ourselves who bears the burden of proof?  Must the petitioners convince us that the 
land was not requisitioned for the needs of the Army and security or should we perhaps require the 
respondents, the security authorities, to convince us that the requisition was needed for this purpose?  I 
think that the burden rests upon the respondents.” Id. at 433.
242 Id. at 422.
243
 Julius Stone, Aspects of the Beit-El and Eilon Moreh Cases, 15 ISR. L. REV. 476, 490 (1980).  Stone 
even questioned whether it made sense to allow the testimony of individuals to surmound the testimony of 
military officers that military necessity existed.  Id. at 492.
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such if it appears that historically the subjective motive of the officials 
initiating the requisitioning procedure was not predominantly military.”244
Even more important than the court’s show of independence, its 
rhetoric and the particular result regarding the initial location of the Elon
Moreh settlement, was the long term consequence of the decision.245
Thereafter, all Israeli settlements legally246 authorized by the Israeli Military 
Administration have been constructed on lands that Israel characterizes as 
state-owned or “public” land.247  This term would seem to include 
uncultivated rural land not registered in the name of anyone248 and land 
244 Id. at 490.
245
 Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34.
246
 At times settlers have established settlements without authority of the Military Government, usually in 
the form of mobile homes on empty hilltops.  In response to such, the Prime Minister appointed a 
commission, chaired by Talya Sason, to determine the extent of and make recommendations concerning 
illegal outposts.  As a consequence of the resultant Sason Report, supra note 2,  such settlements were 
supposed to be immediately dismantled.  It appears, however,  that the great bulk were still in existence as 
of December, 2005.  See Dan Izenberg & Tovah Lazaroff, No Action Taken on Illegal Outposts, Dec. 7, 
2005,  THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132475697589&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
According to the Sason Report, four conditions must be satisfied to have settlement that is considered legal 
under Israeli law:
“First, the decision to establish a settlement must be made by the authoritative political echelon. 
….Second,… Israeli settlements shall be established only on State land.…Third[,]…a settlement shall be 
established only according to a lawful designed building scheme. ….Fourth[,] the bounds of jurisdiction of 
such a settlement was determined in an order by the Commander of the area....”
Because of these conditions for legality, the Sason Report defines  an illegal settlement as one having one 
of the following characteristics: a)  there was no government decision to establish it; 2) the outpost was 
established with no legal planning status; c) the outpost is not attached to an existing settlement; and/or 4) it 
was established from the mid-nineties on.
247
 The term, as used by Israel since the Elon Moreh decision in the late 1970’s, seems to include lands 
owned by absentee owners and uncultivated rural land not registered to anyone. See Benvinisti & Zamir, 
supra note 34, at 307-314 and 315 (f.n. 106).   The absentee owner category would seem to include land on 
the West Bank under registered ownership to Jews prior to 1948 that was held by Jordanian governmental 
authorities prior to 1967, but, in any event, the land most in dispute involves uncultivated rural land that 
was not under registered ownership to anyone.  Even if this characterization is a continuation of the 
Jordanian characterization and law on the subject, this is not to say that Palestinians accept the notion that 
uncultivated land that is not registered qualifies as “state land.”  See RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S LAW
26-33 (rev. ed. 1988).  In addition, there have been recent reports of certain fraudulent land sales from 
Arabs to Jews, who then turn the land over to the Civil Administration operating under the military 
governor as “state lands”, with the lands then being leased back to the donors for development.  See Akiva 
Eldar, There’s a System for Turning Palestinian Property into Israel’s State Land, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/662729.html (updated Dec. 27, 2005).
248 KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 90.  Although Ottoman law required registration for ownership, it is 
claimed that most land on the West Bank was never so registered in order “to preserve the collective 
ownership system (musha’a)[,] …to evade tax liability, and …to avoid being drafted into the Turkish 
army.”  During the British Mandate period and subsequent Jordanian rule, the pace of registration picked 
up, “[b]y the time that Israel occupied the West Bank, regulation proceedings had beencompleted for 
approximately one-third of the area.” Lein, supra note 29, at 54.
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owned by absentee owners, 249 both categories that existed under pre-
existing legal regimes, including Jordanian law.  Inversely, the term would 
seem to exclude land registered in the name of someone other than an 
absentee owner (regardless of whether the land is presently being 
cultivated), land as to which a title deed exists (even if not registered),250 and 
land held by prescriptive use.251  The latter requires continuous use of the 
land for a period of ten years.
As might be expected, Israel’s categorization and characterization of 
certain lands as “state” or “public” have provoked considerable 
controversy.252  Several of the most detailed critiques have been undertaken 
by B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, which concedes that 90 percent 
of the settlements have been established on what is nominally “state” land,253
but takes issue with that designation on both substantive and procedural 
grounds.  
B’Tselem’s principal substantive objections relate to the  percentage 
of West Bank land that has been designated as “state” land and to the 
categories of land so categorized.   According to B’Tselem, approximately 
40 percent of West Bank land254 has been declared to be “state” or “public” 
lands, a vast expansion of the 16 percent of West Bank land considered state 
or public land while under Jordanian control.  Other settlement opponents 
have used percentages in the range of 60 percent,255 although even 
B’Tselem’s figure may be on the high side when account is taken of its 
inclusion of certain Jerusalem neighborhoods in its calculations.  However, 
249
 The designation of land as “public” because owned by absentee owners was a continuation of the 
Jordanian designation.  Some of this land was owned by Jews or the Jewish Agency prior to 1948.  See 
Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 310-14.
250
 Both of these types of land ownership would presumably come under the designation of mulk land.  
Lein, supra note 29, at 51
251 KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 90.  According to B’Tselem, “Miri lands are those situated close to places 
of settlement and suitable for agricultural use.  A person may secure ownership of such land by holding and 
working the land for ten consecutive years.  If a landowners of this type fails completely to farm the land 
for three consecutive years for reasons other than those recognized by the law…, the land is then known as 
makhlul.  In such a circumstance, the sovereign may take possession of the land or transfer the rights 
therein to another person. “Lein, supra note 29, at 52. 
252 See,e.g., Raja Shehadeh, Jewish Settlements in the Occupied West Bank – How the Land was Acquired 
for their Use and how they are Structured, 6-30  in Unispal, Division for Palestinian Rights,QUESTION OF 
PALETINE:  LEGAL ASPECTS (Document 4) (United Nations Mar. 31, 1992) at 7-11 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/ec6dd0bff00344e18525611e006d8
08d!OpenDocument (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006);  Stacey Howlette, Palestinian Private Property Rights in 
Israel and the Occupied Territories, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 117, 143-46 (2001); Lein, supra note 29 
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B’Tselem’s concedes that the vast majority of this land is in the Jordan 
Valley, which, with the primary exception of Jericho, was barely populated 
by Palestinian Arabs prior to 1967 (a fact that would explain why such land 
was both unregistered and uncultivated).256   Moreover, regardless of the 
gross percentage of land designated as state or public land, according to 
B’Tselem’s own statistics, only approximately 5 percent of the West Bank 
land is within settlement “municipal boundaries” and a much, much smaller 
percentage of land, 1.7 percent of the West Bank, is developed settlement 
land.257  In other words, B’Tselem’s emphasis on the large percentage of land 
considered state or public on the West Bank relates more to the potential 
takeover of West Bank land by Jewish settlements rather than to the present 
reality of the actual land occupied.  As B’Tselem itself concedes, there is a 
huge divergence between built-up areas and municipal boundaries.258
Of greater substantive merit is B’Tselem’s claim that, while in 
percentage terms the amount of public lands involved may not be large, 
West Bank areas designated as public lands along the central mountain range 
between the Jordan River and the Mediteranean Sea, and to the immediate 
east or west of the range, where many settlements were established, lie close 
to populated Palestinian centers and choke off their expansion and the use of 
the land for agricultural purposes.  But analysis of particular settlements, 
including Ariel, one of the West Bank’s largest, seems to focus more upon 
the stultifying effect of Ariel’s presence if expansion continues to its full 
municipal boundaries than the comparatively small present built-up area.259
In other words, the notion of expansive municipal boundaries only has great 
relevance if continued Israeli sovereignty rather than Palestinian sovereignty 
is assumed.
B’Tselem also takes issue with the categories of land designated as 
“state” or “public” lands, a designation that existed under both Jordanian law 
and Ottoman law.  To lands that were considered “state” lands by the 
Jordanians,  according to B’Tselem, the Israeli military administration added 
land owned by the Jordanian government -- as property belonging to an 
256
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enemy state – and three categories of untitled land:260 “Miri  land261 that was 
not farmed for at least three consecutive years, and thus became makhul; 
Miri land that had been farmed for less than ten years (the period of 
limitation), so that the farmer had not yet secured ownership; [and] land 
defined as mawat262 due to its distance from the nearest village.”263  Clearly 
it would be unfair to declare Miri lands that have been continuously farmed, 
but not yet for the full ten years, as state land.  Yet it is unclear from 
B’Tselem’s presentation how much of the “state” land consists of Miri lands 
that fall into this subcategory and which, if any, Jewish settlements were 
actually established on that land.264
B’Tselem’s procedural objections to the notion of state or public land 
on which all settlements have been established since 1979 are deserving of 
serious attention.265 B’Tselem claims that, because most land was not 
registered under the Ottoman Empire for reasons such as tax avoidance, it 
was held according to prescriptive use.  Yet, according to B’Tselem, parties 
who might have been affected by the designation of land as public land were 
frequently not directly notified of such designation. While village mukhtars, 
actually appointed by the military government, were notified, the mukhtars
in turn failed to notify the affected land “owners”, who first discovered the 
designation when settlement building had begun.266   Theoretically, an 
260
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appeals process existed, but the land claimants often learned of the 
designation of their property as state land too late to appeal the designation.  
Moreover, regardless of when the affected Palestinians heard about the 
designation, their only source of contesting the designation was a Board of 
Appeals established by the military administration, which granted relief in 
only a small percentage of cases.  The burden of proof lay on the petitioners.  
And that proof was difficult, given that that the Israeli authorities took 
periodic aerial photographs as to whether the land was in fact being used for 
farming.267  With respect to West Bank property that was registered but 
owned by someone mistakenly classified as an absentee owner, B’Tselem
asserts a similar failure in the notice process.  It cites one instance in which 
the appeals committee refused to undo the transaction that allowed for a 
settlement to be built on the ground that the faulty conclusion that the land 
had been abandoned was made in “good faith.”268 In addition, B’Tselem
claims, the presence of the military court of appeals actually precluded, in 
most instances, the Palestinians appealing to the Israeli Supreme Court 
because, in theory, another procedural recourse existed.  
These are, of course, allegations.  B’Tselem seems to say that the 
military administration, by using aerial photographs, had an unfair advantage 
over those contesting land ownership, but it is unclear why use of 
technology should prejudice the purported landowner. B’Tselem also 
concedes that many prospective claimants had discontinued use of 
unregistered land because of high wages in the Israeli labor market, which 
made working in that market more favorable than continuing to farm.269
This argument, in any event, would seem to relate more to the political and
economic relationship between any prospective Palestinian state and Israel 
than to the genuineness of an ownership claim based upon prescriptive use.   
It is difficult to jump to the conclusion that a settlement falls on private land, 
claimed on the basis of alleged use which was discontinued by choice on the 
part of the purported owner.270
Nonetheless, B’Tselem’s core accusation that many land claimants 
were denied notice and/or failed to contest the designation of land because 
of the biased, or perceived to be biased, nature of the tribunal remains a 
serious allegation.  Even if recourse was never sought from the Board of 
267 Id. at 56.
268 Id. at 59.
269 Id. at 56-7.
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Appeals, landowners should still have the opportunity to prove their claims.  
If such a claim is established, two resolutions are possible, consistent with 
the theme of this Article.  Where substantial construction on land has not yet 
occurred (that is, the land is in effect “reserved” for a particular settlement), 
the condition that no private Arab land has been taken for the settlement will 
not have been established, and the particular land should revert to its 
Palestinian owner, with damages for the period in which the Palestinian 
owner was unable to use the land.  If there is substantial settlement 
construction on that land with conflicting claims of settlers who relied upon 
the characterization of the land as “state” land, rightful Palestinian claimants 
should be granted restitutionary relief that would include a monetary amount 
representing lease payments equal to what they would have received had the 
land been requisitioned rather than mistakenly designated as “state” land, 
with appropriate interest thereon from the date those lease payments would 
have been made,  as well as damages equal to the present value of the 
property (rather than the value as of the date of the false designation).  
Settlements falling into two other categories would, as well, not meet 
the condition that a settlement must not have been established on Palestinian 
owned land.  Certain outposts, mostly hilltop caravans, have been set up 
without the approval of the Israeli government; some of these were later 
abandoned and then reoccupied.  These settlements are considered illegal 
under Israeli law.  Several years ago, the Israeli government appointed Talya 
Sason, an attorney, to investigate this phenomenon.  Her investigation 
revealed at least 105 of these illegal outposts.  Of these, to the extent that 
Sason was able to establish the legal status of the land on which the outposts 
sit, 26 are located on state land, 7 are located on survey land, and 15 located 
on Palestinian private property.  Thirty-nine are located on “mixed” lands, 
that is, land that is part state, part survey, and part owned by Palestinians.271
These outposts, almost all of which were established in the 1990’s, are 
supposed to be dismantled, although only several have been thus far.272   A 
majority of these outposts fail the condition that a settlement not be 
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 Sason Report, supra note 2. “Survey land” seems to refer to land that has gone through a survey land 
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established on Palestinian private property and hence should not continue in 
a future state of Palestine.273
Another group of settlements that may not satisfy this condition are 
settlements that allegedly have been constructed on land acquired 
fraudulently.274  One recent allegation by B’Tselem,275 for instance, relates to 
new construction in the Modi’in Illit settlement on land within the territory 
of the Palestinian village of Bil’in.  Supposedly, a Palestinian father sold 
land to his son who in turn sold the land to the Society of the Foundation.  
The latter then transferred that land in trust to the Israeli administration, 
which, after converting the land to state land, leased the land back to the 
settlers’ building concern.276 Both the Palestinian father and son are dead,277
and the claim is that their signatures as well as those of others were forged in 
this chain of events.  If this is proved, any such settlement would not have 
satisfied the condition of not having been built on Arab owned land.  The 
facts of the case remain murky, including whether the land at issue belonged 
to the individual Palestinian-sellers or to the village within whose borders 
the land was situated.  A justice of the Israeli Supreme Court has issued a 
temporary injunction in this case, and the Israeli State Prosecution is 
considering a criminal prosecution.278
With these exceptions, however – no matter the procedural flaws that 
require redress – the important point is that the vast majority of settlements 
have not been legally established on land deeded or registered to resident 
Palestinian Arabs or on land to which they can lay claim by cultivated use 
over a period of time.  Critics rightly note that Arab individually owned land 
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has been used for public improvements such as roads.279  As long as Israel is 
the ultimate power in the West Bank, especially over a 40-year period, it 
cannot simply neglect infrastructure improvements that other governments 
routinely effect, even if private property must be taken with compensation, 
or requisitioned with periodic use payments, for such purpose.  Every nation 
in the world, including the United States280, takes land for such purposes. 
Until a final peace settlement is achieved, road construction and other public 
infrastructure improvements are theoretically both inevitable and warranted.  
The heart of the criticism, however, is that most of the road work seems to  
have primarily benefited the Israeli military and/or settlers rather than the 
Arab residents and therefore cannot be justified on the need to ensure the 
civil life and order of the local populace in accord with Article 43 of the 
Hague Regulations.281  On the other hand, the extent of terrorist attacks on 
279 See, e.g., HCJ 393/82 Askan v. Military Commander, [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785, translated in Zamir & 
Zysblat, supra note 223, at 396-409.  The petitioners, who consitituted a cooperative society, had purchased 
land for the purpose of a housing project.  When they applied for a housing permit, the permit was denied 
and part of the land was requisitioned to construct two highways, linking two different towns in the West 
Bank and also linking those towns to Israel.  In that case, Justice Barak spoke about the twin themes of the 
Hague regulations, the interests of the military occupant (in this case, Israel) and the interests of the needs 
of the civilian population (in this case, the Palestinians).  Since one of the duties of a military commander is 
to secure the continued existence of civilian order and life under §43 of the Regulations and since, 
especially in a long occupation not envisioned in the Hague Regulations, circumstances do not stand still, 
the Military Commander was held to be able to take account of changed circumstances in pursuing public 
investments, as long as a prime reason was the good of the civilian population.  In Justice Barak’s words, 
“Fundamental investments which might lead to permanent change that persists after termination of the 
military government are permitted if they are reasonably required for the needs of the local population.” Id. 
at 494.  
280 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), where in a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court 
validated New London’s expropriation of the property of homeowners not even to construct a highway or 
public facility, but to facilitate construction on the land by a private developer.  The majority of Stevens 
(writing for the court), Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, included those considered most liberal on 
the court.  One prominent Supreme Court academic observer, Professor Erwin Chermerinsky of Duke Law 
School, disputed the notion that this decision was a “dramatic change in the law”:  “in reality the Court 
applied exactly theprinciple that was articulated decades ago:  a taking is for public use so long as the 
government acts out of a reasonable belief that the taking will benefit the public.” Practicing Law Institute, 
All Star Briefing, Erwin Chemerinsky: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Kelo is not so Radical as Many 
have Made it Out to Be, Dec. 8, 2005, http://media.whatcounts.com/pli/allstar/ASB3.45.htm.
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the Israeli military and Jewish residents while traveling would tend to 
legitimate takings necessary for infrastructure work on a theory of “military 
necessity.”282 Moreover, while there is dispute as to whether these roads 
presently benefit the Israeli military and citizens more than West Bank 
Palestinians, in any peace settlement the roads would serve all residents and 
substantially contribute to the economic well-being of a new Palestinian 
state.
(b) Land owned by Arab communities or villages
B’Tselem has also made a wider claim, to wit, that Israel has 
expropriated land belonging to Arab villages, without compensation, in 
order to construct Jewish settlements.  For example, B’Tselem vigorously 
argues that Ma’aleh Admumim, the largest Israeli settlement on the West 
Bank and one several kilometers to the east of Jerusalem, is situated on 
territory taken from Abu Dis, al-‘Izriyyeh, al-‘Issawiyyeh, a-Tur, and ‘Anata, 
Palestinian Arab villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem.283   But its “brief” to 
that effect then equivocates: “The farmland of these villages extended from 
the border of Jerusalem on the west to a’-Khan al-Ahmad, at the approach to 
the Dead Sea, on the east.  Ownership determined land usage, i.e., each 
family worked the land that it owned.”284 Thus, it is unclear whether 
B’Tselem is making the claim that the land is owned by private individuals 
within the identified villages or is village land owned collectively by its 
residents.  If it is the former, B’Tselem’s argument collapses into the 
argument, already discussed, that Israeli settlements have been placed on 
land privately owned by Palestinians.  If, instead, B’Tselem’s claim is that it 
is village land, the source of this claim needs to be examined.  
Since the five villages identified do not have any registered title to this 
expanse of land, B’Tselem tries to argue on the basis of prescriptive use.  
But, while some claim is made that the villagers themselves had used the 
land for grazing, the use demonstrated was by Jahalin Bedhouin, who in 
recent years intermittently camped and grazed their livestock on land to the 
east of Jerusalem going down to the Dead Sea.  But B’Tselem strains to find 
a connection between Jahalin Bedhouin and the Palestinian villagers whose 
should not also include the West Bank’s Jewish residents, unless there are other grounds that make their 
presence on the West Bank illegal.
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284 Id. at 4.
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claim to the land B’Tselem champions:  “They grazed on village land in 
accordance with lease agreements (at times symbolic) with the landowners –
including landowners from the villages of Abu Dis and al’Izariyyeh.”285
In other words, only Palestinian Arab villages may be constructed and 
expanded on land because Bedhouin have occasionally grazed their flocks 
thereon pursuant to the implied consent of Palestinian villagers whose right 
to the land (that is, the right to consent to someone else using it) is based 
upon the same Bedhouin use.  Aside from its circularity, B’Tselem’s 
argument equates whatever rights Bedhouin may or may not have with the 
rights of sedentary Arab villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem.  Are the 
rights identical?  Why?286  Interestingly, Bedhouin do not necessarily 
identify themselves as Palestinian Arabs, and, although they are surely not 
Israeli Jews, many Bedhouin are Israeli citizens, serve (unlike most 
Palestinian Arabs who are Israeli citizens) in the Israeli army, and 
disproportionately have been killed by Palestinian attacks on Israeli border 
patrols.  
Moreover, when the expansive reach of B’Tselem’s claim on behalf of 
the villages (all land substantially down to the Dead Sea to the east of 
Jerusalem) is considered, presumably the question of which of the five 
villages has the rights to this expansive stretch of land becomes pertinent.  
Are the rights of each of these villages identical?  Would not the claim of 
some of the villages conflict with the claims of others?  B’Tselem’s brief 
neither asks nor tries to answer these questions.  The result is that, 
sometimes explicitly and otherwise implicitly, its claim that the land belongs 
to these villages collapses into the contention – dealt with in the next 
subsection -- that only Arabs, not Jews, have the right to own and use this 
land.  
             (c) Land owned by a larger Arab polity of “people”
        The meaning of the argument (by some) or the assumption (by others) 
that Israeli Jewish settlements have been established on “Arab” land in a 
broader sense is quite obscure.   Let us put aside for the moment the whole 
argument about whether Israel’s only status on the West Bank is that of an 
“occupying power”, with any international legal implications of that 
285 Id. at 22.
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characterization.287  If the resultant conclusion from the 
argument/assumption is that Jews cannot legally establish settlements west 
of the Jordan River and east of the “green line”, the armistice lines that 
characterized Israel prior to 1967, is the essence of this claim based upon the 
negative notion that Jews have no rights or the positive notion that the land 
legally belongs to “Palestinian” Arabs?288
         As related previously, that Jews have only limited privileges in the 
Near East is a recurrent historical theme.  This perspective denies 
substantially all aspects of the Jewish narrative, including a millennia-old 
nexus with the land.  More recently, within the 20th century, after promising 
the land in the Palestinian mandate for a Jewish homeland289, the British 
decided to partition off approximately 70 percent of Mandatory Palestine to 
provide a kingdom for the Hashemites.290  Transjordan, once created, barred 
Jews from owning land or even living within its borders, a prohibition it 
extended to the West Bank when it captured it in 1948.291
If the basis of the argument is that, in a positive sense, the West Bank 
“belongs” to Palestinian Arabs, what is the basis for this claim – legal title, 
longevity of habitation, the concept of peoplehood, or other?  Although these 
issues have been adequately discussed and in some cases debated elsewhere, 
at least brief mention of why the notion that the West Bank is only “Arab” 
land cannot justify the claim that Israeli Jewish settlements are illegal is 
warranted.  Prior to the first Zionist aliyah in the late 19th century, most of 
the privately owned land west of the Jordan was either “state-owned” land or 
287 See infra notes 168-179, and accompanying text.
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land privately held by absentee Turkish landlords.  With respect to the 
privately owned land, most of the purchases were by the Jewish Agency and 
allowed Jewish settlements to exist, and virtually all of this land was not 
even land that was then farmed by Arabs in that area.  As for state 
ownership, any title claims descended from the Ottoman Empire (that is, 
Turkish state ownership) to British trusteeship to Jordanian annexation that 
was never recognized internationally.  Moreover, it has been estimated that 
over thirty square kilometers of land on the West Bank were owned by 
Israeli Jews prior to any requisitions for settlements.292  In short, whatever 
claims exist with respect to West Bank land on the part of Palestinian Arabs, 
the claim is not based upon any concept of a recorded legal title.  
Certainly, much of the popular belief in the claim that the West Bank 
belongs to Palestinian Arabs rests upon a notion of longevity – the Arabs 
were there first.  But what does “first” mean?  One possible meaning of 
“firstness” is “most ancient.”  As mentioned previously, Arabs recently have 
tried to buttress the  “firstness” of their claim by asserting that they are 
descended from the ancient Canaanites293, but there is no anthropological or 
other evidence that supports this claim.294  The solely political nature of the 
claim is transparent.295  If, then, “first” means the ties to the land that are 
most ancient, the three millennia history of the Jews in that area296 – a 
history increasingly supported by mounting archaeological evidence297 –- 
would seem to give Jews the superior claim.
292
 Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34.  Benvinisti and Zamir further report:  “Some of the Jewish-owned 
lands in these areas were not inhabited, but most were.  Some of the inhabitants had been forced to leave 
their property during the turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s, and most of them (several thousand, mainly 
from the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and the Gush Etzion settlements south of Jerusalem) were displace in 
the 1948 war.  Yet, unlike the Palestinian refugees, these Jewish refugees were rehabilitated and the 
resettled with the help of the Israeli authorities, which prevented the creation of apermanent problem.” Id., 
f.n.15 at 298.
293 See, e.g., SALMAN ABU SITTA, ATLAS OF PALESTINE 1948: RECONSTRUCTING PALESTINE (2005); Itamar 
Marcus and Barbara Crook, PA hate TV Reaches New Levels, Dec. 29, 2005, 
http://www.pmw.org.il/Latest%20bulletins%20new.htm#b291205 (describing a program about Jaffa that 
“opens with a revision of history, by casting the ancient Canaanites as Arabs [and] [b]y doing this, the more 
than 3,000 years of Jewish history in the area are pre-dated by a fabricated Arab history.”)
294
 As Ephraim Karsh reported, “in an attempt to prove the historic continuity of an ‘Arab nation’, the 
Palestinian intellectual and political leader Yusuf Haikal traced Arab imperial greatness to the ancient 
Fertile Crescent peoples such as the Hittites, Canaanites, Amourites, et. al., ignoring the minor problem that 
these diverse peoples never constituted a single people, let alone an Arab one.” KARSH, supra note 36, at 7.
295 See Benny Morris, Details and Lies, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, 
www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20051031&s=morris103105 at 9 (reviewing Salman Abu Sitta, supra note   
293.
296 See supra, notes 84-6, and accompanying text.
297 See, e.g., Itim, Remains of Second Temple Era Jewish Village Discovered, HAARETZ DAILY,    
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/664845.html (updated Jan. 1, 2006). 
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Popular support for the argument that the Palestinian Arabs were there 
first, it would seem, depends far less upon an ancient notion that the 
Palestinians were the first inhabitants of the land several millennia ago, than 
the notion that in more recent times they were the majority, indeed almost 
exclusive, inhabitants of the land prior to the advent of modern Zionism.  
Edward Said298 and Noam Chomsky, among others, popularized this view, 
according to which the Zionists were colonizers over an indigenous 
Palestinian population.  But even that argument raises more questions than it 
supplies answers.  What land is included in the claim of .majoritarianism or 
exclusivity?  For example, Jews apparently constituted a plurality of the 
residents of Jerusalem, whose other inhabitants included Palestinian Arabs, 
Greeks, Europeans, Turks and others, at least at the turn of 19th century.299
Prior to Arab riots and massacres in early Twentieth Century, Jews had 
inhabited Hebron along with Arabs for centuries.300  While the exact 
numbers are uncertain, it appears that many Arabs that assert  a “Palestinian” 
identity were attracted to the land west of the Jordan because of Jewish 
settlement and economic development that provided jobs.301 The quality of 
some of the research on this subject has been subjected to enormous 
criticism – for example, on the theory that the 20th Century increase in the 
Arab population in Palestine may have resulted from better health care rather 
than the economic growth generated by Jewish settlement 302 -- but the two 
tendered explanations are not mutually exclusive.  The fact that the Arab 
population in and around Jewish settlements increased several times the 
increase recorded in other areas of Palestine, as well as other evidence, lends 
298
 For a taste of his writings on the subject, see SAID, supra note 4,  at 266-77.  Said, now deceased, was so 
adamant about the Palestinian cause that he rejected a two-state solution in favor of a bi-national state, 
which is generally recognized to be code for destruction of the State of Israel.  See DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, 
supra note 14, at 5.
299 MARTIN GILBERT, JERUSALEM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, Introduction at ix (1996)(describing Jews 
as a majority of Jerusalem residents around the year 1900); DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 
17(describing Jews as being a majority since the first population census began in the 18th century).
300 DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 17.
301
 The extensive literature on this subject is also summarized in DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 
27-8 and the footnotes accompanying that text. The uniqueness of the United Nations definition of a 
Palestinian refugee is also instructive:  unlike the definition applicable to any other group, having been in 
Palestine for only one year prior to exodus qualified the emigrant as a “refugee.”  
302
 The work that has been subjected to most of this criticism is JOAN PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE (1984). Ms.Peters, an English researcher,  
started looking at the Israeli-Arab dispute several decades ago from a Palestinian perspective, but then 
concluded almost ten years of research with a belief that many “Palestinians” came from elsewhere due to 
the improving economic conditions that accompanied Jewish settlement. While some of the criticism 
directed towards Peters’ work was politically motivated, the strongest critique was not.  See Yehoshua 
Porath, Mrs. Peters’s Palestine, N.Y.REVIEW OF BOOKS, vol. 32, Jan. 16, 1986, at 36-40 (ascribing 
much of the growth of the Arab population not to immigration, but to better health provision).  
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support  to the economic growth  thesis.303  In short, both Jews and Arabs 
lived for centuries in a sparsely populated, desolate and largely neglected 
land; Arabs surely constituted the majority of the population prior to the 20th
century, but Jews constituted a majority or plurality in Jerusalem and certain 
other places.  Yet, Jews were excluded from most of Palestine once the 
British created Transjordan in order to provide the Hashemites a throne.304
Some of the notion that the West Bank belongs to Palestinian Arabs 
exclusively rests on the notion of Palestinian “peoplehood.”  Indeed, an 
argument made in favor of the state of Israel has been applied to the 
Palestinians:  the state of Israel is justified on the ground that a people 
(Jews), having a common culture and religion (Judaism, whatever its 
variety), with a distinct language (Hebrew), deserve like other peoples a 
geographical area distinct and governed by them.  But the analogy breaks 
down on many fronts.  First and foremost, if the argument is used to counter 
the right of Jews to settle as communities on the West Bank, one must 
initially note that there are communities of Arabs living within Israel.305
Equally significantly, the Palestinian Arabs do not have a tradition, religion, 
language or anything else that is materially distinct from the other countries 
in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and the possible exception of 
Lebanon.306  Through much of the Twentieth Century, most Arabs, including 
most Arabs in Palestine, saw the Arabs in Palestine less as a separate people 
than as part of a greater polity of Arabs living within a greater Syria.307
There is even evidence that the whole notion of peoplehood was a construct 
303 See Letter from Ronald Sanders, Mrs. Peters’s Palestine: An Exchange, 32 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 
27, 1986, at 50; Dershowitz, ISRAEL, supra note 39 at 27-8.   The uniqueness of the United Nations 
definition of a Palestinian refugee is also instructive:  unlike the definition applicable to any other group, 
having been in Palestine for only one year prior to exodus qualified the emigrant as a “refugee.”   
304
 Originally, the Balfour Resolution, recognized by the League of Nations, called for a Jewish National 
home in all of Palestine, but at least two thirds of that possibility was eliminated by the League’s “assent to
a British proposal to suspend application of Jewish national rights under the Palestine Mandate to the area 
of Trans-Jordan.” GERSON, supra note 160, at 44. See also Peel Report, supra note 86, at 37-38.
305
 As stated elsewhere, the percentage is approximately 20 percent. See Z. Klein, Israel’s Population on 
Eve of New Year: 6.955m, Oct. 2, 2005, www.globes.co.il.
306
 The prominent Palestinian academic, Walid Khalidi, has even stated that the “Arab nation both is, and 
should be, one.”  Khalidi, Thinking the Unthinkable , FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 696, July 1978.
307
 Peel Report, supra note 86.  See a discussion of this in Curtis, supra note 110, at 471-2:  “The myth that 
Jews in Palestine unjustly displaced ‘the Palestinian people’ may be widely espoused, but official 
documents before 1947 generally spoke of ‘Arabs in Palestine,’ not of a ‘Palestinian people.’ Though some 
Arab journalists and politicians spoke of a Palestinian national movement in the 1920’s, the people in the 
area did not consider themselves a separate Palestinian people per se.  Rather, they historically identified 
themselves with the larger Moslem or Arab world (Qawmiya) or with the Syrian nation.  Only with the 
creation of Israel and the Arab exodus from the occupied territory did a Palestinian national consciousness 
develop.”
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to be used against the creation of a Jewish state rather than a firmly held 
reality prior to the creation of the modern state of Israel.308
However, all of these arguments are beside the point:  whether or not 
Palestinians considered themselves a somewhat distinct people, they seem to 
do so now and the question of whether there should be an independent state 
of Palestine has been answered in the affirmative.  The point here is not that 
there should not be a Palestinian state, but that state need not exclusively be 
inhabited by Palestinian Arabs.  To the extent that such a claim depends 
upon a notion that the land belongs to an Arab polity, it did not in the past 
(note that the Ottomon Empire is not an Arab polity) and, most importantly, 
it would not destroy any “Peoplehood” of Palestinian Arabs by having 
Jewish communities in their midst.
Indeed, in the broadest sense that the West Bank “belongs” only to 
Palestinian Arabs as “Arab” land is a notion that speaks not only to the issue 
of Jewish settlements, but to the question of Jewish settlement within the 
pre-1967 borders of Israel, that is, the legitimacy of Israel itself.309
3.  The “transfer” issue:  the charge that Israel, as an occupying 
power, has transferred its citizens into the West Bank in violation of Article 
49 of the 4th Geneva Convention310
As time passed, settlement opponents increasingly have relied less on 
the the Hague Regulations, with its underlying dominant theme of protecting 
an ousted sovereign, and more on the 4th Geneva Convention, with its 
transparently humanitarian ideals and provisions.  The specific charge has 
308
 While no one contests that there were Arabs in the Palestinian Mandate, the self-identity of those Arabs 
has been fiercely contested. For an example of the view that “Palestinian” identity was simply “a purely 
negative reaction to Zionism after the Balfour Declaration”, see Marie Syrkin, Palestinian Nationalism:  Its 
Development and Goal, in M. CURTIS, J. NEYER, C. WAXMAN, & A. POLLACK, THE PALESTINIANS, 
PEOPLE, HISTORY, POLITICS at 199-208 (1975).  On the other side of the political spectrum, an extreme 
view of Palestinian identity based upon continuity from the ancient Philistines may be found in FRANK 
SAKRAN, PALESTINE, STILL A DILEMMA 104-05 (Washington, D.C.: American Council on the Middle East, 
1976).  A group of “new historians” in Israel, who generally are regarded as more favorable to the 
Palestinian than the Israeli viewpoint, have taken a more nuanced view of Palestinian identity as arising 
simultaneously with the Zionist movement. See, e.g., BARUCH KIMMERLING AND JOEL. MIGDAL, THE 
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, A HISTORY (2003).  
309
 In an article primarily addressed to the question of the legality of Jewish settlements but also the 
question of whether a second Palestinian state should be established (the first being Jordan itself, which 
was carved out of and acquired the majority of the land covered by the Palestinian Mandate), Eugene 
Rostow recognized this fundamental reality: “They [the “Proponents of ‘Palestinian self-determination’] 
cannot bring themselves to believe that the object of the campaign for a third Palestinian state is not a 
peaceful solution of the Palestine problem, but the destruction of Israel.” Rostow, Self Determination,  
supra note 174, at 171.
310 See supra note 152.
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been that the establishment of the settlements violated the sixth paragraph of 
Article 49,311 which states: “The occupying power shall not deport or 
transfer parts of its own civilian population into territories it occupies.”312
Frequently paragraph 6 is recited as its “plain meaning” were transparent 
and its application to the establishment of Israeli settlements beyond 
dispute.313 However, as is the case with respect to the Hague Regulations, 
both the meaning of this provision and its applicability to Israeli settlements 
are subjects of substantial dispute.  Many general texts on international 
humanitarian law give paragraph 6 scant if no attention,314 and, if anything, 
its origins and meaning are more obscure than the provisions of the Hague 
Regulations discussed previously.
(a) The Rostow perspective, redux
An initial problem with the argument that Israeli settlements violate 
paragraph 6 of Article 49 is that this argument, once again, may presuppose 
the West Bank constitutes “occupied” rather than “disputed” territory in a 
legal sense.  Eugene Rostow consistently took the position that the predicate 
for the application of Article 49, as a provision in Section III (“Occupied 
Territories”) of Part III of the Geneva Convention, “Status and Treatment of 
Protected Persons,” was the act of one signatory of the Convention 
occupying “the territory of a High Contracting Party…”315  To Rostow, who 
311
 For the complete text of Article 49, see supra note 157.Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 307. 
312 Id.
313 See, e.g., letter from Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, Middle East North Africa Division of 
Human Rights Watch, to President Bush, entitled, Israel:  Expanding Settlements in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, December 26, 2005, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/27/isrlpa12346_txt.htm (last viewed Jan. 22, 2006); DIETER FLECK, 
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAND IN ARMED CONFLICTS 246 (1995) (“Article 49, para.6 prohibits 
… the settlement of nationals of the occupying power in the occupied territory.”, with a footnote 33 
concluding, “The settlement of civilians in the territories occupied by Israel therefore contravenes Article 
49, para. 6.”).
314 VON GLAHN, supra note 203, at 72-74 (no mention in general discussion of Article 49); RENE PROVOST, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002) (no mention, but would seem to have 
missed one context in which paragraph 6 might apply on pp.38-9); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN Law (2d. ed. Ashgate/Dartmouth 1998)(scant reference at 199).  See infra note 385 as to 
this reference.  Even G.I.A.D. Draper, whose well known work, RED CROSS CONVENTIONS (supra note 
161), while calling the sixth paragraph “very important”, devotes one clause of a sentence to it 
(“Conversely, this Article prohibits the detaining of protected persons in danger areas, and furthermore, 
which is very important, prevents the Occupant from moving parts of its own population into the occupied 
territory” Id. at 41).
315
 Rostow, supra note 108, at 719.  Rostow’s correspondence is in response to the article by Adam 
Roberts, supra note 200,  in which Roberts termed this analysis – which he ascribed to Israel -- a “technical 
error”: “To refer to the terms of the second paragraph of common Article 2 is of limited relevance, because 
it is in fact the first paragraph that applies when a belligerent occupation begins during a war.   [T]his 
paragraph says nothings about ‘the territory of a High Contracting Party,” referring simply to ‘all cases of 
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noted that Jordan’s own occupation of the West Bank was not recognized 
internationally, “[t]he West Bank is not the territory of a signatory power, 
but an unallocated part of the British Mandate.”316  Rostow’s reference, in 
the 4th Geneva Convention, was to the second paragraph of Article 2, which 
states that “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance.”317
To the extent that Rostow’s conclusion was based upon his positive 
view of the legitimacy of Israel’s claim to the West Bank – that is, his view 
that the West Bank is “disputed” rather than simply “occupied” territory –
Rostow  might have a point.  Otherwise, one would arrive at the totally 
paradoxical result that, for example, once Kuwait’s government reacquired 
control over its territory after the first Gulf War, it could not construct 
housing for Kuwaitees because both it and Iraq were signatories to the 
Geneva Convention.  However, to the extent that Rostow’s conclusion was 
meant solely as an interpretation of the 4th Geneva Convention in light of 
Jordan’s suspect sovereignty rights, a sensible reading of the application of 
the Convention described in Article 2 is to the contrary.  The vast weight of 
authority318 is that Article 2’s second paragraph expands rather than limits 
the application of the Convention described in its first paragraph: “the 
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them.”319  In other words, the application of the Convention simply depends 
upon whether both Jordan and Israel are signatories, not whether the West 
Bank was legally the territory of Jordan.  And Article 6 provides that certain 
articles of the Convention, including Article 49, binds occupying powers 
declared war or of any other armed conflict’ arising between two or more of the high contracting parties.” 
Id. at 64. Quoting Chaim Weizmann, the first president of Israel, Rostow argued that Roberts presented 
“the problem of terminating the Israeli occupation of the territories as if the only relevant legal question 
were the arbitrary denial of Palestinianian national rights”, whereas, quoting Chaim Weizmann, the first 
president of Israel, “the true issue is … ‘not the clash of right and wrong, but the clash of two rights.’” 
Rostow, Correspondence, supra note 108, at 720.
316 Id.
317
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 297.
318
 For example, the ICJ, in its judgment on the Israeli security fence, see infra note 412, and accompanying 
text, said the following:  “The object of the second paragraph of Article 2 is not to restrict the scope of 
application of the Convention, as defined by the first paragraph, by excluding therefrom territories not 
falling under the sovereignty of one of the contracting parties. It is directed simply to making it clear that, 
even if occupation effected during the conflict met no armed resistance, the Convention is still applicable.
This interpretation reflects the intention of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect civilians 
who find themselves, in whatever way, in the hands of the occupying Power.” 2004 ICJ 136, 175.
319
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 297..
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“for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such power exercises 
the functions of government in such territory…”320
(b) Defining the nature of state involvement
Aside from this basic prerequisite for the application of paragraph 6 of 
Article 49, both the nature of state involvement that would trigger the 
paragraph’s prohibition and, whatever the definition of that trigger, its 
application to the Israeli settlements are moot questions.  With respect to the 
more abstract of these questions – what character and degree of state 
involvement trigger paragraph 6 – one can envision a spectrum, with a 
variety of legal opinions as to how most points within that spectrum relate to 
paragraph 6.  At one end of the spectrum would be citizens of the occupant 
voluntarily moving to the occupied country, with the permission of the 
occupant and under its protection but without any inducements of any 
nature.  At the other end of the spectrum would be an occupant’s forcible 
transfer of its own population into occupied territory.   
Closely related to, and arguably influencing, the question of the 
degree and character of state involvement necessary to violate Article 49’s 
sixth paragraph is the question of purpose, both that underlying the sixth 
paragraph and that of the occupying power that effectuates the transfer.  One 
might conceive of the purpose of Article 49 as protecting the civilians who 
are transferred, the population of the territory to which the civilians are 
transferred, or both.  Correlatively, the purpose of the occupying power so 
transferring its own civilians might be to change the ethnic or racial 
composition of its own population (that is, to cleanse its own territory of an 
undesirable ethnicity), to change the ethnic or racial composition of the 
population in the occupied territory, or, even, to replace the population in the 
occupied territory with its own nationals.
Unfortunately, neither the language nor the history of paragraph 6 of 
Article 49 conclusively resolves the issue of the extent and character of state 
involvement necessary for a violation.  Neither do they unambiguously 
identify those persons intended to be protected by its prohibition. And the 
only “authoritative” judicial interpretation interpreting Article 49’s sixth
paragraph, by the High Court of Justice, was given in the context of an 
advisory opinion concerning Israel’s security fence,321 leaving open the 
question of whether its interpretation will apply apolitically to disputes 
involving other nations in similar contexts. 
320 Id., at 298.
321 See infra, notes 412-18, and accompanying text.
78
(c) The Limits of “plain meaning”
Article 49, in its entirety,322 deals with transfers of persons -- largely 
civilians323 -- from and to occupied territories, except for their transfer to a 
power not a party to the 4th Geneva Convention, which is the subject of 
present Article 45 of the Convention.324  Key to an understanding of textual 
arguments based solely upon paragraph 6’s language is Article 49’s first 
paragraph, which reads:  “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as 
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of 
the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are 
prohibited, regardless of their motive.”325 To settlement opponents, 
“transfer” in the sixth paragraph -- especially because the adjective, 
“forcible”, which precedes the term, “transfers”,  in the first paragraph, is 
lacking – connotes that any transfer of the occupying power’s civilian 
population is prohibited.326
This literalist interpretive attempt only succeeds, however, if other 
“literalisms” are disregarded.  If the settlers have moved to the West Bank 
willingly – and arguably forced the government to acquiesce in their 
settlement327 -- it is questionable that one can say that Israel as an 
“occupying power” has so transferred them. If it is then argued that the 
Israeli government has often encouraged the settlers through tax subsidies 
and other benefits and hence the effect is the same as if Israel had 
“transferred” them,328 it should at least be acknowledged that interpretation 
322 See supra note 157.
323
 Article 49 relates to two groups of persons, “protected persons”, in the first five paragraphs, and an 
occupying power’s own civilian population in the sixth paragraph.  Article 4 defines “protected persons” as 
follows:  Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner 
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”  Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I. at 298. But it 
then excludes certain parties, including any persons protected under the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Id.
324
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 306.
325 See supra note 157.
326 See Lein, supra note 29, at 38.
327
 Even B’Tselem concedes that the part of the settlement enterprise that resulted in the largest number of 
settlers and settlements close to Palestinian population areas, on the central mountain range of the West 
Bank, was forced by Gush Emunim, meaning, the Bloc of the Faithful:  “The principal method adopted by 
the movement was to settle a given site without government permission – and sometimes contrary to its 
policy – in an effort to force the government later to recognize the settlement as an accomplished fact.” Id. 
at 13.
328
 Id. at 39.  “State” involvement would include the Ministerial Committee for Settlement, composed of 
ministers from relevant government ministries and members of the World Zionist Organization, which 
decides on the establishment of a new settlement, and the Ministry of Construction and housing and the 
Settlement Division of the WZO which are involved in the actual physical and economic structure of the 
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has transcended the “plain meaning” of words in paragraph 6 to other modes 
of interpretation.  A literalist interpretation would also be self-contradictory 
if one were to accept Rostow’s view that Article 49, like other provisions 
dealing with occupation in the Geneva Convention, only applies to “acts by 
one signatory ‘carried out on the territory of another,’”329 a predicate quite 
problematic given Jordan’s very questionable rights to the West Bank. 
Settlement opponents rightly emphasize that the Geneva Convention, unlike 
the Hague Regulations, was designed primarily as humanitarian law to 
protect people, not to protect dispossessed sovereign states, and therefore 
argue that the applicability of the Geneva Convention’s occupation 
provisions should not depend upon such a technicality.330  That is fair 
enough, but the present point is that “plain meaning” of words or provisions 
can be a two-way street.  Superficially noting the “plain meaning” of a term 
like, “transfer”, unmodified by “forceful”, without accepting the plain 
meaning of “occupying power” or taking into account Rostow’s argument 
about the Convention’s applicability hardly suffices to derive meaning.
A textual approach that may enlighten is to inquire why the term, 
“forcible”, may have been used in the first but not sixth paragraph of Article 
49.  The answer of settlement opponents, of course, is that force is a 
prerequisite of a violation of the first paragraph, but not necessary for a 
violation of the sixth.331  But other answers are equally as plausible.  Not 
infrequently, in legislation of all sorts, when similar language is used in 
several different paragraphs of the same provision, modifying language is 
dropped because the modifying language is understood.332  Another 
explanation is that while the first paragraph is phrased in the passive voice, 
the sixth paragraph is phrased in the active.  Force may be inherent and 
therefore understood if one speaks about government action, that is, the act 
settlement.  See Lein, supra note 29, at 20-22.  And state encouragement would include certain benefits and 
financial incentives, which are generally available to development towns in Israel as well, but exceed on a 
per capita basis the subsidies actually received by residents of settlement towns within the  pre-1967 
borders of Israel, primarily because of the role played by the Settlement Division of the World Zionist 
Organization. Id. at 73-84.
329
 Rostow, Correspondence, supra note 108, at 719.  
330
 Roberts, supra note 200.
331 See, e.g., David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian 
Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 91 (2005) (“As paragraph 1 of Article 49 refers expressly to forcible transfers, 
it seems fair to conclude that the term ‘transfer’ in paragraph 6 means both forcible and nonforcible 
transfers.”).
332
 This is essentially the point that Ruth Lapidoth makes specifically in relation to Article 49.  See Ruth 
Lapidoth, The Status of the Territories: The Advisory Opinion and the Jewish Settlements, 38 ISR. L. REV. 
292 (2005) at 294-95: “According to a well known principle of interpretation, a term which appears several 
times in a treaty, should usually be given the same meaning in each provision.  This applies a plus forte 
raison to a term that appears several times in one and the same article.  A look at the other paragraphs of 
Article 49 shows, that the terms deportation and transfer refer to non-voluntary movement of people.”
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of an “occupying power” deporting or transferring parts of its own 
population, whereas “transfers” without any identified transferor may occur 
at the instance of actors (including, conceivably, the transferees themselves) 
in addition to the occupying power and therefore not necessarily imply 
coercion exercised by one party upon another.  And to understand the  
phraseology used in the first paragraph – “individual or mass forcible 
transfers” --, as well as one plausible origin of the sixth paragraph, it seems 
necessary to transcend a dictionary definition of words to take account of 
context, background and purpose.
(d) Context, Background and Purpose
Although an earlier effort to draft and have states adopt an 
international convention for the protection of civilians preceded World War 
II,333 the 4th Geneva Convention, the product of the Geneva Conference held 
in the summer of 1949, was drafted in the aftermath of, and took into 
account the experiences of, World War II,334 especially the Nazi atrocities 
that occurred both before and during the war.  Throughout, “[t]he 
discussions were dominated … by a common horror of the evils caused by 
the recent World War and a determination to lessen the sufferings of war 
victims.”335   The various nations’ delegates at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic 
Conference considered a draft of the convention that was the product of a 
preliminary conference held in Stockholm the prior year, 1948.336  The 
Stockholm draft was an amended version of the draft presented to the 
Stockholm Conference, which in turn was based upon, but replaced, an even 
earlier draft convention considered by a Conference of Government 
Experts337 held in Geneva in the Spring of 1947.  Article 49, in the final 
333 See 15th International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, 1934, Draft International Convention on the 
Condition and Protection of Civilians of Enemy Nationality who are on Territory Belonging to or Occupied 
by a Belligerent, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 445 
(2004).
334
 In the words of George Best, “This was a long-standing Red Cross project to which the experiences of 
1939-45 gave urgency and direction.” Best, supra note 163, at 115.  See Id., at 80-179 for a description of 
the stages of considering ideas and drafts that became the 4th Geneva Convention, including the political 
stances taken by various government as they, in some cases belatedly, realized the dimensions of the 
convention they were drafting. 
335 JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN 
PRISONERS IN TIME OF WAR (1958) (hereinafter, “Pictet’s Commentary”) at 8.  
336 See Final Record, supra note 152, Volume I, at 113-40.
337 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government 
Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, April 14-26, 1947) 
(hereinafter, “ICRC Report of Government Experts”). The Conference of Experts was itself preceded by a 
Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies held in the summer of 1946, which, although 
dominated by the most recent horrors of the 2d World War, initially considered the question of whether the 
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draft, was the renumbered and partially redrafted successor to Article 45 of 
the Stockholm draft,338 which in turn amended the draft of Article 45339 that 
had been presented for discussion at the Stockholm conference.  That draft 
protection of civilians should be integrated into the convention protecting prisoners of war or required a 
separate convention.   See id. 
338
 Article 45 in the Stockholm draft reads as follows:
Deportations or transfers against their will of protected persons out of occupied territory are 
prohibited, whether such deportations or transfers are individual or collective, and regardless of their 
motive.
The occupying Power shall not undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area, unless the 
security of the population or imperative military considerations demand.  Such evacuations may not involve 
displacements outside the bounds of the occupied territory, except in cases of physical necessity.
The occupying power shall not carry out such transfers and evacuations unless it has ensured 
proper accommodation to receive the protected persons.  Such removals shall be effected in satisfactory 
conditions of hygiene, healthfulness, security and nutrition.  Members of the same family shall not be 
separated.
The Protecting power shall be informed of any proposed transfers and evacuations.  It may 
supervise the preparations and the conditions in which such operations are carried out.
The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civil population into the territory 
it occupies. Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 120-21.
As this was the draft of what became, once renumbered, Article 49, hereinafter reinafter Article 45 refers to 
that article, unless the text otherwise indicates.  For a usage otherwise, see the reference to the Final Article 
45 (not the final Article 49) at infra note 363, and accompanying text.
339
 Deportations or transfers of protected persons out of occupied territory, whether individual or collective, 
and whatever their motive, are prohibited.
The occupying Power shall carry out no evacuation, total or partial, of a given area, unless the 
security of the population or imperative military considerations require.  Such evacuations may only take 
place within the occupied territory, except in cases of material impossibility.
The occupying Power shall undertake such transfers and evacuations only after ensuring to the 
protected persons proper accommodation to receive them.  Such removals shall be effected in satisfactory 
conditions of hygiene, salubrity, security and nutrition.  Members of the same family shall not be separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any proposed transfers and evacuations.  It may 
supervise the preparations and the conditions in which they are carried out.
XVIIth International Red Cross Conference (Stockholm, August 1948), International Committee of the Red 
Cross,  Draft Revised or New Conventions for the Protection of War Victims at 173 (Geneva, May 1948) 
(hereinafter, “XVIIth ICRC Conference”).
Each article of the draft presented to the Stockholm conference was accompanied by remarks that 
had been prepared either by the committee that had revised the draft considered at the 1947 experts 
conference or by the staff of the ICRC. The Legal Commission of the ICRC at that point consisted of :
Jean S. Pictet, Director and head of the legal division, and M. MAX HUBER, Honorary President of the 
ICRC and M. BOSSIER, presumably a member of the ICRC staff., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, REPORT ON GENERAL ACTIVITIES, July 1, 1947 – December 31, 1948, at 12 (Geneva 1949).   The 
remarks following the text of Article 45 stated:
This Article corresponds to Article 27 of the Draft of the Government Experts.  It draws a very clear 
distinction between deportation of protected persons outside the borders of occupied territory (which is 
strictly forbidden), and the evacuation of particular areas, which is permitted in two cases, named by way 
of l imitations:  (1) if the security of the populations requires; (2) if imperative military considerations 
demand.  It should be noted that the Protecting Power may exercise the right of supervision which is 
granted to it, without exception, even when, for example, populations are removed outside the boundaries 
of the occupied territory and transferred to the national territory of the Power in occupation.  The Protecting 
Power may exercise its right of supervision in respect both of the transfers themselves and of the conditions 
in which they are carried out. XVIIth ICRC Conference, supra this note,  at 173.
82
of Article 45 succeeded what had been Article 27340 considered at the 1947 
Conference of experts.   Prior to the Stockholm conference, a legal 
committee substituted the term, “transfers”, in Article 45’s first paragraph 
for “removals”, which had been the term used in Article 27’s first 
paragraph.341 But Article 27 lacked any analogue to Article 49’s sixth 
paragraph, which a legal subcommittee at the Stockholm Conference 
inserted. The new paragraph became the fifth paragraph in the Stockholm 
draft of Article 45 considered at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference.
When the Convention was presented to the conference of delegates in 
1949, the text of Article 45’s first paragraph read:  “Deportations or transfers 
against their will of protected persons out of occupied territory are 
prohibited, whether such deportations or transfers are individual or 
collective, and regardless of their motive.”342  Delegates from various 
nations, most notably the Soviet Union,343 thought the language in the first 
paragraph, “against their will”, too weak, on the theory that persons could be 
coerced to consent to expulsions.344  Whether or not the text read as in its 
original guise, “against their will”, or as redrafted to read, “individual or 
mass forcible transfers”, the sentence remained in the passive tense, rather 
than being phrased in the active voice, such as, “The occupying power may 
340
 Art 27 provided:
Individual or collective deportations or transfer, carried out under physical or moral constraint, to 
places outside occupied territories, and for whatever motives, are prohibited.
This prohibition applies to all persons in the said territories.  It shall not constitute an obstacle to 
the general evacuation of an area by the occupying Power, if military operations make it necessary.  Such 
evacuation shall not involve the transfer of the population beyond the occupied territory, unless it cannot 
possibly be effected within the limits thereof.
Collective transfers within an occupied territory shall only be enforced to meet the security 
requirements of the occupying Power.
The occupying Power shall carry out such transfers and removals with all due regard to the rules 
of hygiene, salubrity, security and nutrition, not only during the transfer, but also in the area in which the 
evacuees will be accommodated.
The conditions under which transfers and removals are carried out shall be verified by the 
Protecting power, or by the competent international body.
In no case shall the above removals and transfers constitute a disguised form of internment or 
assigned residence.
ICRC Report of Government Experts, supra note 337, at 288.  Note that Article 27 was drafted as a much 
more specific text, taken into account the horrors of the 2d World War, in place of Article 19(b) of the 
Tokyo draft, which read:
Deportations outside the territory of the occupied State are forbidden, unless they are evacuations intended, 
on account of the extension of Military operatons, to ensure the security of the inhabitants. Id.. at 288.
341
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIB, at p. 193.
342
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 1, at 120-21.
343 See remarks of  P. Morosov of the Soviet Union: “The Soviet Delegation further proposed deletion of 
the words “against their will”, because in occupied territory no one had the right to express an opinion.  
There was a risk of abuses arising out of the words ‘against their will’”. Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 
IIA, at p. 664.
344 See remarks of Colonel du Pasquier, the Reporter, in Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at p. 759.
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not deport or forcibly transfer…”   The most probable reason is that the Nazi 
atrocities to which the first paragraph primarily referred were often carried 
out not by the Nazis themselves, but the nationals or partisans of the 
occupied country, for example, Poles or Lithuanians, who rounded up Jews, 
either for killing in mass pits or for transfer to concentration camps.  Hence, 
the phraseology of the first paragraph prohibited the kind of events that 
occurred in Poland, Lithuania and other occupied countries, regardless of 
whether an occupying power, such as the Nazis, or its surrogates committed 
the atrocities.
The text of Article 49’s present sixth paragraph (the Stockholm draft’s 
fifth paragraph) on which the alleged illegality of Israeli settlements is 
based, remained the same from the Stockholm draft through the adoption of 
the 4th Geneva Convention.  To view its necessity in order to cover more 
fully the heinous practices that occurred before and during World War II and 
hence its plausible meaning, reference must be made to the definition of 
“protected persons”, the parties sought to be protected by the initial 
paragraphs of Article 49, in contrast to the occupying power’s own 
“civilians” referred to in the sixth paragraph.  Article 4 provides that 
“[p]ersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of 
which they are not nationals.”345  In other words, although the Geneva 
Convention was primarily 346designed to protect individuals rather than 
sovereigns, it did exhibit some deference to the concept of sovereignty:  
most of its provisions did not apply to a belligerent power’s own nationals or 
civilians,347 and therefore left uncovered two Nazi practices, engaged in to a 
lesser extent by other Axis powers: deporting Germany’s own Jews and 
other undesirables to slave and extermination camps in Poland and other 
occupied countries; and transplanting Germans to portions of Poland and 
other occupied countries to displace those populations with Germans.  The 
language of the sixth paragraph covered these omissions, as the restrictive 
345
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 298.  It should be noted that Article 4 then excludes from the 
category of protected persons “Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention”, “Nationals of a 
neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State”, and “Nationals of a co-belligerent 
State.” Id.
346
 The exception to this statement are the provisions of Part II of the Convention, but they are not relevant 
to the present issues.
347
 It should be noted that two other sets of civilians were excluded from the class of  “protected persons”: 
nationals of a state not bound by the convention; nationals of a neutral state who are in the territory of a 
belligerent state if the state of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic relations with the belligerent 
state; and nationals of a co-belligerent state.  See Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 298.
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definition of “protected persons” protected by Article 49’s first paragraph 
did not include the occupying power’s own “civilians.”
Besides the question of whether the “against their will” language348 in 
the first paragraph was strong enough, many of the conference delegates and 
the drafting committee members’ comments about original Article 45 related 
to the question of responsibility for protected persons if, for their own 
protection, they had to be temporarily transferred from the occupied territory 
to the territory of another power.349  With the exception of these evacuations 
for the benefit of the population evacuated,350 substantially all references by 
delegates that concerned “transfers” connoted an involuntary movement of 
people, whether or not the term, “transfers”, was modified by “forcible” and 
regardless of the paragraph of Article 49 or of another provision of the 
Geneva Convention in which one found the term.351  In the third committee 
at the Geneva Conference, charged with the final drafting of the 4th Geneva 
Convention, Adolpho Maresca of Italy “said that in the last war the flower of 
Italian youth had been sent to Germany in cattle trucks.”352  Significantly, he 
added, “Such forced transfers must at all events be prohibited in the future.  
The term ‘deportation’ in the last paragraph of the Article had better not be 
used, as ‘deportation’ was something quite different.”353  Maresca, here, was 
clearly making reference to the text of present paragraph 6, and making the 
same distinction between “deportations”, which some participants saw as 
legitimate during war time,354 and “transfers”, which they condemned as 
348
 This language was inserted by a legal subcommittee at the Stockholm Conference into the text of Article 
45 prepared for that conference’s approval and therefore became part of Article 45’s text in the Stockholm 
draft presented to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference the following year.  Its proponent was Albert J. 
Clattenburg of the U.S.  See Resume des debats, infra note 379, at 62.
349 See, e.g., the comment of Anna Kara of the Hungarian People’s Republic at Final Record, supra note 
152, Vol. 1 at 347. 
350
 See infra notes 359-62, and accompanying text.
351
 The one possible exception is this report from the drafting committee as to why it changed the wording 
of the first paragraph of original Article 45:
“Although there was general unanimity in condemning such deportations as took place during the recent 
war, the phrase at the beginning of Article 45 caused some trouble in view of the difficulty in reconciling 
exactly the ideas expressed with the various terms in French, English and Russian.  In the end the 
Committee have decided on a wording which prohibits individual or mass forcible removals as well as 
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to any other country, but which permits voluntary 
transfers.” Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 2-A, at 827.  This paragraph could be even be interpreted, 
however, not as indicating a difference between the conduct condemned by the first and sixth paragraphs of 
the redrafted Article 49, but as substantiating the conclusion that  the line of division between prohibited 
and permitted conduct corresponded to the difference between forceful versus voluntary transfers.  
352
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 664.
353
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA at 664. 
354 See, e.g., remarks of Remarks of H.E. Mr. Maurice Mineur of Belgium, Final Record, supra note 152, 
Vol. IIA, at 809.
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inherently forced and condemned.  Representatives of the Soviet Union355
and the Netherlands356 similarly saw transfers as forced rather than 
voluntary, without any comment that its use in the last paragraph of then 
Article 45 differed.  
Colonel du Pasquier of Switzerland, the Reporter for the Committee 
considering the civilian convention, introduced the final draft of Article 45 
to the 3d committee with these words: “the text proposed by the Drafting 
Committee set forth a principle on which all the members of that Committee 
had had no difficulty in agreeing, namely, the need to prohibit, once and for 
all, the abominable transfers of population which had taken place during the 
last war.”357   Addressing a Belgian fear that a majority vote, at one point, to 
include “deportation” on the same footing as “transfers” in a draft of Article 
41 (Article 45 in the final draft, which applies to transfers to a non-signatory 
power) would “seriously prejudice the sovereign rights of the States 
concerned”, Colonel du Pasquier replied, “the provisions of the Convention 
might be evaded, ‘transfers’ taking place under the guise of 
‘deportations.’”358 The Reporter’s comment reinforced the usage, adopted 
throughout the discussions, that “transfers” were even more culpable than 
“deportations”; hence, use of both terms in the sixth paragraph can hardly be 
used to refer to “transfer” as a voluntary act and “deport” as a forced act.  
Nowhere in this whole discussion was there any reference to the sixth’s 
paragraph use of the word, “transfer”, as involving or including voluntary 
movement.  Nor, in these sparse references, can one find any indication that 
the conference delegates understood the prohibition of an occupying power 
transferring its own civilians in the 6th paragraph was anything more than 
protection of those civilians who were being “transferred.”  
In fact, the one usage of the term, “transfer”, in Article 45 that could 
be construed as importing lack of compulsion reinforces the conclusion that 
“transfer” in the 6th paragraph implied lack of volition on the part of the 
population transferred.  Because of the blanket prohibition of transfers and 
deportations in Article 45’s first paragraph, it might have been considered 
355
 See remarks of  P. Morosov, Final Record, supra note 152, IIA, at 664.  From context, his motion to 
insert “by force” in the first paragraph was to emphasize this usage, rather than depart from what speakers 
understood the to be in the text’s meaning: “The insertion of the words “by force” [he had earlier offered an 
amendment to such effect] would ensure a formal prohibition of the deplorable practices carried out by 
certain European countries, where men had been loaded into trucks like cattle, and sent to distant countries 
to do forced labour.” (emphasis added)
356
 “ [Mas] Slamet (Netherlands) agreed with the principles underlying Article 45.  In Indonesia, during the 
last war, numbers of women and children had been transferred to unhealthy climates and forced to build 
roads, and had died as a result.” Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 2-A, at 664.
357
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 759.
358
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 809.
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unlawful to transfer protected persons out of harm’s way during warfare for 
their own benefit.  Hence, while the 2d paragraph of the Stockholm draft of 
Article 45 did bar an occupying power from “undertak[ing] total or partial 
evacuation of a given area,” this prohibition was succeeded by the clause, 
“unless the security of the population or imperative military considerations 
demand.”359  Without any change of meaning, the final draft of the 2d 
paragraph was rephrased to read: “The Occupying power may undertake 
total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand.”360  With minor modifications not 
here relevant, the third and fourth paragraphs then dealt with the necessity of 
insuring that, in the context where civilians had to be evacuated for their 
own benefit, proper accommodations would be provided, their health 
safeguarded, family members would not be separated, and the party in 
control of the territory to which the civilians were being evacuated would be 
so informed.  In reference to these provisions, the Final Report of the 
Committee drafting the text for consideration by the plenary meeting of the 
delegates, referred to the function of the second paragraph in relation to the 
first paragraph:
Although there was general unanimity in condemning such 
deportations as took place during the recent war, the phrase at the 
beginning of Article 45 caused some trouble in view of the difficulty 
in reconciling exactly the ideas expressed with the various terms in 
French, English and Russian.  In the end the Committee have decided 
on a wording which prohibits individual or mass forcible removals as 
well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to 
any other country, but which permits voluntary transfers.
The second paragraph deals with the problem of evacuations 
made necessary in the interest of the security of the civilian 
population, or for imperative military considerations.  …This special 
case constitutes an exception to the first paragraph….361
In other words, those transfers which were “voluntary” were those that were 
permitted, that is, evacuations for the benefit of the civilians in the second 
paragraph.  In that context, the term, “transfer”, was used as a synonym for 
“evacuations.”  In contrast, the transfers in Article 45’s sixth paragraph are 
of course prohibited, and there is no suggestion anywhere that these 
359
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I at 120.
360
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I at 307.
361
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 827.
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prohibited transfers were viewed as anything but involuntary.  In this latter 
context, “transfer” and “deport” were used synonymously.362
Within the 4th Geneva Convention, the two other primary uses of the 
term “transfer” relate to protected persons, who are “transferred to a Power 
not a party to the Convention”363 – which is prohibited -- and to “internees”, 
whose transfer must “be effected humanely.”364 Both contexts clearly 
indicate that “transfer”, again unmodified by “forcible” or a synonym, 
connotes an act effected by the Detaining Power upon the protected persons 
or internees, as the case may be, irrespective of their consent.  Finally, the 4th
Geneva Convention, with which we are concerned, was considered at the 
same diplomatic conference that considered and adopted three other 
conventions; in the 3d Geneva Convention, relating to Prisoners of War,  
“transfer” is used consistently, without any adjectives, to connote an act of 
the Detaining Power upon them, rather than a voluntary act on the prisoners’ 
part.365
Without more, then, a textual reading that takes into account the term, 
“occupying power”, as well as the term, “transfer”, reinforced by the term, 
“deport,”  the use of similar terminology elsewhere in the 4th Geneva 
Convention, the use of similar terminology in the 3d Geneva Convention, 
the comments of delegates to the Convention, as well as the overriding 
context that surrounded the drafting of the Geneva Convention, would seem 
to support an interpretation that voluntary movement of one’s civilians, done 
of their own free will, is not prohibited by the sixth paragraph of Article 49. 
To Julius Stone, writing in reference to this paragraph, “the word ‘transfer’ 
in itself implies that the movement is not voluntary on the part of the persons 
concerned, but a magisterial act of the state concerned.”366  Terming a 
contrary interpretation of the 6th paragraph as “an irony bordering on the 
absurd”, he commented:  “Ignoring the overall purpose of Article 49, which 
would inter alia protect the population of the State of Israel from being 
removed against their will into the occupied territory, it is now sought to be 
interpreted so as to impose on the Israel government a duty to prevent any 
Jewish individual from voluntarily taking up residence in that area.”367
Eugene Rostow concurred that “the provision was drafted to deal with 
362 STONE, supra note 118, at 180.  This same distinction between mass transfers that are voluntary and 
those that are involuntary is drawn in De Zayas, supra note 33, at 208-09.
363
 Article 45 in Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 1 at 306.
364 See Article 127, in Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 1, at 323.
365 See, e.g., the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, Art. 
12, Final Record, supra note 152, at 246 (“Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining 
Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention …).
366 STONE, supra note 118, at 180.
367 Id.
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‘individual or mass forcible transfers of population,’ like those in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary before and after the Second World 
War,”368  In contrast, Rostow characterized Jewish settlers in the West Bank 
as “most emphatically volunteers,”369 and concluded that Jews had every 
right to settle on the West Bank, “equivalent in every way to the right of the 
existing population to live there.”370
(e) Pictet’s Commentary and its Sources
There is “more”, however, and that additional input casts some doubt 
on the meaning and purpose of the 6th paragraph. Under the general 
editorship of Jean S. Pictet, Director Delegate of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the sponsoring organization for the Geneva 
Conference and the organization under whose auspices the Convention was 
drafted, members or former members of the ICRC wrote a commentary on 
the Convention,371 published in its original French version approximately 
seven years after the conference. Like “official comments” of a statute 
subsequently written by non-legislators who participated in drafting the 
legislation, there is serious question of what weight to attach to commentary 
of an international treaty published well after the conference at which the 
drafts have been discussed, the final draft adopted, and the Convention 
signed by the delegates from different nations and ratified by various 
governments.372 Nonetheless, Pictet’s commentary has been given 
authoritative weight,373 and therefore must be considered.
368
 Rostow, Self Determination, supra note 174, at 160.
369
 Rostow, Correspondence, supra note 108, at 719.
370 Id.
371
 Pictet’s Commentary, supra note 335; JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTAIRE, IV LA CONVENTION DE GENEVE 
RELATIVE A LA PROTECTION DES PERSONNES CIVILES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE (Comite International de la 
Croix-Rouge Geneve 1956) (in French). Later references to the text are based upon the English edition of 
Pictet’s Commentary.  The actual authors are identified as Oscar M. Uhler, Frederic Siordet, Roger Boppe, 
Henri Coursier, Claude Pilloud, Rene-Jean Wilhelm & Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer.  Of these parties, Pictet, 
Siordet, Pilloud, and Wilhelm attended the diplomatic conference as “experts.”
372
 Israel signed the Convention on December 8, 1949, and the Knesset ratified the Convention on July 6, 
1951.
373
 For example, Kretzmer relies heavily upon it in criticizing the Israeli Supreme Court’s views on Article 
49.  See KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 49-50.  Significantly, Kretzmer’s preference for Pictet over Julius 
Stone’s views (which the court has relied upon) proceeds not only from Pictet’s status as the editor in chief  
of the ICRC commentary, the ICRC being the sponsoring organization of the Convention, but also the fact 
Pictet’s  Commentary “was written before 1967, was not related to any specific conflict and is therefore 
obviously an objective view of the Convention.”  What Kretzmer does not mention is, as noted in the text, 
that Pictet authored his Commentary well after the delegates at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference 
discussed, approved amd signed the Convention on behalf of their governments and  and their governments 
had ratified it.
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Referring to the theme of Article 49 as a whole, Pictet’s commentary 
states: “it will suffice to mention that millions of human beings were torn 
from their homes, separated from their families and deported from their 
country, usually under inhumane conditions.”374  But the authors were less 
certain of the role of the 6th paragraph, and commented: “It is intended to 
prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, 
which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for 
political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those 
territories.  Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native 
population and endangered their separate existence as a race.”375  Moreover, 
in addition to the above, the authors posited that “[i]t  would therefore 
appear to have been more logical – and this was pointed out at the 
Diplomatic Conference[fn.3] – to have made the clause in question into a 
separate provision distinct from Article 49, so that the concepts of 
“deportations” and “transfers” in that Article could have kept throughout the 
meaning given them in paragraph 1, i.e., the compulsory movement of 
protected persons from occupied territory.”376
In other words, Pictet’s commentary suggests two things that might 
give pause with respect to the prior conclusion that the 6th paragraph was 
intended to protect the civilians of the occupying power’s own country (e.g., 
Germany) from their forcible transfer to the occupied territory (e.g., 
Auschwitz or other concentration camp in Poland).  The first is that the 
purpose of the sixth paragraph was the protection of two sets of parties:  the 
occupied power’s own civilians transported against their will into occupied 
territory; and the native people of the occupied territory. The second is the 
suggestion that the terms, “transfer” and “deport”, were not used with the 
same connotation of involuntariness or compulsion that these terms 
connoted in Article 49’s first paragraph.  
To the extent that the purpose was to protect the racial purity or 
economic situation of the native population, could it not be argued that the 
sixth paragraph of Article 49 should be interpreted most liberally and 
broadly against any actions of an occupying power that sponsor or promote 
the movement of an occupant’s population into the occupied territory?377
Indeed, Palestinians and settlement opponents argue quiet vigorously that 
the settlement enterprise had as its intent to change the demographic 
composition of the West Bank. And does not the suggestion of a different 
374 Id. at 278-79, cited in STONE, supra note 118, at 178-79.
375 Id. (emphasis added)
376 Id.
377 See Kretzmer, Advisory Opinion, supra note 331, at 91.
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meaning or usage of “transfer” and “deport” in the sixth than in the first 
paragraph support the notion that Israel’s actions, -- allegedly a combination 
of subsidies, tax and otherwise, infrastructure improvements for the use of 
such settlements and confiscation of Arab lands378-- have violated the sixth 
paragraph’s prohibition? But, while the historical record does provide
support for the first notion (that the beneficiaries of the 6th paragraph’s 
prohibition included the native population of the occupied territory), it does 
not confirm the latter (that “transfer” as used in the 6th paragraph, unlike its 
usage in the first paragraph, did not connote compulsion).
There is support for the idea that the prohibition against the occupying 
power transferring its own civilian population into occupied territory had, at 
least as one of its purposes if not its primary purpose, the protection of the 
native population.  Pictet’s Commentary cites as support several pages in a 
type-written report that tersely summarized discussions in a sub-committee 
of the Legal Commission at the Stockholm Conference (interestingly, this is 
the only cite to this source in the entire commentary on the 4th Geneva 
Convention).379  The reference seems to have been directed primarily to the 
378
 For example, Roberts opined that “even if voluntary settlement of nations on an individual basis were 
permissible under Article 49, the ambitious settlements program of the 1980s, which was planned, 
encouraged and financed at the governmental level, does not meet that description.” Roberts, supra note 
200, at 85.  He then concludes that “[t]he settlement program is quite simply contrary to international law” 
(id.), but gives no authority for such except UN General Assembly Resolutions.  Elsewhere, Roberts admits 
to bias that can result in the UN General Assembly passing any resolution brought up against Israel, 
including the infamous 1975 resolution equating Zionism (that is, the whole notion that Jews have the right 
to statehood) with racism. Id. at 100.
379 Résumé des débats des sous-commissions de la Commission juridique [de la]
XVIIe Conférence internationale de la Croix-Rouge, Stockholm, août 1948. -
[Genève : CICR], décembre 1948. - 91 p. 30 cm (Document ronéographié), cited in Pictet’s Commentary as 
XVIIth Internation Red Cross Conference, Legal Commission, at 61-2.  Because this summary seems not to 
be available either in the United States or on the internet, the notes kept from the meeting are presented 
below, with the scant recorded introduction of the proposal at a first meeting, its tabling until a second 
meeting, its contraction and the ambiguous references of various participants.
Discussion of Article 45 at first meeting:
M. Cohn (Danemark, Gvt.) propose d’ajouter un nouvel alinéa ainsi conçu: “La Puissance occupante ne 
pourra pas procéder à la déportation ou au transfert d’une partie de sa propre population ou de la population 
d’un autre territoire qu’elle occupe dans le territoire occupé par elle”, ceci afin de protéger la population 
d’un Etat occupé contre une invasion de personnes.
M. Pilloud (CICR), croit qu’il s’agit là plutôt des devoirs de la Puissance occupante, ce qui n’est pas 
entièrement du ressort de la Croix-Rouge internationale.  Nous devons chercher à protéger plutôt les 
ressortissants d’un pays.
M. Castnerg (Norvège, Gvt.) appuie la proposition de M. Cohn car il estime que ce nouvel alinéa 
protégerait les nationaux d’un pays occupé contre un envahissement de personnes venant d’autre territoires 
et qu’il faudrait nourrir, etc.
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remarks of Dr. Georg Cohn of Denmark, who initially introduced the 
provision with explicit reference to “protecting the inhabitants of an 
occupied State against an invasion of people.”380 Cohn’s initial provision 
would have prohibited an occupying power from deporting or transferring a 
“part of its own inhabitants or the inhabitatnts of another territory which it 
occupies” into the occupied territory.381 Claude Pilloud, then the Chief of the 
Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross, reacted, 
seemingly with some skepticism, with ambiguous references about some 
aspect of Cohn’s proposal directed “more at the duties of the occupying 
power, which is not entirely within the competence of the International Red 
Cross”, but then concluded: “We should therefore try to protect a country’s 
nationals.” It is unclear from the abbreviated summary whether Pilloud’s 
La Commission, sur proposition de MM. Holmgren (Suède, CR.) et Abut (Turquie, CR.), decide de 
différer sa décision sur cet article et d’attendre que la proposition de M. Cohn ait été distribuée.
M. Clattenburg (YSA, Gvt.) demande qu’au premier alinéa de l’article 45 on ajoute “contre leur gré” 
après “les déportations ou transferts”.  Cette proposition est adoptée.  L’article 45  avec ou sans addition de 
la proposition de M. Cohn sera mis aux voix lors de la prochaine séance. Id. at 61-2.
Discussion of Article 45 at next meeting:
M. Cohn (Danemark, Gvt.) propose l’addition suivante à l’article 45:
“La Puissance occupante ne pourra pas procéder é la déportation ou au transfert d’une 
partie de sa propre population ou de la population d’un autre territoire qu’elle occupe 
dans le territoire occupé par elle.”
Après une discussion à laquelle ont pris part M. Clattenburg (USA, Gvt.) qui estime que cet alinéa a un 
sens beaucoup trop étendu, M. Wershof (Canada, Gvt.) et M. Pilloud (CICR), la sous-commission adopte 
cet alinéa modifié comme suit:
“La Puissance occupante ne pourra procéder á la 
déportation ou au transfert d’une partie de sa propre
population civile dans le territoire occupé par elle”.
M. Wershof (Canada, Gvt.) signale qu’il s’est abstenu de voter, non qu’il réprouve les sentiments 
exprimés dans cet alinéa, mais il estime que cette conférence n’est pas habilitée pour examiner dans cet 
alinéa des questions de ce genre et trouve que la Convention n’a pas pour but de montrer à des Nations 
comment elles doivent faire la guerre. Id. at 77-8.
380Résumé des débats des sous-commissions de la Commission juridique [de la]
XVIIe Conférence internationale de la Croix-Rouge, Stockholm, août 1948. -
[Genève : CICR], décembre 1948. - 91 p.;30 cm (Document ronéographié), cited in Pictet’s Commentary as 
XVIIth Internation Red Cross Conference, Legal Commission, at 61-2.
381
 Id.
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reference to “a country’s nationals” referred to the transferred population of 
the occupying power or the inhabitants of the occupied territory.382
The proposal to add the provision was first shelved to allow interested 
parties to consider it.  Cohn reintroduced his text at the next subcommittee 
meeting, without reference to the intended beneficiaries of the prohibition.383
Other participants at the subcommittee committee, led by Albert J. 
Clattenburg, Jr. of the United States, thought the provision was too broad.  
After discussion, the language, “or the inhabitants of another territory which 
it occupies”, was deleted, and the word, “civil”, was added prior to 
“inhabitants” in the French text.
Shortly after the 1949 Geneva Conference, Hersh Lauterpacht, 
published the 7th edition of Oppenheim’s International Law384, in which he 
opined that the paragraph’s “prohibition [was] intended to cover cases of the 
occupant bringing in its nationals for the purpose of displacing the 
population of the occupied territory.”385  Lauterpacht, the very distinguished 
English law professor and member of the International Court of Justice, had 
been a legal expert to the International Committee of the Red Cross at a 
committee of experts in December of 1948, but that meeting apparently 
382
 In the French, Cohn used the phrase, “la population d’un Etat occupe”, while Pilloud used the term, les 
ressortissants d’un pays.” Id.
383 Id. at 77-8.  Note that  Cohn’s original text would also have prohibited the Occupying Power from 
deporting or transferring, not only parts of its own inhabitants, but also the inhabitants of another territory 
which it occupies, into the occupied territory.   Arguably, although this reference to the inhabitants of 
another territory does not relate to whether the primary purpose of the provision was to protect the 
transferred parties or native population of the occupied territory, it does suggest that “transfer” was still 
referring to movements of people determined by the Occupying Power rather than movement of people of 
their own free will.  The phrase, “or the inhabitants of another territory which it occupies,” was deleted, at 
the suggestion of  Albert E. Clattenburg, Jr., one of those  representing the United States, who thought the 
paragraph “too extensive.”  Clattenburg at the time was the First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, 
and had been Chief of Special War Problems Division, Department of State, during World War II.  In the 
latter capacity, he apparently resisted an attempt to save Jews interned at the Bergen Belsen concentration 
camp by exchanging them for interned Germans in South America (See Max Paul Friedman, The U.S. State 
Department and the Failure to Rescue: New Evidence on the Missed Opportunity at Bergen-Belsen, 19 
HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUDIES, No. 1, 26-50, at 40 (Spring 2005)) and participated in a program of 
interning Japanese Peruvians during World War II.  See Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border:  The 
Interdependence of Foreign Policy and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & 
DEVELOPMENT L.J. 53, n.79 and accompanying text, at 69-70 (1999).  In addition, Cohn’s proposal at the 
two meetings had no adjective prior to the word, “inhabitants.”  As adopted by the Committee, the French 
word for “civil” was inserted prior to inhabitants.  XVIIth International Red Cross Conference, Legal 
Commission, supra note 379, at 78.   
384 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, ED., OPPENHEIM’S  INTERNATIONAL LAW , VOL.II DISPUTES, WAR AND 
NEUTRALITY (7th ed., David McKay Company, 1952).
385 Id. at 452.  This would seem to be the same meaning suggested by one modern text of international 
humanitarian law, written without any reference to Israel and the West Bank: “Once occupation is 
established, individual or mass forcible transfers or deportation are prohibited, apart from the evacuations 
dictated by imperative military necessity…In no circumstances may evacuated areas be repopulated by 
nations transferred from the home territories of the occupying power.” MCCOUBREY, supra note 314, at 
199 (emphasis added).  
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concerned certain “grave breaches” provisions common to all four of the 
Geneva Conventions and occurred subsequently to the Stockholm 
Conference at which the language of the fifth paragraph was introduced and 
fixed.386  In the preface to his edition of Oppenheim’s text, Lauterpacht 
thanks Pilloud, of the ICRC, “for information concerning the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.”387 Pilloud, who, as mentioned above, was chief of the 
Legal Division of the ICRC and a participant at the legal subcommittee 
meeting at the Stockholm conference, is also listed as one of the authors of 
Pictet’s Commentary, although not the principal one. It is a reasonable 
assumption that Lauterpacht divined the meaning of the paragraph from 
Pilloud.   
Pictet’s Commentary itself notes that “[a]fter passing through these 
various stages, the draft texts were taken as the only working documents for 
the Diplomatic Conference …”388 – i.e., it appears that the delegates did not 
have the summaries of the committee discussions before them, and those 
delegates who spoke with respect to then Article 45 did not include the 
members of the legal subcommittee that added its fifth (later, Article 49’s 
sixth) paragraph.  In any event, while it may be unclear whom the Geneva 
delegates understood to be the intended beneficiaries of the prohibition in 
the paragraph, all explicit references by delegates to “transfers” – whether of 
protected persons, internees, the occupying power’s civilian population, or 
others – seemed to focus either upon the need to protect the transferred 
population or, in the context of transfers for the benefit of transferees (e.g., 
for their own safety) upon the necessity of notification to, and having regard 
for the other needs of, the “protecting power” to whose caretaking they 
would be transferred.  
Certainly, the theme of racial or ethnic purity expressed in Pictet’s 
Commentary cannot be found in either the remarks of the legal 
subcommittee that inserted the provision into then Article 45 or elsewhere in 
the 4th Geneva Convention.  Quite the contrary.  Article 13, the first 
provision of Part II (General Protection of Populations against Certain 
Consequences of War), which applies even if the parties affected are not 
“protected parties” under the Geneva Convention, states that the provisions 
of Part II “cover the whole of the population of the countries in conflict, 
without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, 
religion or political opinion…”389  Part III (Status and Treatment of 
386 BEST, supra note 163, at 93-4..
387 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 384, at Preface, p.vii-viii.
388
 Pictet’s Commentary, supra note 335, at 6.
389
 Art. 13, Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 1 at 300.
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Protected Persons) provides that “ all protected persons shall be treated with 
the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, 
without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or 
political opinion.”390  And, of course, modern trends in international 
humanitarian law, including negative views of immigration restrictions 
based upon color or ethnicity and positive views of granting political 
asylum,391 show no respect for a notion of preserving the racial composition 
or ethnic integrity of the country of immigration, although they do evince 
support for self-determination.
In less racial terms, 392whatever the intent of those who promoted 
settlement – the negative one sometimes imputed to Israel by its opponents -
- to displace the Palestinian population with Israeli Jews -- or a positive one 
-- facilitating the rights of Jews to live on the West Bank without prejudice 
to the rights of Palestinians393 – it is difficult to argue that Jewish settlements 
have altered materially the ethnic balance of the West Bank.394  Excluding 
disputed neighborhoods in Jerusalem and settlements contiguous to the pre-
1967 armistice lines, Jews at most constitute no more than 8 percent of the 
West Bank’s population, less than 4 percent of a Palestinian state that would 
include Gaza, and an even smaller percentage of the population if at least 
some Palestinian refugees return to live in either the West Bank or Gaza.395
390
 Art. 27, Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 1 at 303.
391 See, e.g., Article 14, ¶1,  of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides:  “Everyone has 
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” 
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/udhr.html (last viewed Jan. 21, 2006). 
392 See the population discussion, supra note 29.
393 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, May, 2001, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Settlements+and+Intern
ational+Law.htm (last viewed, Feb. 2, 2006) (“…the movement of individuals to the territory is entirely 
voluntary, while the settlements themselves are not intended to displace Arab inhabitants, nor do they do so 
in practice”).  See also Arye Naor, “Behold, Rachel, Behold”: The Six Day War as a Biblical Experience 
and its Impact on Israel’s Political Mentality, 24 THEJOURNAL OF ISRAELI HISTORY, No. 2, 229-250, 
(September 2005), who notes that Menachem Begin, while a believer in a Greater Israel that would include 
the West Bank, rejected the notion of denying equal rights to Palestinians and “believed that both Jews and 
Arabs would live in peace and harmony in the State of Israel…” Id. at 243-44.
394
 One can also note that the Palestinian economic situations improved appreciatly from 1967 through 
1995 (the approximate date that the Palestinian Authority assumed control over most of the West Bank’s 
population),.  Life expectancy increased, infant mortality fell, and medium to strong economic growth 
occurred.  See the Zimmerman group,  supra note 29 .  On the other hand, it can also be argued that 
Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy itself had a negative effect that presently requires 
substantial recovery. 
395
 During the first decade of Israeli control over the West Bank, the numbers of settlers, approximately 
2,000, and the percentage of the population the settlers constited, approximately ½ of 1 percent, were even 
smaller (GERSON, supra note 160, at 174), but at that point there was no movement on the Arab side to 
make peace.  Certainly, during the first decade when the Labor party still dominated the Israeli government, 
“in the perspective of contemporary international law, Isael’s land acquisition and settlement policy was 
not unlawful as it neither aimed for, nor neared, a stage involving displacement of the existing population 
as a prelude to future annexation.” GERSON, supra note 160, at 173.
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Moreover, while the 1967 War, like the 1948 War, produced some refugees, 
there is no evidence that there was any nexus between any Arab refugees in 
1967 and any plan to construct and populate Jewish settlements. This 
situation differs substantially, then, from efforts by the Soviet Union to alter 
the ethnic makeup of the Baltic States, by initially deporting hundreds of 
thousands of people and then encouraging Russian immigration into them,396
or by China to alter the ethnic makeup of Tibet, by forcibly scattering its 
native population and moving Chinese into Tibetan territory in their stead.397
With respect to the Pictet Commentary’s support for “transfer” 
possibly having a meaning different from elsewhere in Article 49’s text, its 
footnote 3 refers solely to that page in the Final Record of the Geneva 
conference containing the remarks of delegates Morosov of the Soviet 
Union, Slamet of the Netherlands, Maresca from Italy (discussed 
previously), none of whom suggested that the 6th paragraph be removed to a 
different separate article and all of whom referred to “transfers” in the 
negative sense as involving force and compulsion.398 At the close of the 16th
committee meeting considering the civilians’ convention, Mr. Georges 
Cahen-Salvador of France, chair of the committee, was reported to have 
summed up the discussion concerning the whole of Article 49 in the 
following way:  “The Chairman, before declaring the discussion on article 
45 closed, noted that the Committee was unanimous in condemnation of the 
abominable practice of deportations.  The sole purpose of every speaker had 
been to strengthen the interdictory provisions of the Article.  He suggested 
that deportations should, in the same way as the taking of hostages, be 
solemnly prohibited in the Preamble.”399   The delegates, meeting as a 
396 See THOMAS A. ARMS, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE COLD WAR 43 (Facts on File 1994).   While the 
deportations began under Stalin in 1945, prior to the 4th Geneva Convention, the movement of Russians in 
to the Baltic States continued even under Khruschev and Brezhnev “so that by 1980 of 1.5 million citizens 
in Estonia, only 900,000 were ethnic Estonians.” Id.  For a description of the forced deportations of 
hundreds of thousands of natives of the Baltic States and the Russification of Estonia, Latvia and, to a 
lesser extent, Lithuania, see also WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR., BALTIC INDEPENDENCE AND RUSSIAN EMPIRE
56-7(1991); JOHN HIDEN & PATRICK SALMON, THE BALTIC NATIONS AND EUROPE 131(rev’d ed., 
Longman, 1994) (“By 1979 ethnic Latvians constituted only 38.3 percent of their own capital, Riga.”); 
ROMUALD J. MISIUNAS & REIN TAAGEPERA, THE BALTIC STATES, YEARS OF DEPEDENCE 1940-1990 
(1993) (about 1/10 of Latvian and Estonian farmers were deported, Id. at 102, and “The Latvians’ share of 
their country’s population was probably around 83 percent in 1945, but dropped to about 60 percent by 
1953, due to immigration and deportations.”, Id. at 112).
397 See John S. Hall, Chinese Population Transfer in Tibet,  9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 173 (2001). 
The reticence of the international community actively and vociferously to criticize China’s human rights 
record in this regard is explored in Philip Baker, Human Rights, Europe and the Peoples Republic of China,  
THE CHINA QUARTERLY 45-63(2002), also available at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=101319.
398 See supra notes 348-56, and accompanying text.
399
 Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 664.
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committee before the draft was presented to the plenary session for approval, 
then proceeded to discuss succeeding articles. No one argues that Israel 
forcibly moved settlers into the West Bank, although, as part of the Gaza 
disengagement, Israel did forcibly remove settlers from four settlements in 
the Northern West Bank and has since begun to evacuate, with force, illegal 
outposts having some permanent residents.
(f) Other Considerations – Avoiding Absurdity and Circularity, 
and Taking Account of the Element of Time
Several other considerations – most notably, avoiding absurd 
conclusions, avoiding circularity of meaning and taking account of the 
element of time,– counsel against the conclusion that Israeli settlements 
violate Article 49’s sixth paragraph, especially on the basis of preserving 
any alleged racial or ethnic purity of Palestinians.  While Julius Stone 
considered Israeli settlements in compliance with both of the themes that, at 
least in his reading of Pictet’s Commentary, inhered in Article 49’s sixth 
paragraph – protecting the occupying power’s own civilians from transfer 
against their will and protecting the nationals of the occupied territory from 
a mass influx that historically had often accompanied forcible transfer of 
nationals out of occupied territory -- he did have the following to say about a 
conclusion that Israel had any obligation to keep Israeli volunteers from 
settling on the West Bank:
…[W]e would have to say that the effect of Article 49(6) is to impose 
an obligation on the state of Israel to ensure (by force if necessary) 
that these areas, despite their millennial association with Jewish life, 
shall be forever judenrein.  Irony would thus be pushed to the 
absurdity of claiming that Article 49(6), designed to prevent repetition 
of Nazi-type genocidal policies of rendering Nazi metropolitan 
territories judenrein, has now come to mean that …the West Bank… 
must be made judenrein and must be so maintained, if necessary by 
the use of force by the government of Israel against its own 
inhabitants.
Common sense as well as correct historical and functional 
context exclude so tyrannical a reading of Article 49(6)….400
400 STONE, supra note 118, at 180.
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Stone’s observation invites a hypothetical:  suppose that a group of 
Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel requested permission to establish 
a community on the West Bank.  Without loss of their citizenship, Israel 
facilitated the community’s establishment on land that this group was able to 
purchase from other Palestinian Arabs (not citizens of Israel) or on state 
land.  Would establishment of this settlement violate Article 49’s sixth 
paragraph?  If not, how can one distinguish the hypothetical from Jewish 
settlements?
Those who most vigorously allege that Jewish settlements violate the 
sixth paragraph generally tend not to differentiate between those settlements 
established prior to or subsequent to actions on the part of the Israeli 
government that, for a time, are said to have promoted settlement activity; to 
these opponents, the military government’s permission to establish a 
settlement itself would have been prohibited.  An argument that only Jewish 
settlement without any state involvement would satisfy Article 49, therefore, 
leads to another absurdity, to wit, that only Jewish settlements unauthorized 
by the military commander and therefore illegal under Israeli law401 are 
lawful under Article 49.  Only the occupants of these illegal outposts would 
seemingly truly qualify as “volunteers” not related in any way to Israeli 
government action! 
Circularity of interpretation is also to be avoided.  Concluding that 
Israeli settlements violate the sixth paragraph of Article 49 also overlooks 
the fact that Jewish communities formerly existed in some of the areas that 
are today defined as Israeli settlements, for example, in Hebron and in the 
Etzion Bloc.402  These Jewish communities were destroyed by Arab armies, 
militias, and/or rioters, and, as in the case of Hebron, the community’s 
population slaughtered.  Does it make sense to interpret Article 49 to bar the 
reconstitution of Jewish communities that were themselves destroyed 
through aggression and slaughter?  If so, the international law of occupation 
funs the risk of freezing one occupier’s conduct in place, no matter how 
unlawful.  And under what theory can one then distinguish between 
settlements and the reconstruction and repopulation of the Jewish quarter of 
Jerusalem’s old city, which was also destroyed by the Jordanians in its 1948 
occupation of the West Bank?403  An answer that these acts of Arab 
401 See the Sason Report, supra note 2.
402 See Lein, supra note 29, at 11:  “As early as September 1967, Kfar Ezyon became the first settlement to 
be established in the West Bank.  It was established because of the pressure of a group of settlers, some of 
whom were relatives of the residents of the original community of Kfar Ezyon, which was abandoned and 
destroyed during the 1948 war.”
403
 To its “credit” on grounds of consistency, B’Tselem does not do so, characterizing the Jewish quarter in 
the Old City as a “settlement.” Id. at 103.  Most people would presumably recoil at this characterization in 
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aggression against Jewish communities preceded the Geneva Convention, 
whereas the establishment of Jewish settlements on the West Bank succeeds 
it, would be a “technicality” hardly consistent with a view that Article 2’s 
provision as to when the Convention applies to occupied territory is a 
“technicality” not to be relied upon or the view that “occupying power” and 
“transfers” should be interpreted most broadly to accord with the 
Convention’s humanitarian purposes.
Suppose that, irrespective of any textual, contextual, historical or 
purposive analysis and no matter how voluntarily Jews have moved to 
civilian settlements on the West Bank, one still wishes to conclude that the 
initial establishment of Israeli civilian settlements on the West Bank violated 
Article 49’s sixth paragraph.  Substantially, all legal systems take account of 
the element of time, which bears on both the relevance of legal doctrine as 
well as the equities of parties involved.404 International law is no exception.  
For example, after substantial time has passed where one has been 
dispossessed of property, should one have a right of repossession or a right 
to compensation under international law?  Generally, the international 
practice has been, at best, to grant compensation rather than a right to 
repossession based upon dated claims.  And, even then, compensation has 
been based upon what Benvinisti and Zamir have called “adequate 
compensation” rather than “fair value.”405  No one disputes that the Hague 
Regulations were designed to regulate short term occupations.406  While it 
has been argued that the Geneva Convention, because its focus is the 
protection of people rather than simply sovereign states, does not necessarily 
presuppose that only short term occupations are meant to be regulated by its 
provisions, no one contends that even its drafters or signatories contemplated 
a lawful belligerent occupation lasting close to 40 years.407 As George Best 
has written, “[t]he makers of the Civilian Conventions can never have 
envisaged a military occupation as unprecedentedly prolonged as this, or 
circumstances as intractable as those which tangle tgether the new State of 
Israel, the neighbouring Arab States (most of them in some sense new too), 
that the property in this area had been owned and populated by Jews for centuries (if not millennia), the 
synagogues were destroyed during Jordanian occupation, and Judaism’s holiest site, the Western Wall, lies 
at the edge of the area.
404
 A domestic example might be the doctrine of adverse possession, where open use of another’s property 
after a certain number of years results in title passing to the occupier from the original owner.
405 See Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 328-31.
406 See Benvinisti, supra note 133, 7-3.
407
 Roberts, supra note 200 (“the Fourth Geneva Convention was designed to protect the civilian population 
under an essentially temporary occupation”), although the same author elsewhere states, “The proposition 
that the basic rules codified in the law on occupations must continue to be observed for as long as the 
occupation lasts is a useful compass bearing to guide one through this difficult subject.” Id. at 54.
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and the dispossessed Palestinian people bearing the aspect of a State-in-
waiting.”408  In its original guise, in fact, the Geneva Convention included a 
one-year provision after which only certain of its provisions would continue 
to be binding on signatory states.409  Surely, there is a difference between a 
lawful occupation that, say, lasts five410 to ten years (relatively, “long” in 
terms of the Hague Regulations) than one that lasts forty years or more.  At 
some point it becomes absurd to argue that an occupying power cannot 
permit its own citizens to settle in disputed land411 , which is not privately 
owned, especially in areas once occupied by Jews, simply because they 
belong to the dominant ethnic group of the occupying power. The contrary 
conclusion could well be reached if, consistent with Security Council 
Resolution 242 and 338, Arab states had negotiated and arrived at peace 
treaties with Israel, or if the Palestinians had accepted a negotiated 
settlement of all claims with Israel in 2000, that is, if the occupation had 
persisted not because of Israel’s legitimate security concerns but because of 
Israel’s refusal to settle all claims with the Palestinians.  It can even be 
argued that, at some point, uprooting the settlers itself becomes a wrong 
comparable to those at which Article 49 is directed.  In short, even if one 
adopts an interpretation of the Geneva Convention that would dictate the 
initial illegality of Israeli settlements, both time and culpability in failing to 
resolve the conflict should be accorded some weight in adjudging their 
present legality. 
(g) Judicial interpretation
The only instance of the International Court of Justice applying and/or 
interpreting paragraph 6 of Article 49 was its advisory opinion in 2004, in 
408 See BEST, supra note 163, at 316.
409
 Art. 6, ¶3, amended by the 1977 Geneva Protocol I. See Roberts, supra note 200, at 55.   Although Israel 
never ratified the Protocol, it has never relied upon Art. 6 for its position that the Geneva Convention does 
not apply to its control over the West Bank, although it has insisted that its conform to the Convention’s 
humanitarian provision.  See id. (“Israeli authorities have never invoked it as a means of reducing their 
obligations.”). In any event, the one-year provision specifically does not apply to Article 49.  See Final 
Record, supra note 152,  Vol. I, at 298.
410
 Roberts defines a “prolonged occupation” as one “that lasts more than 5 years and extends into a period 
when hostilities are sharply reduced –i.e., a period at least approximating peacetime.” Roberts, supra note 
200, at 47.  Roberts, who is critical of Israeli settlement building, wrote in 1990 at a period when Israel’s 
control over the West Bank was approaching 25 years.  That is a far cry from the 40 years that is now 
imminent.  Moreover, while the consideration of time might be analyzed differently if the failure to end the 
hostilities and the resultant occupation primarily lay at Israel’s feet, but the weight of authority is to the 
contrary. See supra notes 179-98, and accompanying text.
411
 In this regard, one of the weightiest grounds given by an opponent of Israeli settlements – that some 
were established on territories the sovereignty over which by another nation was not disputed – does not 
apply to the West Bank.  See Roberts, supra note 200, at 64-65.
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response to a request from an emergency session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, that Israel’s security fence violates international law.412
Israel appeared only to contest the Court’s jurisdiction. For the most part, the 
fence follows the route of the green line, but is in many instances 
constructed to its east, that is, in the West Bank. Writing for the ICJ, its 
President, Shi Jiuyong of China, reiterated the commonly accepted position 
that the 4th Geneva Convention does apply to Israel’s control over the West 
Bank. In his opinion, he also opined that Israeli settlements violate Article 
49’s sixth paragraph, which he interpreted as “prohibit[ing] not only
deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out 
during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an occupying 
Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own 
population into the occupied territory.”413 As support, the opinion cited three 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1979 and 1980,414 but the 
Court did not otherwise buttress its interpretation with any reference to the 
drafting history of paragraph 6, the understandings at the Geneva Diplomatic 
Conference, the Nazi behaviors towards which the whole of Article 49 was 
directed, or contrary views. 
From the Court’s perspective, its opinion regarding paragraph 6 was 
hardly dictum, however.  In addition to protecting the lives of soldiers and 
Israeli civilians living within the Green Line, protecting the lives of Israeli 
settlers on the West Bank seems to have constituted one purpose that 
explained the positioning of the fence, at least at the time of the Court’s 
opinion.415  Implicit in the court’s opinion, therefore, was the notion that 
such a purpose could not serve as justification for constructing a fence on 
occupied territory.  On the other hand, since the Court held that all parts of 
the fence lying within the West Bank were unlawful – and not simply those 
parts that were designed to protect settlers – its view of the scope of 
paragraph 6 was actually irrelevant to its broad decision with respect to the 
412 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 
136 (July 9, 2004) (hereinafter, “ICJ Wall opinion”).  The opinion was sought by tenth emergency special 
session of the United Nations General Assembly.  Israel appeared only to contest the court’s jurisdiction.
413 Id. at 183.
414 S.C. Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979) ; S.C. Res. 452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (July 20, 
1979); S.C. Res 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 11980). The last of these resolutions described "Israel's 
policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in [the occupied] territories" as a 
"flagrant violation" of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”
415
 The court stated: “ it is apparent from an examination of the map mentioned in paragraph 80 above that 
the wall's sinuous route has been traced in such a way as to include within that area the great majority of the 
Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem).” ICJ Wall Opinion, 
supra note 412, at 183. It should be noted, however, that the positioning of the security fence has shifted a 
number of times since, sometimes at the instance of questioning by the Israeli Supreme Court.  See infra
notes 421-23, and accompanying text.
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fence.416  The vote of the court was fourteen to one.  While six justices who 
joined the majority wrote separate opinions, none expressed a difference of 
opinion with respect to Article 49’s sixth paragraph. The sole dissenter was 
Justice Thomas Buergenthal, who thought that the court should have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction in light of the fact that “the court did not 
have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings.”417
Nonetheless, even he agreed that Article 49 “applies to the Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank”, that “their existence violates … paragraph 
6”, and that “[i]t follows that the segments of the wall being built by Israel to 
protect the settlements are ipso facto in violation of international 
humanitarian law.”418
In Elon Moreh, the 1979 Israeli Supreme Court decision that greatly 
impacted that land on which subsequent Israeli settlements were established, 
Justice Witkon, unlike his other colleagues deciding the case, was prepared 
to say that the 4th Geneva Convention applied to Israel’s control over the 
West Bank.  However, he noted in his concurring opinion, “the question 
whether voluntary settlement falls under the prohibition of “transferring 
sections of the population” within the meaning of Article 49(6) of the 
Geneva Convention is not an easy one and … no answer has yet been found 
in international jurisprudence.”419 The view expressed by Justice Witkon 
about the applicability of the 4th Geneva Convention to Israel’s control over 
the West Bank presaged a subtle shift on the part of the Israeli Supreme 
Court as a whole.  In later cases, the Court did measure Israeli actions 
against the standards of the Convention’s humanitarian provisions, in part 
because the government of Israel -- despite its official stance regarding the 
Convention’s non-applicability -- claimed that its actions conformed to the 
Convention.420  And, despite disagreeing with the ICJ as to whether it was 
416 See Ruth Lapidoth, The Status of the Territories:  The Advisory Opinion and the Jewish Settlements, 38 
ISR. L. REV. 292, 293 (2005) (“discussion of the legality of the settlements was not necessary, and thus is 
only an obiter dictum”).
417
 ICJ Wall opinion, supra note 414, declaration of Judge Buergenthal at 1.
418 Id. at 4.
419
 Concurring opinion in the Elon Moreh case, SHAMGAR, supra 219, at 438.  It is pertinent to note that 
Judge Witkon thought the Geneva Convention did apply to Israel’s hold on the West Bank, unlike the view 
expressed by Justice Landau that the Geneva Convention “belongs to conventional international law shich 
does not legally bind an Israeli court…” Id. at 419.
420
  Most recently, this “construct” was articulated in Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 
7957/04,  (Sept. 15, 2005), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html:  “The Judea and 
Samaria areas are held by the State of Israel in belligerent occupation. The long arm of the state in the area 
is the military commander. He is not the sovereign in the territory held in belligerent occupation (see The 
Beit Sourik Case, supra note 420, at p. 832). His power is granted him by public international law 
regarding belligerent occupation. The legal meaning of this view is twofold: first, Israeli law does not apply 
in these areas. They have not been "annexed" to Israel. Second, the legal regime which applies in these 
areas is determined by public international lawregarding belligerent occupation …In the center of this 
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legal for an occupying power to construct a security fence in occupied 
territory in order to protect its own citizens from terrorism, even if those 
citizens were settlers,421 the Court has required the government to change the 
shape and scope of the fence to take greater account of the interests of 
Palestinians affected by it.422 In these and other more recent opinions, the 
public international law stand the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The 
Hague, 18 October 1907…. These regulations are a reflection of customary international law. The law of 
belligerent occupation is also laid out in IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War 1949….The State of Israel has declared that it practices the humanitarian parts of 
this convention. In light of that declaration on the part of the government of Israel, we see no need to 
reexamine the government's position. We are aware that the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice determined that The Fourth GenevaConvention applies in the Judea and Samaria area, and that its 
application is not conditional upon the willingness of the State of Israel to uphold its provisions. As 
mentioned, seeing as the government of Israel accepts that the humanitarian aspects of The Fourth Geneva 
Convention apply in the area, we are not of the opinion that we must take a stand on that issue in the 
petition before us. In addition to those two sources of international law, there is a third source of law which 
applies to the State of Israel's belligerent occupation. That third source is the basic principles of Israeli 
administrative law, which is law regarding the use of a public official's governing power. These principles 
include, inter alia, rules of substantive and procedural fairness, the duty to act reasonably, and rules of 
proportionality. " Id. at 8-9.
421 Maar’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, supra note 420. The Mara’abe case dealt with a petition by 
residents of several Palestinian villages that were separated from the remainder of the West Bank by the 
placement of Israel’s security fence to protect Alfei Menashe, an Israeli settlement in the West Bank, 4 
kilometers beyond the “green line.”  The Court’s opinion, by its President, Aharon Barak, was written in 
the aftermath of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion about the security fence, see notes 
412-18 and accompanying text, and was as much a response to the ICJ opinion as it was an adjudication of
the rights of the villages affected (although it did order the military “within a reasonable period, to 
reconsider the various alternatives for the separation fence route at Alfei Menashe, while meaning security 
alternatives which injure the fabric of life of the residents of the villages of the enclave to a lesser extent.”) 
Id. at p. 63.  
422
 One of these cases, HCJ 2056/04 Bet Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel [2005] , 58(5) 
P.D. 807 (hereinafter, the Bet Sourik Case), occurred prior to the ICJ opinion, while the Maar’abe case was 
decided subsequently.  Writing for the court in the Beit Sourik case, President Barak also laid out the test of 
proportionality that, according to the Court,  inheres in both international humanitarian law and Israeli 
municipal law:  “[a]ccording to the principle of proportionality, the decision of an administrative body is 
legal only if the means used to realize the governmental objective is of proper proportion. The principle of 
proportionality focuses, therefore, on the relationship between the objective whose achievement is being 
attempted, and the means used to achieve it.”   Barak then laid out the subtests, all of which must be 
satisfied, if proportionality is to be satisfied: “The first subtest is that the objective must be related to the 
means. … According to the second subtest, the means used by the administrative body must injure the 
individual to the least extent possible.  In the spectrum of means which can be used to achieve the 
objective, the least injurious means must be used.  This is the “least injurious means” test.  The third test 
requires that the damage caused to the individual by the means used by the administrative body in order to 
achieve its objectives must be of proper proportion to the gain brought about by that means.” 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html.  In Beit Sourik itself, the Court was convinced that 
the first two sub-tests of the proportionality test were satisfied but not the third in a majority of the 
instances to which the decision related and ordered the government and military to change thes placement 
of the fence in the objectionable areas.  Similarly, in Maar’abe, supra  note 420, although the Court 
disagreed with the ICJ – both as to the question of whether the safety of Israel’s own citizens could be 
taken into account with respect to the placement of the fence (Id.at 13) and the question of whether more 
generally international law forbade the construction of the fence in occupied territory -- the Court did find 
particular segments of the fence to have failed the proportionality test, especially the third sub-test part of 
it. Id. at 63. This trend has continued.  In another recent case, the Court has also required the Israeli 
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Court has seemed less certain that its basis for adjudging Israeli actions on 
the West Bank according to the 4th Geneva Convention depends solely upon 
the government’s own claim of adherence to the Convention’s humanitarian 
provisions.423 As David Kretzmer, a prominent critic of settlements, has 
acknowledged, “[i]n the last few years the Court has handed down a number 
of courageous decisions, supportive of human rights.”424 Yet, despite this 
record of attentiveness to Palestinian interests and of decisions that have 
actually restricted governmental and/or military actions vis´ a vis the 
Palestinians,425 the Court has never held that Israeli settlements, per se, 
violate international law.426
government to reconfigure the security fence on grounds of hardship to Palestinian residents or of 
separation of Palestinians from their agricultural lands. See, e.g., Yuval Yoaz, High Court:  State Must 
Explain why it Won’t Move Separation Fence in Bil’in,  HAARETZ DAILY, 
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/678112.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2006). In another case, the 
court has enjoined building the security fence around illegal outposts.  See Yuval Yoaz, High Court 
Forbids Building Fence Round Illegal Avnei Hefetz Outpost, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/664913.html (updated Jan. 2, 2006).   In general, the Israeli Supreme 
Court has been regarded as one of the most impartial judiciaries in the world and seen as highly protective 
of the rights of Palestinians.  See D. Beinisch, “The Role of the Supreme Court of Israel in Times of 
Emergency”, Globes, November 21, 2002 and DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 39 at 183-7.  Indeed, the 
Israeli Supreme Court, particularly under its present President, Aharon Barak, has been criticized precisely 
for its judgments allegedly adverse to Israeli settlers and security.  See Caroline Glick, Column One: 
Israel’s Judicial Tyranny, Nov. 18, 2005, THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132053877195&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
423
 For example, in the  Mara’abe case, supra note 420, President Barak’s opinion for the Court termed the  
basic normative foundation of both the ICJ opinion on the security fence and its own to be “a common 
one.”  Specifically, in regard to the 4th Geneva Convention, it articulated that commonalty of normative 
foundation in the following subtle way:  
“The ICJ held that in an occupied territory, the occupier state must act according to The
Hague Regulations and The Fourth Geneva Convention. That too was the assumption
of the Court in The Beit Sourik Case, although the question of the force of The Fourth
Geneva Convention was not decided, in light of the State's declaration that it shall act
in accordance with the humanitarian part of that convention. The ICJ determined that
in addition to the humanitarian law, the conventions on human rights apply in the
occupied territory. This question did not arise in The Beit Sourik Case. For the
purposes of our judgment in this case, we assume that these conventions indeed apply.”
Id. at 36 
424 KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 14.
425
 David Kretzmer, writing approximately five years ago, noted:  “In the last few years the Court has … 
handed down a number of courageous decisions, supportive of human rights.  Foremost among these are 
decisions forbidding the security services from using any form of physical force in interrogation of terrorist 
suspects, denying the authorities the power to use the law on administrative deterntion to hold detainees as 
‘bargaining chips,’ and deeming unlawful restrictions on Arabs purchasing houses in a communal 
settlement established on state land by the Jewish Agency.” KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 14-15 (citations 
omitted).  A recent example is a case in which the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of 
Justice, rebuked the municipality of Jerusalem for not having created enough classrooms for the Arabs of 
East Jerusalem and requiring the Jerusalem municipality and Israel’s Department of Education to draft a 
plan to do so within five months.  See Ketsena Svetlova, HCJ rebukes Municipality, Education Ministry 
over Education in e. Jerusalem, THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132475619858&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
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 In accord with the ICJ’s opinion and the Security Council resolutions 
in 1979-80 to which the ICJ referred, the General Assembly has repeatedly 
passed resolutions stating that Israeli settlements violate Article 49’s sixth 
paragraph.427  The Security Council issued three such resolutions during 
1979 and 1980.428  However, finding references to the application of Article 
49’s sixth paragraph to the actions of any nation except Israel is like looking 
for “needles in a haystack.” A number of indictments and decisions by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that have 
considered acts of genocide and forced deportations, primarily those 
committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims,429 and a decision on a motion 
for acquittal by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda430 deal with, 
or are based upon, a violation of Article 49, along with other provisions from 
the four Geneva Conventions.   However, all references with respect to the 
Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention seem to pertain to its first and 
(updated Nov. 30, 2005).  See also Y. Yoaz, High Court Bans IDF’s ‘Early-Warning Practice, HAARETZ, 
Oct. 10, 2005, www.haaretz.com/hasen/objectw/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo-632657.
Although acknowledging and applauding this activism, however, Kretzmer seems partially to agree with 
the view that the Supreme Court has legitimated the actions of Israel on the West Bank “[b]y clothing acts 
of military authorities in a cloak of legality …” KRETCHMER, supra note 204, at 2.  On the other hand, he 
concedes that court questioning and pressure have caused the military and government to back down from 
decisions or acts under consideration:  “when the overall picture is considered, the conclusion is far less 
clear [that the Court’s legitimating function has dominated], since the Court’s shadow has played a 
significant role in restraining the authorities.” Id. at 190. 
426
 David Kretzmer suggests that the doctrine of “justiciability” still plays a role, the court accepting the 
justiciability of individual claims brought by Palestinians on the basis of their property or other rights but 
deeming the general policy of settlements not justiciable. For a case that support’s Kretzmer’s suggestion, 
see Bargil v. Government of Israel, supra note 224.  In other words, the Court’s silence on this issue does 
not necessarily mean that it concurs with the government that the settlements do not violate international 
law.  And in the Mara-be case, supra note 420, the Court was able to avoid an opinion as to whether the 
settlements themselves violate international law because it determined that the responsibility of the Israeli 
military administration under the Hague Regulations included not only the safety and security of the 
Palestinians on the West Bank but Israeli civilians as well (that is, the duty of protection did not depend 
upon the legality of the presence of the settlers there).  See id.at 13-14.
427 See supra, note 12.
428 S.C. Res. 452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (July 20, 1979); S.C. Res. 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (March 1, 
1980); S.C. Res. 478, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980), 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html.  The date of these resolutions, which were adopted 
during the Carter administration, is significant.  While the United States State Department, during the 
Carter and George H.W. Bush administrations, did consider the settlements illegal, the State Department 
subsequently declined to reiterate that position. The Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations 
have adopted the more frequent formulation that the settlements simply are an obstacle to peace.  
429 See, e.g.,  Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic, Dragan Jokic, 2005 WL 414846 (UN ICT)(Trial)(Yug));
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic 2004 WL 2781930 (UN ICT (App)(Yug)).  For a description of the horrific 
events on account of which these prosecutions were brought, see TONY JUDT, POSTWAR, A HISTORY OF 
EUROPE SINCE 1945 665-83 (2005).
430
  The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsene Shalom Ntahobali (Case No. ICTR-87-21-T), 
Sylvain Nsabimana and Aphonse Ntezirayo (Case No. ICTR-97-29A-T), Joseph Kanyabashi (Case No. 
ICTR-96-8-T), Joint Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, 2004 WL 3154919 (UN ICT (Trial)(Rwa)).
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second paragraphs rather than to its sixth.  Finally, occasionally one finds a 
non-governmental reference to Article 49 applying to the conduct of a nation 
other than Israel – for example, in 1994, a non-governmental organization 
alleged that Article 49(6) was violated in the Chinese transfer of its 
population into Tibet in order to alter the population mix in Tibet.431
Caution in facilely concluding that Israeli settlements violate Article 
49(6) comes from respect for, rather than disregard of international 
humanitarian law.  Although elementary, it merits repetition that what 
distinguishes a system of “law” from arbitrary systems of control is that 
similar situations are handled alike.  No legal system is one hundred percent 
pure, of course, but the incompletely achieved goal remains that legal 
principles are applied based upon the circumstances regardless of the 
political position or identity of the parties.  The very loose use of 
international law, disproportionately applied to every instance of Israel 
trying to protect itself undermines the notion that this is “law” entitled to 
authoritative weight in the first place.432  Where are the legal proceedings 
and/or repeated United Nations General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions condemning and applying Article 49’s sixth paragraph to the 
forced displacement of Tibetans by Chinese, the movement of Russians into 
the Baltic States or other post-1949 transfers in Africa, Asia and Central 
Europe?  
Where warranted, of course, Israel should not be immune to the 
charge that it has violated the 4th Geneva Convention.  But others have cited 
the irony of applying the Geneva Convention, drafted and adopted in the 
aftermath of World War II, with the Holocaust specifically in mind, uniquely
431
 International Association of Educators for World Peace, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other 
Dependent Countries and Territories, submitted to the UN Economic and Social Council, 
E/CN.4/1994/NGO/29 (Feb. 10, 1994).  The International Commission of Jurists wrote two reports dealing 
with Tibet in 1959 and 1960, reporting “genocide”, but neither one seemed to be based upon Article 49(6) 
of the Geneva convention.  See ICJ, The Questions of Tibet, The Rule of Law (Geneva 1959) (excerpts); 
ICJ, Report on Tibet and the Chinesee Peoples Republic (Geneva 1960) (excerpts),  
http://www.tibet.com/Resolution/index.html (last viewed Feb. 9, 2006)).  As Alan Gerson has pointed out, 
“The General Assembly limited its response to mild censure and the Security Council was never 
convened.” GERSON, supra note 160, at 19.  After the Republic of China assumed the United Nations post 
formerly held by the Republic of China (Taiwan), no subsequent resolutions were ever passed.
432
 This point is made most emphatically in Micha Pomerance, the ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction and the 
Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial”, 99 AM. J. INT. L. 26, 36 (2005): 
“Since advisory opinions are inherently nonbinding--and do not gain in legal force when endorsed by the 
General Assembly or even the Security Council --their authoritativeness depends, naturally, on the 
persuasiveness of their reasoning. To rise above the level of political discourse and be considered judicial 
utterances worthy of respect in state practice, they must be seen as thorough and balanced in the 
presentation of facts and law, fair to the contending interests involved, and internally consistent. Mere ipse 
dixits obviously cannot substitute for careful judicial explication of the process by which conclusions were 
reached.”
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to that state a significant percentage of whose population consists either of 
Holocaust survivors, their offspring, or other relatives of those who perished 
in the Holocaust.433  On the part of some, the implied equation of Israeli 
actions with those of the Nazis forms part of a strategy to demonize and 
deny legitimacy to Israel, not simply its settlements on the West Bank or 
particular Israeli policies.434  As one legal commentator writing in 2003 
noted, “In three recent emergency special sessions of the UN General 
Assembly, Israeli settlement was cited as a violation of the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention.  These international humanitarian instruments, forged 
in the ashes of the Holocaust to prevent future genocidal brutality and 
oppression, were never invoked in 50 years until the case of condominium 
construction in Jerusalem during 1998.”435  Similarly, would it not be ironic 
if the only applications of the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment were against the interests of African Americans when that 
amendment, like the 13th amendment, was passed in the aftermath of and 
directed towards the end of slavery and its consequences in America?  
4.  Some concluding remarks about the applicability and weight to be 
assigned to the condition of legality under international law
In sum, the question of whether, as a general matter, Israeli 
settlements violate either the various provisions of the Hague Regulations 
and/or Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention is reasonably moot.  One 
should be cautious about overstating the position of either settlement 
proponents or opponents.
Many of those who allege a violation of international law 
acknowledge, indeed try to point out, a distinction between settlements 
established in the late 1960’s until at least 1977, when the Labor led 
government basically followed the Allon plan, and those established in 
433 See Curtis, supra note 110, at 486:  “It is ironic that this charge [that Israel has violated the Geneva 
Convention] should be made in reference to a convention the purpose of which was to prevent the 
recurrence of Nazi-like occupation with its brutality, disregard of human rights, physical and mental 
coercion, taking of hostages, and imposition of foreign law.”
434 See Bradley Burston, What Makes Islam so Easy to Hate?, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=676507&contrassID=2 (last updated Jan. 30, 
2006) (“The Code is clear, and it is communicated to a billion Muslims the world over – these Jews, these 
are the Nazis now.”); Francis A. Boyle, Israel’s Crimes against Palestinians: War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Humanity, Genocide, MEDIA MONITORS NETWORK, Aug. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.mediamonitors.net/francis7.html. Boyle served as Legal Adviser to the PLO from 1991 to 
1993.
435 See  J. Helmreich, Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue, 2 JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF, 
No.16 (Jan. 19, 2003).
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subsequent years under Likud led governments.436  Many if not most of the 
settlements established under the Allon plan were placed in the Jordan 
Valley, away from Palestinian population centers, and, wherever placed, had 
a military defense justification.  These settlements, then, at least initially 
qualified under the “military necessity” standard of the Hague Regulations 
and hardly affected the Palestinian civilian population.437  Under later Likud 
led governments, many if not most settlements were demanded if not forced 
upon the government by Gush Emunim and similar settlement groups.  As to 
the great bulk of these settlements, there is little doubt that almost all settlers 
were enthusiastic volunteers, who, irrespective of any Israeli tax incentives 
or other help, would nonetheless have established their settlements.  As 
B’Tselem itself has stated, “The principal method adopted by the [Gush 
Emunim] movement was to settle a given site without government 
permission – and sometimes contrary to its policy – in an effort to force the 
government later to recognize the settlement as an accomplished fact.”438
Hence, the argument that Israel, as an “occupying power”, had “transferred” 
them in violation of the Article 49(6) of the 4th Geneva Convention becomes 
very weak. Similarly, since most Israeli settlements have been established on 
state rather than private land, the charge that all settlements have been 
established on “Arab” land should meet with substantial skepticism unless 
material errors either in the substance or procedure of designating land as 
“state” land is established. 
On the other hand, one should also exercise caution about overstating 
Israel’s position. When both the Hague Regulations and 4th Geneva 
Convention are viewed together, there is a sense that Israeli arguments 
justifying West Bank settlements under one body of law weaken its 
arguments under the other body.  The more one justifies settlements in the 
West Bank under a doctrine of “military necessity” as a reason to depart 
from the status quo ante prior to June, 1967 (in order to satisfy the Hague 
Regulations), the more that justification seems incongruous with seemingly 
permanent civilian settlements.   Stated inversely, the more one emphasizes 
that the settlers have moved to the West Bank of their own accord rather 
than at the instance of the Israeli government or its military (in response to 
the charge that an occupying power has transferred its civilians into 
occupied territory in violation of Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention), 
the more difficult it is to support the justification of “military necessity” 
436
 Lein, supra note 29, at 11-15.
437
 Even B’Tselem concedes that, at least when initially established as military bases, the settlements did 
not violate international law.  See id., at 40.
438
 Lein, id., at 13. 
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under the Hague Regulations for alterations in the West Bank allegedly 
prejudicial to the native population, including the settlements.  Similarly, 
even if the settlers are present legally because of military necessity, that 
would not give them the right to remain in a Palestinian state any more than 
Israel’s soldiers present on the West Bank would have a right to remain.  
While there may be answers to these difficulties that are given in the text of 
this article – including the Blum/Rostow/Stone opinion that Israel’s status on 
the West Bank cannot be defined solely as that of an occupying power, the 
removal of seemingly “permanent” settlements from the Gaza Strip 
(demonstrating that even the notion of permanence is ephemeral), the fact 
that international law related to occupation was never formulated with 
reference to control over a territory lasting this long without final peace 
agreements, the absurdity of interpreting international law so as to bar Jews 
from voluntarily living in an area, etc., etc. – the point is that, just like the 
frequently reiterated statement that Israeli settlements clearly violate 
international law, the question of legality is not a “slam dunk” on Israel’s 
part either.  
Nonetheless, international law should not be used solely as an 
instrument of politics. To the extent that it is so used, its legitimacy as a 
source of law materially suffers, as illustrated by the pointed critiques that 
followed the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the fence.439   Given the paradoxes of 
439 See, e.g., Pomerance, supra note 432; Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory 
Opinion:  An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ, 99 AM.J.INT.L. 62 (2005);  Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on the Israeli Security “Fence and the Limited of Self Defence, 99 AM. J. INT. L. 52 (2005).  
Wedgwood even reports that “following the rendering of the Court’s judgment, foreign ministry legal 
advisers from varied countries privately conveyed dismay at the opinion.” Id. at 57.  The one-sided nature 
of the facts accepted as the basis for the International Court of Justice’s decision, the cursory nature of its 
handling of legal materials, and the its problematic position that military necessity does not include 
protection against terrorism emanating from occupied territory contrast unfavorably with the measured 
way that the Israeli Supreme Court decided the same questions by applying its  proportionality test in the 
Sourik and Mara’be cases. See supra note 422. Even David Kretzmer criticized the superficial analysis 
offered by the ICJ: “International mechanisms for ensuring compliance with norms of IHL (International 
Humanitarian Law) have always been extremely weak. It is essential that they be strengthened. A major 
step in this direction has been taken with the establishment of the International Criminal Court. 
Nevertheless, while this step has been welcomed by many, some experts and a few states, foremost among 
which are the United States and Israel, remain skeptical. Their skepticism is mainly grounded in the fear 
that the ICC's decisions will be dictated by politics rather than by law. In this atmosphere the credibility of 
international judicial organs involved in assessing compliance with IHL becomes more important than 
ever. This credibility rests largely on the professionalism of such organs and the soundness in law of their 
opinions. When looked at from this point of view, an opinion whose findings "are not legally well-
founded"  is hard to applaud.” Kretzmer, supra note 331, at 102.  While several international law scholars 
applauded the ICJ opinion, most particularly Richard Falk, (see Richard A. Falk, Toward 
Authoritativeness:  The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s Security Wall, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2005), at least Falk’s 
reaction could be anticipated in light of his unrelenting opposition to Israel and substantially all its policies 
over many decades.  See, e.g., Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law 
to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intfada, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 
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applying the international law of occupation, especially Article 49(6) of the 
4th Geneva Convention, which has uniquely and increasingly been the thrust 
of the charge of illegality, to Jewish settlements on the West Bank – a reality 
for millennia prior to the Twentieth Century and a right established in the 
Balfour declaration and the Palestine Mandate-- it is questionable at best to 
conclude that Jewish settlements in general violate international law.  
Stating the condition initially posed in the negative – that Israeli settlements 
are not demonstrated to be illegal -- the condition seems to have been 
satisfied.  This conclusion, of course, may not hold as to particular civilian 
settlements that, without military necessity, have been established on 
requisitioned land, civilian settlements established on private Palestinian 
land subsequent to Elon Moreh, or settlements established on land 
fraudulently purchased and/or fraudulently designated as state land.  While 
international law cannot be the ultimate arbiter of whether settlements 
remain, it can influence the decision with respect to particular settlements. 
The Oslo accords440signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization in September of 1993 specifically left the subject of Israeli 
settlements, like the subjects of Jerusalem and refugees, to the political 
process of negotiation.441  The 1995 interim agreement between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority similarly designated settlements and borders as 
subjects to be negotiated in final status negotiations between the parties.442
It is the conditions based upon predominantly and transparently political, 
(1991) (defending the intifada with a one-sided view of Israeli policies on the West Bank); UN 
Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab 
Territories, including Palestine, Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/20001/121, ¶¶35-44, Report on   
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G01/118/72/PDF/G0111872.pdf?OpenElement(Falk was one 
of the three authors of a report taking the position that Israel could not exercise the rights of an occupation 
bellico on the theory that its conflict in the West Bank was a not an international conflict.).  
440
  Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-government Arrangements, September 13, 1993,    
http://www.israel-
mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm (last viewed 
Jan. 20, 2006).
441 Id.  Article V, ¶3 provided that negotiations would cover the remaining issues, including: “Jerusalem, 
refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and 
other issues of common interest.”; id., Annex II (Protocol on withdrawal o Israeli Forces from the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho Area), ¶3.b. specifically excepted from “Structure, powers and responsibilitieis of the 
Palestinian authority” “external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations…”  And, the agreed minutes 
to the Accords provides that the jurisdiction of the Palestinian council to be created “will cover west Bank 
and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: 
Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.” Id. , Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of 
Priniciples on Interim Self-government Arrangements, ¶ B. 
442
 See The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Article XXXI, ¶5 (Sep. 
28, 1995), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT.htm (last viewed Jan. 21, 2006).
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social and security considerations – namely, that continuance of Jewish 
settlements is both practical and consistent with the creation of a viable 
Palestinian state – that will and should determine their fate in general.
B.  That Israeli Jewish settlements not prevent the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state necessary for a two-state solution
Except for partisans who tend to use legal arguments to score political 
points, legitimate political issues dominate over legal issues when speaking 
about Jewish settlements.  It is to these political issues that we now turn.  
The first, again heard repeatedly, is that Israeli settlements prevent the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. The political argument would seem to 
have two dimensions, one geographical and the other directed towards 
peoplehood or citizenship. 
The most frequently heard version of this political argument is 
geographical. The strong form version of the geographical argument is that 
Israeli settlements prevent a contiguous Palestinian state.443  A moderate-
form version of the geographical argument is that, whether or not, Gaza 
aside, such a state would have contiguity, its borders would be 
extraordinarily convoluted.   A correlative claim connected to both versions 
is that the settlements, in any event, occupy too much of the land that 
Palestinians would need for their state.  
It is difficult to understand the strong form version because, even if 
Israel were to retain sovereignty over every existing Jewish settlement on the 
West Bank, it would be Israel, not a state of Palestine, that would lack 
contiguity.  And, as previously discussed in this article, while the moderate 
version has some validity in the abstract, much of its force is undermined 
when we remind ourselves that we are speaking about an allocation of land 
west of the Jordan River between two independent states.  But, the irony of 
both of these geographical concerns is that they do not apply to the argument 
made in the article.  Acceptance of the fact that Israeli Jewish settlements
can exist in an Arab state of Palestine would only serve to increase the 
contiguity and/or geographical wholeness of the Palestinian state.444
Connected to both the “strong” and “moderate” geographical 
argument is an assumption, seemingly held by the popular press and much of 
443 See Editorial, Bush,  Abbas Intentions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2005 at A16 (“Palestinians perceive 
continued thickening of settlements as proof that Israel has no intention of allowing a viable Palestinian 
state on land that is not divided into multiple separate enclaves.”).
444
 See supra, notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
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the public, that Israeli settlements constitute a substantial percentage of the 
land mass of the West Bank.  Ironically, Peace Now and B’Tselem, both of 
which oppose the settlements, estimate the percentage of land mass 
settlements presently occupy on the West Bank at 1.36 percent and 1.7 
percent, respectively.445  To the extent that population clusters of Arabs and 
Jews should and will influence the borders between Israel and a state of 
Palestine, at least some of the settlements will be integrated into Israel, 
probably in exchange for land in the Negev that would broaden the width of 
Gaza.  And, if so, the percentage of land on the West Bank that settlements 
constitute would drop even further, arguably well below 1 percent.  These 
percentages rise appreciably, to somewhere between 3 and 6 percent of the 
West Bank, if connecting roads and the like are considered.446 But, once 
again, these percentages can only drop if the issue under consideration is not 
whether the settlements will stay, but under whose jurisdiction they will 
remain. 
The heart of the matter concerns the presence of a population within 
Palestine that identifies as Israeli Jews.  In contrast to the nearly 20 percent 
of Israel’s own population that is Palestinian Arab, however, the 50,000 to 
100,000 Jewish settlers that will probably be most affected by continuance 
of Jewish settlements in a Palestinian state would constitute less than three 
percent of Palestine’s population, based upon a present population of 
approximately 2.3 to 2.5 million Palestinian Arabs within the West Bank and 
Gaza,447 and substantially less than 2 percent of such a state if one assumes 
some influx of Palestinian refugees into such a state.  Whereas, in the words 
of Ephraim Karsh, “it is certainly true … that the influx of these 
[Palestinian] refugees into the Jewish State would irrevocably transform its 
demographic composition”448, the existence of Jewish communities within a 
Palestine would not pose any demographic risk to Palestine’s remaining an 
overwhelmingly Arab state.
As with Israel’s Arab population, the presence of Israeli Jews in a 
state of Palestine would pose issues of citizenship (will they be citizens of 
Palestine or only residents?), loyalty (will the settlers, regardless of whether 
they gain Palestinian citizenship, remain citizens of the state of Israel?), and 
445 See Helmreich, supra note 435. 
446
 This was reflected in Washington’s proposal between July 2000 and the end of that year that Israel 
withdraw from 95 percent of the West Bank.  See Morris, Camp David and After, supra note 58.
447 See Arnon Regular, 1.1m Palestinaians Live in Local Councils Controlled by Hamas, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/658955.html (updated Dec. 18, 2005).  If the Palestinian Authority’s 
own population figures were used (see supra note 29), the Jewish percentage of the population Jews would 
be de minimus. 
448 KARSH, supra note 37, at 166.
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legal autonomy in particular spheres.  These are serious issues, but it is 
unclear why they pose more serious problems than those concerning the 
Arab population in Israel.449 Israel’s Arabs – whether Muslim or Christian –
exercise legal autonomy in personal affairs.450  A recent Israeli survey on 
patriotism in Israel and its bearing on national security found that “most of 
the Israeli Arabs are not proud of their citizenship (56 percent) and are not 
ready to fight to defend the state (73 percent).”451  Moreover, the survey 
found differences “between the type and expression of patriotism among 
Jewish citizens …and … Arab citizens.”  “Among the latter”, it was 
reported, “patriotic feeling is subdued” and “[w]hen patriotic sentiment is 
given expression, twice as many Arabs define themselves as Palestinian 
patriots than as Israeli patriots.”452 After the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state, would not at least some of Israel’s Arab citizens wish to 
become citizens of that state as well as citizens of Israel?453
Moreover, just as conceptions of sovereignty continue to evolve and 
change454, it is clear that citizenship, a concept related to one’s degree of 
449
 For a brief review of the legal status of various minority populations within Israel, See HENRY J. 
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 493-6 (2000).  Nor is the 
question of autonomy for religious and ethnic minorities unique to Israel or to a future state of Palestine if 
Jewish settlements remain.  See id. at 491-3.  With respect to loyalty, various anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the problem of “dual loyalty” may be equally as applicable to Israeli Arabs as it would be for 
Palestinian Jews.  See, e.g., Jack Khoury & Nir Hasson, Two Israeli Arab Dentists Admit Joining Hamas 
While in Romania, HAARETZ, Oct. 23, 2005, www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/jhtml?itemNo=637317.  
It has been reported that “Arab MKs over the years have become more resolved and effective expressing 
Palestinian identity and the national Palestinian struggle.” Dan Rabinowitz, The Peretz Challenge to Arab 
politics, HAARETZ, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/652261.html.  See also Zvi Barel, 
Absentee Journalism, HAARETZ,  http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/656078.html (last updated 
December 11, 2005) (“Hebrew Jewish society … is almost completely missing from the Arab press…Even 
worse, the leaders of Arab society take no interest in the way Israeli society is covered – or not covered – in 
the Arab press.”).
450 See Steiner, supra note 449.
451
 Uzi Arad and Gal Alon, Patriotism and Israel’s National Security – Herzliya Patriotism Survey 2006
(Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Jan. 19, 2006), 
http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3 (last viewed Jan. 22, 2006). One commentator has addressed the nuances 
in this survey, including the fact that 77% of the Arabs view Israel as better than other countries.  See
Alexander Yacobson, On Israeli-Arab Patriotism, HAARETZ, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/676221.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2006). 
452 Id.
453
 This is a very different question than the one Uzi Arad discusses. See Arad, supra note 63.  In discussing 
and supporting land swaps, Arad admits  that only one-third of Israeli Palestinians support a land swap that 
would make them residents and, presumably, citizens of Palestine rather than Israel (parenthetically, he also 
argues that this percentage would rise for a variety of reasons).  But whether Palestinians who are citizens 
of Israel would like to give up their Israeli citizenship and become citizens of Palestine is a very different 
question of whether they would like to enjoy dual citizenship.  
454
 For discussions of this phenomenon, see STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY, ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
(1999); AMOS SHAPIRA & MALA TABORY, EDS., NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); NEIL WALKER, SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION (2003); and Lapidoth, supra
note 185, at 318.
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inclusiveness within a given sovereignty, bears different and evolving 
meanings. Summarizing a wealth of social scientific learning, Paul Schiff 
Berman demonstrates, “people can hold multiple, sometimes nonterritorial, 
community affiliations.”455 Traditional and allied notions of citizenship, 
sovereignty and the “nation-state” are fast eroding, with flexible and 
contingent forms of these notions replacing the more absolutist, formalistic 
notions associated with Europe post the Middle Ages. Significantly, under 
the Oslo Accords, Palestinians in East Jerusalem were allowed to vote in the 
Palestinian elections, although Israel claims all of Jerusalem as its capital 
under its jurisdiction.456
Millions of Americans, to consider another example, hold dual 
citizenship, retaining their American citizenship even as they live in Ireland, 
Poland, Israel, Mexico or some other place and also exercise citizenship or 
some attributes we associate with citizenship in these other places.  Why 
would dual citizenship necessarily be more problematic in the context of two 
contiguous states?  And what if the Jewish population, or large numbers of 
it, chose not to become citizens of Palestine?  Again, by way of analogy, 
approximately 6.6 percent of legal residents in the United States are not 
citizens.457  Provided that they are legally residing within the United States, 
these residents enjoy many of the same rights as American citizens, the most 
notable exception being the right to vote.  Arguably, it is optimal to have all 
persons permanently resident within a given territory enjoy all the rights and 
experience all the obligations of others, but this utopian ideal rarely 
characterizes the situation of any present country, especially multi-ethnic 
nations that also attract immigrants.
Moreover, substantially all peace plans that have been proposed that 
incorporate a two-state solution, with one of those states being an Israel that 
can realistically be denominated and remain both a democratic and 
predominantly Jewish state, also posit that any Palestinian state to be created 
alongside Israel would be demilitarized.458  Without an army, some of the 
455 See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:  Redefining Governmental 
Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005).  See also Paul Schiff Berman, The 
Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 472-90 (2002).  Although Berman directs his 
attention to jurisdictional questions, his analysis is applicable to juridical questions more broadly.
456
 For a discussion of the difficulties Israel faced in reconciling a vote by Jerusalem’s Palestinian 
population with the reality that Hamas was on the ballot, see Aluf Benn, State Seeks Solution for E. J’lem 
Voters in PLC Elections, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/663125.html (updated Dec. 28, 
2005).
457
  CensusScope, United States Nativity and Citizenship, 1990-2000, 
http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_nativity.html (year 2000 estimate based upon a total population of 
281.4 million and a non-naturalized foreign population of 18.6 million).
458
 The usual phrase used in the negotiations was, “nonmilitarized state.”  See ROSS, supra note 58, at 720.
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complications that Israel experiences with its Arab population459 disappear.  
Issues of taxation, juridical status for purposes of legal proceedings, and 
voting are no more intractable in the context of a peace agreement and 
accompanying treaties than the comparable issues with respect to 
Palestinians residing within the state of Israel as citizens or entering Israel 
for employment on a daily basis.  
C.  That Continuance is practical: the issue of whether Jews and Arabs can 
co-exist safely within a predominantly Arab Palestine
The argument that Jewish settlements are an obstacle to peace 
frequently devolves to questions related to the willingness and safety of Jews 
and Arabs to co-exist in a Palestinian state.  Sometimes this view is 
expressed in terms of “pragmatism”460, that is, although Jews should as a 
matter of principle be allowed to establish communities on the West Bank, 
pursuing the continuance option is not a pragmatic solution.  The recent 
victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections has, if anything, 
heightened such concerns, although many pundits and academics have 
attributed the Palestinian vote more to the Palestinian Authority’s 
incompetence and inefficiency than to Hamas’ militant stance towards Israel 
and Jews.461
Both Arabs and Jews have legitimate security and safety concerns.  
Palestinians have been witness to the destructive, anarchic acts of some 
Jewish settlers, who, originally armed for their self-protection, have stolen 
additional munitions from the Israeli military and turned their wrath both 
against the Israeli military and Palestinians.  In several cases, they have 
killed Palestinians and in other cases beaten them, torched residences and/or 
stolen their olive crops.462
459
 Generally, Israeli Palestinian Arabs do not serve in the Israeli Army, while Israeli Druze and Bedhouin
do.  The Israeli justification for this has been that it would be unseemly for Israel to require Palestinians to 
fight their Arab brethren.  Whether or not this justification is convincing, the exclusion of Palestinian Arabs 
from military service has been criticized because a number of government benefits are based upon military 
service. 
460 See Dershowitz, ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 176. 
461 See, e.g., Kary Liggett & Neil King Jr., Hamas Victory Roils Middle East Peace Process, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 27, 2006, at 1; Fotini Christia & Sreemati Mitter, Hamas at the Helm, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at 
A23.
462
 Amira Hass, Jonathan Liss and Nadav Shragai, Shin Bet: IDF did Nothing to Stop Settlers Uprooting 
Olive Trees,HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/668510.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2006) 
(several human rights organizations allege 29 “harvest incidents” occurred  between March 2005 and 
January 8, 2006, and that 773 olive trees were uprooted during the last 3 years; the Yesha Council of 
settlements allege that many of these incidents resulted either from the Palestinians pruning their trees or 
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  Jewish settlers also have good reason to fear for their safety.463
Sectarian hatred  is a common phenomenon in the Middle East.464  Even 
Christian Palestinian Arabs have increasingly faced discrimination and 
physical violence from Muslims.465   Jews face even greater hostility. 
Sermons and speeches, broadcast on the official Palestinian Authority radio 
station, continually desecrate Jews and Judaism, calling them the children of 
pigs and monkeys, and implore Arab Muslims to kill all Jews and drive them 
from Palestine (a term that includes all of even pre-1967 Israel).466  Indeed, 
intentionally damaging them in order to receive compensation from the Israeli military).  The recurrence of 
incidents, however, indicates that the great bulk of damage has been caused by settlers.  For reports of these 
incidents, see, e.g., Ze’ev Schiff, Anarchy on the Hilltops, HAARETZ, Nov. 18, 2005, , 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650475.html; Arnon Regular & Eli Ashkenazi, Palestinians:  
Settlers Cut Down 200 Olive Trees near Nablus, HAARETZ, Nov. 27, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650475.html.  (updated Nov. 27, 2005); David Forman, Settlers, 
Hands off the Olive Trees, THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1134309653390&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2F
ShowFull (updated Dec. 27, 2005); Gideon Alon, Shin Bet gives IDF, Police ‘Harvest Incident’ Suspects, 
HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/668680.html (updated Jan. 11, 2006) (both describing an 
allegation that Jewish youths cut down olive trees in the Hebron area, and giving the statistic that there 
were 17 “harvest incidents” in 2005, including physical attacks on Palestinian harvesters, the theft of 
harvested olives, and trespassing); Amos Harel, Hundreds of Settlers Riot in Hebron, Set Fire to 
Palestinian Home, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/670191.html (last updated 
Jan. 15, 2006) (Israeli settlers, reacting violently to orders issued by the Israeli military to evacuate shops in 
Hebron, rioted, including torching a home belonging to Palestinians in the city); Amos Harel, Settlers Riot 
across W. Bank Ahead of Amona Evacuation, HAARETZ DAILY
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/676627.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2006)(describing beatings of 
Arabs and torching of their cars, as well as violence by settlers against the Israeli Army in anticipation of 
the forced evacuation by the Army of an illegal settlement on the West Bank). 
463 See Raphaeli Israeli, The New muslim Anti-Semitism:  Exploring Novel Avenues of Hatred, JEWISH 
POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW 17:3-4 (Fall 2005);  Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Abbas Must Act, U.S. NEWS,
www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/051031/31edit.htm; Glenn Kessler, Palestinian Leader Is Urged 
To Confront Militant Groups, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005 at A14.
464
 Witness the horrendous violence exhibited by Sunnis against Shiites, and visa versa, in Iraq. See Sabrina 
Tavernise, Sectarian Hatred Pulls Apart Iraq’s Mixed Towns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, at 1.
465 See generally WEINER, supra note 83.  Weiner ascribes much of this to the emergence of Islam as a 
political force, pointing out the draft constitution of the Palestinian Authority declares Islam to be the 
official religion and includes Sharia Law.  Specifically, Weiner details the social and economic 
discrimination against Christians, the boycott and extortion of Christian businesses, violation of real 
property rights, crimes against Christian Arab women, Palestinian Authority Incitement against Christians, 
and the failure of the Palestinian security forces to protect Christians.  One of his conclusions is that “[t]he 
reversion to traditional Muslim religious attitudes necessarily includes the treatment of Christians as 
second-class citizens or dhimmi.” Id. at 22.  In other words, Christians, as non-Muslims, face the same 
second class status that characterized minority communities in the Islamic Middle East for centuries, 
especially its Jewish communities.
466 See generally Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Kill a Jew – Go to Heaven:  The Perception of the Jew 
in Palestinian Society, JEWISH POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW 17:3-4 (Fall 2005), reprinted at 
http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-marcus-crook-f05.htm.  The authors write:
“The Palestinian religious, academic, and political elites teach an ideology of virulent hatred of Jews. The 
killing of Jews is presented both as a religious obligation and as necessary self-defense for all humankind.
Palestinian Authority elites have built a three-stage case against Jewish existence, much as a prosecutor 
might build a case demanding a death sentence. As their expert witness, they bring Allah Himself, Who is 
said to have sent a message through the Prophet Muhammad that killing Jews is a necessary step to bring 
116
during Ramadan, during the past several years, serial dramas based upon the 
Czarist produced forgery, Protocols of the Elders of Zion, have been 
broadcast on Arab television, including on stations under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority and stations in Egypt (with whom Israel has a peace 
treaty) and Syria.467  Very recently, the President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
the president of Iran, pronounced that “Israel must be wiped off the map.”468
Iran sponsors both Hezbollah, which fights Israel from Southern Lebanon, 
and Islamic Jihad, which, operating both out of Gaza and the West Bank, 
engages in terrorism against Israeli civilians, both within the 1948 borders 
and on the West Bank;  neither of these two groups accept the legitimacy of 
Israel.469  And even after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, scores of terrorist 
incidents have been attempted, and a few have succeeded.470   In the 
immediate aftermath of the Palestinian elections won by Hamas, the Hamas 
leadership seemingly remains committed to that organization’s retention of 
its guns – even perhaps under the legitimacy of forming a Palestinian 
“army” – and to the legitimacy of specifically targeting civilians.471
Yet important voices of moderation do exist, accepting the legitimacy 
of Jews living within the midst of a greater Arab population.472  And 
Resurrection. Stage 1 is characterized by collective labeling of Jews as the enemies of Allah, possessing an 
inherently evil nature. Stage 2 teaches that because of their immutable traits, Jews represent an existential 
danger to all humanity. Stage 3 presents the necessary solution predetermined by Allah: the annihilation of 
Jews as legitimate self-defense and a service to God and man.”
See also Justus Reid Weiner & Michael Sussman, Will the Next Generation of Palestinians Make Peace 
with Israel?, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp537.htm
(“The idea of the shahid (martyr) has become so ingrained in Palestinian culture that it is a major theme in 
formal education, family values, religious practices, television broadcasting, posters, pre-suicide eulogies, 
trading cards, family celebnrations, movies, music, games, and summer camps.”).
467
 For a description of these shows, see http://www.pmw.org.il/Protocols.htm (Itamar Marcus, ed., Jan. 25, 
2001 – Nov. 26, 2002).  See also Tamadan TV Special: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, MEMRI, 
Special Dispatch Series – No. 309, Dec. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP30901. 
468 See M. Indyck, Iran’s Bluster Isn’t a Bluff, L.A.TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-indyk1nov01,0,4655814,print.story?coll=la-
news-comment-opinions.  Indyk, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings 
Institution, is a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of State for Near East affairs.
469 See id..
470
 For example, on October 26, 2005, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed five Israelis in the town of 
Hadera.  See Greg Myre and Dina Kraft, Palestinian Suicide Bomber Kills 5 in an Israeli Town, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A3. 
471 See Meshal, Hamas Ready to Merge Armed Factions to form PA Army, HAARETRZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/675793.html (updated Jan. 28, 2006); Steven Erlanger, Hamas 
Leader Sees No Change Toward Israelis, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at 1.  See also Jonathan Adiri, From 
Mahmoud Abbas to Mahmoud Hamas, Israel  has no Alternative but to Disengage from the Palestinians 
and to Manage the Conflict from a more Secure Position, Feb. 19, 2006, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3218458,00.html.
472 See, e.g., Walid Salem, Address the ‘Jewish Question’ Without Resorting to Propaganda, THE DAILY 
STAR, Nov. 8, 2005, www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=19863#.  
Salem is the director of the East Jerusalem office of Panorama, the Center for the Dissemination of 
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undoubtedly, guarantees of safety, free travel, and the like would have to be 
extended to Jewish communities before they would feel safe and agree to 
stay in an Arab Palestine. The world has seemed to be rushing to create a 
Palestinian state on the assumption that such a state would decrease the level 
of Islamist terror that even the West, both the United States and Europe, 
have recently experienced.  Whether this assumption is wishful thinking or 
not in terms of a decrease of Islamic terrorism against the West in general is 
beyond the realm of this paper, but it increasingly appears to be wishful 
thinking in terms of Palestinian acceptance of Israel.473
Indeed, the mere creation of a Palestinian state, without more, would 
not be a panacea.  There are and must also be preconditions to such a state, 
not as a matter of theory or wishful thinking, but as a matter of reality.  
These conditions include the dismantling of terrorist organizations,474 the 
monopoly of force by a Palestinian police force, demilitarization,475 and 
economic viability.476  It is not simply a matter of acceding to Israel’s 
interest or that of Jews who may be living in a Palestinian state.  As even 
Adam Roberts, who is sympathetic to the Palestinian view of Israeli 
settlements has observed, “on the Palestinian side, the belief that self-
determination is an internationally recognized right still sometimes involves 
a corollary reluctance … to accept that there might be any obligation on 
Palestinians to demonstrate (to Arab states as much as to Israel) that a future 
Democracy and Community Development.  Sari Nusseibah, President of Al Quds University in East 
Jerusalem, is another key voice of moderation.  See,e.g., Alan Cowell, End to Boycott of Israeli 
Universities Is Urged, N.Y.TIMES, May, 20, 2005, at A8; David Horovitz, A Glimmer of Hope, N.Y.TIMES, 
Mar. 10,2004 at A27.  Salem and Nusseibah differ from others, whose calls to integrate Jews into Arab 
society seem part of a strategy to advocate one multi-ethnic state, with Arabs in the majority, rather than 
two states.
473 See Zeev Schiff, The Hope that Turned False, HAARETZ, Dec. 9, 2005, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/655822.html (“In recent months, Israel has shown an openness that it 
has not displayed in the past:  the disengagement from Gaza and evacuation of the settlements, the opening 
of the Rafah passage between Gaza and Egypt, and the agreement allowing European Union monitors at the 
passage. … The response by the Palestinian gangs was to step up the Qassam rocket fire from norther 
Gaza…And who’s among the shooters?  Not only Islamic Jihad members, but also those belonging to Al 
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah, Abu Mazen’s organization.”). 
474 See Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections, Dec. 28, 2005, 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/middle_east/quartet-28dec2005.htm (“those who want to be part of the 
political process should not engage in armed group or militia activities, for there is a fundamental 
contradiction between such activities and the buldin g of a democratic state.”).
475 See PM’s Kadima to call for Demilitarized Palestinian state, HAARETZ DAILY, Nov. 28, 2005, 
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/651003.html; Uzi Arad, No Free Rides, Tangible Israeli Gains 
Required if Palestinian State is Established, Oct. 12, 2005, 
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Palestinian state would be a stable and responsible member of international 
society, accepting frontiers, regimes and rules of coexistence.”477  A recent 
suggestion by Amnon Rubinstein, the founder of Shinui – one of Israel’s 
most liberal parties and the present dean of one of Israel’s law schools – is 
that in the absence of a control of the violence, a new mandate be established 
for the West Bank under the trusteeship of either the European Union or 
Jordan (with Egypt having the trusteeship for the mandate over Gaza), with 
Palestinian sovereignty held in abeyance.478
The military, political and economic conditions interrelate.  Apart 
from the Arab-Jewish question, the lack of a monopoly of force in the 
governing authority threatens the very existence of that governing authority 
and the population it governs.479 A failure to rid the territory that becomes 
the Palestinian state of various forces “contributes to the anarchy in 
Palestinian society, to gangland rule”480, that is, it makes the creation of a 
civil state nearly impossible.481  As the London Telegraph recently 
editorialized, “Mahmoud Abbas’s chronic inability to contain Palestinian 
violence…has serious implications both for democracy in the areas under 
Palestinian authority and for relations with Israel.  A man … unable to keep 
his side of the bargain in the peace talks is failing those he governs…”482
Private investment necessary for economic revival will be difficult in the 
context of a general state of lawlessness.483  Of course, a corollary of 
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centralization of force and police-keeping in a Palestinian central 
government is that Jews also must be barred from militia-like activity and, 
for that matter, bearing unauthorized arms.  To some settlers, this might be 
anathema484, but that would be a condition to their remaining within a 
Palestinian state.
Another condition for the creation of a Palestinian state must be that it 
would be economically viable.  Otherwise, there can be little doubt that 
rather than constituting an answer to the scourge of terrorism, that state 
would become another and important base for it.  And, for the foreseeable 
future, there seems little doubt that to be economically viable, large numbers 
of Palestinians – arguably in excess of 100,000485 – would have to come into 
Israel to work every day, as they did prior to the first and second intifadas.486
The most recent World Bank report calculates unemployment in the West 
Bank at 28 percent, with approximately 57 percent of workers receiving 
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wages below the poverty line.487  An extraordinarily high unemployment 
rate raises serious questions about whether a state at peace with its neighbors 
can be created, especially one that lacks the oil resources of some of the 
other Arab nations.  One analyst at the World Bank, researching policy 
options for the West Bank as well as Gaza, after citing the fact that 
“Palestinians earn 91% more in Israel than in WBG [the West Bank and 
Gaza]”, concluded that “it is paramount for WBG [the West Bank and Gaza] 
to maintain access to Israel’s labor market, irrespective of the trade policy 
between Israel and WBG.”488  Recent economic studies of the Arab Middle 
East reveal very high unemployment rates throughout the Arab Middle 
East,489 making it unlikely that Palestinian excess labor could be absorbed by 
other Arab states, even assuming a willingness to do so. 
Aside from employment within Israel, open or relatively open borders 
are necessary for the export of goods from those industries that exist or are 
created within such a state.490 As the World Bank reports, “All Palestinian 
trade flows to or through Israel:  for the small trade-dependent Palestinian 
economy, therefore, the smooth operation of bilateral passages between 
Gaza, the West Bank and Israel is essential.”491  It may be possible to 
separate Israel and the Palestinians politically, but an economic separation 
will take many, many years.492
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In what way do these economic data bear on the question of whether 
it would be pragmatic to pursue the continuance option?  The only 
circumstances under which it would safe for Israel to accept huge numbers 
of Palestinians every day for employment and exports from industries within 
Palestine, without fear of terror, are the same circumstances under which it 
should be safe for Jews to live in a Palestinian state.  The exact nature of the 
guarantees of safety and rights need not be spelled out here, but the presence 
of Israel with its armed forces nearby ready and willing to protect 
endangered Israeli Jews living close by can be a spur to a truly open and 
therefore civil Palestinian society.  And if this kind of society is not what the 
Palestinians desire and, if permitted, design as their state, there is little 
reason to allow such an independent state.  As two observers of Palestinian 
society have written, “A peace agreement can only successfully end a 
conflict if it enjoys underlying, wide-ranging support from its respective 
populations.”493
Moreover, the question of whether Jews should be allowed to stay in 
their communities in land that is part of what they consider Eretz Y’srael, the 
land of Israel, even if not medinat Y’srael, should be one that such 
communities should be allowed to make.  Under the right circumstances, just 
as Israeli Jews live in New York, Los Angeles and Boston, these same Jews 
might well decide, for religious and other reasons, to remain.  It should be 
their choice.
V.  Conclusion
Two narratives indeed compete.494  According to one, the Palestinian 
Arabs were “there” first, the Jews came and, as imperialists or colonists, 
“took” the Arab land and displaced the native population.495  But blind 
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acceptance of this narrative, intentionally in the case of some 
commentators496, completely obliterates even the affirmative elements of the 
Jewish narrative that relate the several millennia connection between the 
land that Jews referred to as Eretz Y’srael (the Land of Israel) and the 
Romans renamed Palaestina in an effort to sever that connection. According 
to Ephraim Karsh, “[s]o successful has this misrepresentation of the 
historical truth [the narrative that portrays “Israel as an artificial neo-
crusading entity created by Western imperialism”] been that what began as 
propaganda has become conventional wisdom, with aggressors portrayed as 
hapless victims and victims as aggressors.”497  Yet the Palestinian narrative 
has now become dominant,498 and it is probably that narrative’s 
unquestioned and uncritical acceptance, rather than particular arguments or 
claims made and addressed above, that most accounts for the near universal 
acceptance of the proposition that, in any final peace deal between Israel and 
a Palestinian political authority (whether the Palestinian authority, or not) all 
Jewish settlements would have to be abandoned.  Indeed, if one adopts the 
first narrative, then acceptance of the Jewish State of Israel is simply a 
concession to a present geo-political reality rather than an acknowledgement 
that Jews, too, have rights. Conscious suspension rather than acceptance of 
the first narrative would allow for a more critical examination of the notion 
that Israeli Jewish settlements must be completely absent from the territory 
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to be included within a Palestinian state.  The challenge is to move beyond 
political narratives to deal with both the reality and desirability of Jewish 
settlements on the West Bank.  To what degree should the presence of 
Jewish settlements affect the final boundaries of Israel vis a vis a nascent 
Palestinian entity?  Must the Palestinian state be free of Jews?
The presence and location of Jewish settlements surely should and 
will influence the ultimate boundary between Israel and a Palestinian state.  
If the raison d’êtra of Israel is that it is a Jewish albeit democratic state, its 
Jewish majority should not be threatened by an Arab minority that has a 
realistic chance of becoming a majority.  Israel as a haven for Jews around 
the world will have disappeared.  The approximately 20 percent of Israel’s 
present population that is Arab does not so threaten Israel’s Jewish 
character.  Similarly, if the raison d’etre of a future Palestinian state is to 
provide a political sovereignty for Arabs who identify themselves as 
Palestinians, whether or not they reside in that state, Palestine’s Arab 
identity should not be threatened by a Jewish minority that would become a 
majority.  Two conclusions flow from this construct.
The first of these is that, indeed, some Jewish settlements like Maale 
Adumim that are contiguous or substantially contiguous to the 1967 borders 
of Israel will surely remain part of Israel in any final settlement499, with land 
swaps most likely in the area of the Negev that would broaden the waist of 
Gaza in return.  This was basically Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s offer at the 
2000 summit at Camp David with Chairman Yasir Arafat and in the 
negotiations that followed.  And, even some of the most pro-Palestinian 
Israeli politicians, like former Foreign Minister Yossi Beilen, now one of the 
heads of the Meretz party, acknowledge the need for border adjustments that 
would integrate into Israel settlements that border on the old armistice lines 
of Israel and house close to 80 percent of the approximately 250,000 settlors 
on the West Bank.  
The second conclusion is that the remainder of the settlements and the 
Jewish settlers there, including those in the Hebron area, need not be the 
obstacle to a peace settlement that is commonly portrayed.  Even if close to 
100,000 settlers remain (a rather high estimate, if major settlement blocs 
contiguous to the green line are incorporated into Israel in exchange for 
other Israeli land), that number would probably constitute no more than 2 
499
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percent of the population of such a state of Palestine and probably less.  The 
land area of those settlements would constitute considerably less than 2 
percent of the land under Palestinian sovereignty.  
Let us return to the African-American analogy tendered at the 
beginning of this article.  Most Americans, especially liberal Americans, 
would never think that the solution to conflict within a predominantly white-
ethnic neighborhood, whether Irish, Italian or other, if an African-American 
family moved into it would be to remove the African-American family.  
Rather, resources and substantial resources would be devoted to insuring that 
the neighbors respect the new inhabitants.  Instead of reiterations of the 
assumption that the settlements are an obstacle to peace, thought and 
resources should be devoted to a serious discussion of the context and 
conditions under which Jews might continue to live on the West Bank.  
While there is reason and justice for two states to co-exist west of the 
Jordan, there is no reason or justice why one of these two states must be free 
of Jews.
